China’s bid to host biodiversity secretariat undermines treaty credibility amid CCP’s UNCLOS violations

Lt. Col. Richard J. Connaroe II/U.S. Army 8th Theater Sustainment Command, National Security Law Team

China’s bid to host the secretariat of a new international treaty to protect marine biodiversity raises serious questions about the credibility of global oceanic governance, given Beijing’s pattern of selective compliance with international maritime law, especially the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

The landmark accord, which is a UNCLOS instrument and commonly known as both the Marine Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ) agreement and the High Seas Treaty, entered into force January 17, 2026. Sixty-one countries have ratified the treaty, which establishes a framework for the conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction. The BBNJ covers marine genetic resources, environmental impact assessments, capacity-building and marine technology transfers, with an emphasis on establishing large marine protected areas (MPA) crucial to achieving the global goal of safeguarding 30% of the ocean by 2030.

Beijing submitted its bid in January 2026 to host the secretariat for the High Seas Treaty in Xiamen, even as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) continues to disregard an international tribunal’s binding 2016 ruling invalidating China’s arbitrary and expansive territorial claims in the South China Sea. The Philippines brought that case under UNCLOS. As an UNCLOS signatory, China is legally bound by the decision, yet the CCP declared it “null and void.”

Belgium and Chile also are seeking to host the secretariat in Brussels and Valparaíso, respectively. A decision is expected in January 2027.

Hosting the secretariat would provide Beijing with opportunities to shape the treaty’s implementation and interpretation. The host nation gains practical advantages in influencing administrative priorities, facilitating access for its officials and experts, and framing discussions on application of treaty provisions. Given China’s track record of selective compliance with international maritime law, these advantages raise concern that China could advance interpretations favorable to Beijing’s fishing interests and geopolitical objectives — potentially undermining the treaty’s conservation goals.

Pattern of noncompliance

China’s systematic violations of existing maritime law raise serious questions about its suitability to host an institution designed to uphold international oceanic governance standards.

In addition to its continued disregard of the 2016 tribunal ruling, Beijing routinely interferes with the lawful civilian and military operations of neighboring states, including Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam, within their internationally recognized exclusive economic zones (EEZ). For example, China Coast Guard and maritime militia vessels ram, block and fire high-powered water cannons at Philippine fishing and government vessels. Such actions violate UNCLOS Article 56, which grants coastal states sovereign rights over natural resources within their EEZs.

Beijing’s construction and militarization of artificial features in the South China Sea further violates UNCLOS. Notably, Beijing’s dredging to create such features — including at Cuarteron, Fiery Cross, Gaven, Hughes, Johnson South, Mischief, Subi and, most recently, Antelope reefs — irreversibly damaged the marine environment in violation of UNCLOS Article 194, which obligates parties to protect the marine environment. Although Beijing has built military installations on these artificial features and claims sovereignty over surrounding waters, UNCLOS specifies that artificial features are not afforded a territorial sea or EEZ.

Beijing’s approach to fisheries management demonstrates additional disregard for international cooperation. China has the world’s largest distant-water fishing fleet of industrial vessels, operating outside their home nation’s EEZ and frequently engaging in illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing. Beijing also unilaterally imposes a fishing moratorium annually from May to September across swaths of the South China Sea, including areas within other countries’ EEZs, asserting authority it does not possess.

China similarly disregards bilateral maritime cooperation agreements. Chinese vessels routinely violate the 2000 Sino-Vietnamese agreement on fishery cooperation in the Gulf of Tonkin by operating in Vietnamese waters and sometimes attacking Vietnamese fishermen. Beijing also has deployed maritime structures in the Yellow Sea, also known as the West Sea, despite the 2001 Korea-China Fisheries Agreement, in which Beijing agreed to prohibit permanent installations in the zone, according to the United States-based Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Beijing’s resistance to establishing MPAs in sensitive areas further undermines its credibility. For instance, China consistently opposes or delays such proposals within the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources.

International concern

Regional stakeholders, including the Philippines and Vietnam, have expressed reservations about China’s secretariat bid and the potential for institutional capture. Indo-Pacific states also have signaled skepticism of Beijing’s purported commitment to oceanic governance through diplomatic protests at the U.N. regarding China’s maritime conduct.

Beijing’s aggressive enforcement of its unsupported territorial claims and routine encroachment into other nations’ EEZs contradict the BBNJ’s core tenets of responsible oceanic governance. China’s bid exemplifies a troubling contradiction: Beijing seeks leadership roles in international institutions while simultaneously refusing to abide by established legal norms those institutions are designed to uphold. The CCP’s continued rejection of the 2016 South China Sea ruling, interference with neighboring states’ EEZs, construction and militarization of artificial maritime features, destructive fishing practices, disregard for bilateral and multilateral agreements, and resistance to MPAs demonstrate a pattern incompatible with responsible oceanic stewardship.

The U.S. Army 8th Theater Sustainment Command, National Security Law Team, is based in Hawaii.