THE COMPETITION for Regional Advantage
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ABOUT THE COVER:
This illustration depicts the ongoing competition for prominence among countries across the Indo-Pacific.
Dear Readers,

Welcome to Indo-Pacific Defense FORUM’s first quarter edition of 2019, which highlights unity of effort among militaries, security forces, and related government and civilian organizations. Complex missions and multidimensional warfare, such as efforts to combat cyber threats, weapons of mass destruction, and transnational crime, remain priorities across the Indo-Pacific. Multinational engagements and exercises are critical to overcoming challenges ranging from information sharing to managing competing priorities and differences in doctrine and equipment, as well as differences in language and military lexicon.

Because militaries don’t always take the lead in stability or emergency operations, effective communication is key to achieving unity of effort and reducing duplication of work. This edition of FORUM delves into the intricacies of maintaining open lines of communication among civilian-military operators and understanding each other’s capabilities and limitations. Humanitarian agencies, for example, often respond first in many disaster relief situations. Their knowledge of different militaries’ capabilities results in saving as many lives as possible and relieving suffering as quickly as possible.

Our cover article features Australian National University’s Dr. David Brewster’s exploration of mounting competition between India and China for naval dominance in the Indian Ocean region.

North Korea continues to present unique opportunities as the United States and others pressure and work with leader Kim Jong Un to denuclearize. For this edition of FORUM, retired Republic of Korea Army Lt. Gen. In-Bum Chun addresses some of the complicated cultural challenges in the negotiations that the U.S., South Korea and others interested in a peaceful Korean Peninsula are conducting with the North.

This issue shines a light on Southeast Asia through a question-and-answer feature with Rear Adm. Nuttapong Ketsumboon, director of the Peace Operations Center for the Royal Thai Armed Forces. He spoke with FORUM about Thailand’s commitment to international peacekeeping following the multinational military exercise Cobra Gold 2018, which Thailand and the United States co-hosted.

Elsewhere, Russia’s presence has added to an already intense competition for power and persuasion in the Indo-Pacific. Russia’s impact can be felt as President Vladimir Putin extends his imprint on the region. This issue explores Russian exploits to grab power and highlights efforts already in place by the United States that could dampen Russia’s regional aspirations.

I hope this edition creates additional dialogue within ongoing discussions on unity of effort and sparks new ideas. As always, I welcome your comments and invite you to contact the FORUM staff at ipdf@ipdefenseforum.com with your perspectives.

All the best,

P. S. DAVIDSON
Admiral, U.S. Navy
Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command

Indo-Pacific Defense FORUM is a professional military magazine published quarterly by the commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command to provide an international forum for military personnel of the Indo-Pacific area. The opinions expressed in this magazine do not necessarily represent the policies or points of view of this command or any other agency of the U.S. government. All articles are written by FORUM staff unless otherwise noted. The secretary of defense has determined that the publication of this magazine is necessary for conducting public business as required by the Department of Defense.

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We want to hear from YOU!

Indo-Pacific Defense FORUM caters to military and security personnel in the Indo-Pacific region. A product of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, the quarterly magazine provides high-quality, in-depth content on topics that impact security efforts across the region — from counterterrorism efforts to international cooperation and natural disasters.

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**LT. GEN. CHUN IN-BUM** retired in July 2016 from the Army of the Republic of Korea (ROK), where he served as commander of the 27th Infantry Division and of the ROK’s Special Warfare Command. He also served as the deputy chief of staff for the ROK/U.S. Combined Forces Command and as the senior member of the United Nations Military Armistice Commission. He is a visiting fellow in foreign policy at the Center for East Asia Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. Among his awards, Chun received the Hwa-Rang Combat Medal and the U.S. Bronze Star for his service in Iraq in 2005. His research focuses on national security, the Korean Peninsula, terrorism and Northeast Asia.

*Featured on Page 14*

**DR. DAVID BREWSTER** is a senior research fellow with the National Security College, Australian National University, where he specializes in maritime security in the Indian Ocean and the Indo-Pacific. He also holds appointments as a fellow with the Royal Australian Navy Sea Power Centre and a distinguished research fellow with the Australia India Institute, University of Melbourne. His latest book, *India and China at Sea: Competition for Naval Dominance in the Indian Ocean*, addresses Indian and Chinese perspectives about their roles in the Indian Ocean and their evolving naval strategies toward each other.

*Featured on Page 24*

**GEN. PURMA CHANDRA THAPA** is chief of the Army staff of the Nepalese Army. During his 36 years of military service, he has held numerous command and staff appointments, including master general of ordnance at the Army headquarters and commander of the Valley Division. He has also served the United Nations in a range of positions, from platoon commander of the Nepalese contingent in Lebanon in 1986 to head of mission and force commander of the U.N. Disengagement Observer Force in Golan Heights from January 2015 to February 2016. A highly decorated general officer, he is a graduate of Tribhuvan University in Nepal, majoring in humanities and social sciences, and he also earned a Master of Philosophy in defense and strategic studies from the University of Madras in India.

*Featured on Page 42*

**LT. COL. ALEX CARTER** is an officer in the U. S. Army and a military fellow at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (DKI APCSS) in Honolulu, Hawaii.

**CAPT. DAMIAN FERNANDO** is an officer in the Sri Lanka Navy with combat experience fighting the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) at sea. Both writers are 2017 graduates of the DKI APCSS Comprehensive Security Responses to Terrorism course. In this issue, they share counterterrorism strategies and tactics from Sri Lanka’s civil war.

*Featured on Page 46*
Japan has signed a grant and loan agreement with Cambodia totaling more than U.S. $90 million, despite concerns from the international community over Prime Minister Hun Sen’s crackdown on government critics.

Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Taro Kono and Cambodian Foreign Affairs Minister Prak Sokhonn signed the U.S. $4.6 million grant and U.S. $86 million loan, for economic and electricity transmission projects, in Cambodia’s capital, Phnom Penh, in April 2018.

The main opposition Cambodia National Rescue Party was dissolved in November 2017 at the request of the government, prompting some Western countries to condemn the crackdown, cut aid and impose visa bans on some ruling party members.

Rights groups and members of the opposition have urged Tokyo to take a stronger stance against Hun Sen, but Japan has said it would continue to provide election support and would not interfere in what it said were Cambodia’s internal affairs.

Hun Sen praised Japan for its financial assistance but lashed out at critics. “While Japan, a friend, is providing assistance to Cambodia, some bad people can poison the news as bad as they did,” Hun Sen said on his Facebook page.

During a meeting with Hun Sen, Kono said Japan would help Cambodia to become an upper-middle-income country by 2030, said Hun Sen’s aide Eang Sophalleth.

In a recent statement, Kentaro Sonoura, advisor to Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, urged Cambodia’s political rivals to hold talks to end the political crisis.
Indonesia’s government has proposed a law to parliament to limit cash transactions to curb bribery and money laundering in Southeast Asia’s biggest economy, the head of the country’s anti-money laundering watchdog said.

The draft bill, which limits cash payments to a maximum 100 million rupiah (U.S. $7,260), was assigned as a legislative priority for 2018, said Ki Agus Badaruddin, head of the Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (PPATK).

“Basically, the assumption is this restriction will reduce the space in which one can commit acts of money laundering and terrorism financing,” Badaruddin said.

No details were given on how such a law could be enforced.

About 85 percent of transactions in Indonesia are in cash and are harder to track than those done through banks or other electronic channels, making it a challenge for the government to fight money laundering, corruption and terrorism financing.

The PPATK detected an increase in bribery with most transactions in cash, Badaruddin told reporters.

PPATK had found more than a thousand suspicious cash transactions that could be related to the upcoming regional elections across Indonesia, versus 53 suspicious transactions done electronically, Tempo.co reported.

Indonesia placed 96th out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s annual Corruption Perceptions Index in 2017, on par with Colombia and Thailand.

Indonesia’s central bank, which was involved in drafting the bill, thinks the proposed limit could improve law enforcement, then-Bank Indonesia Gov. Agus Martowardjojo said.

For people in charge of payment systems, “cash transaction is fine, but noncash is more efficient,” Martowardjojo said, adding that the plan also supports the bank’s campaign of getting more people to transact electronically. Reuters

India wants to encourage aircraft makers to manufacture in the country, starting with components and moving eventually to complete aircraft, Aviation Minister Suresh Prabhu said in June 2018.

In a series of messages on Twitter, Prabhu appealed to Airbus and Boeing Co. to participate in the push as part of the government’s flagship “Make In India” campaign, highlighting the growth potential of the booming market, which has been adding passengers and cutting fares.

India’s booming aviation market and economy needs more than 1,000 passenger planes and “many more” cargo planes, Prabhu wrote in the Twitter post.

Airbus said it expected Indian carriers to order 1,750 aircraft over 20 years. Boeing predicted up to 2,100 planes would be sold in the same period. Reuters
INDONESIA TOUGHENS TERROR LAW FOLLOWING ATTACKS USING CHILDREN

STORY AND PHOTOS BY THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
Indonesia’s parliament unanimously approved a tougher anti-terrorism law in late May 2018, lengthening detention periods and involving the military in counterterrorism operations. Legislators were spurred to action by bombings that involved children as perpetrators.

Rights groups had criticized some revisions as overly broad or vague and warned against rushing them into law. The scope for the military to become involved in counterterrorism operations is contentious because it backtracks on two decades of keeping Soldiers out of areas under civilian authority.

President Joko Widodo had threatened to impose the changes by special decree if parliament didn’t rapidly approve them. Changes were first proposed after a January 2016 suicide bombing and gun attack in Jakarta but languished in the legislature.

By the end of May 2018, police had killed 14 suspected Islamic militants and arrested 60 since the suicide bombings that took place earlier in the month in Indonesia’s second-largest city, Surabaya. Radicalized families, accompanied by children as young as 7, carried out those attacks.

The suicide bombings, which horrified Muslim-majority Indonesia, killed 26 people, including 13 members of the families that conducted them. The key perpetrator was the leader of the Surabaya cell of an Indonesian militant network that professes loyalty to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

The new law triples the maximum detention period without charge for suspected militants to 21 days and roughly doubles the entire permissible detention period from arrest to trial to more than two years.

Several articles address gaps in the original law from 2003, giving greater legal basis to prosecute individuals such as radical clerics who inspire attacks or Indonesians who traveled abroad to join ISIS.

The definition of terrorist acts and threats was expanded to include motives of ideology, politics and security disruption. Some lawmakers said that would prevent the law from being abused.

Military involvement in counterterrorism operations will be defined later by presidential regulation.

Muhammad Syafi’i, chairman of the parliamentary committee that reviewed the new law, said inclusion of the military aims to improve police capabilities in cracking down on extremism and radical networks in Indonesia.

Indonesia became a democracy after the ouster of dictator Suharto in 1998 and the role of the military, which had enjoyed sweeping powers, was reduced to national defense.

Indonesia’s counterterrorism operations are now led by an elite police squad, Densus 88, set up following the 2002 Bali nightclub bombings that killed 202 people, mostly foreigners. In the past two years, the squad says it has thwarted as many as 23 terror plots and arrested more than 360 suspected militants.

LEFT: Officers of the Indonesian National Police counterterrorism unit Special Detachment 88, known as Densus 88, secure a suspected militant’s hideout after a raid in Surabaya, East Java.

A police bomb squad inspects wreckage of motorcycles at the site of an explosion outside a church in Surabaya.
The Indo-Pacific’s human trafficking record contains highs and lows. While home to some of the worst offenders — including North Korea and Burma — the region also has success stories with several countries implementing recent laws and programs to combat these horrific crimes.

“Human trafficking is a global phenomenon to which no country is immune,” according to the U.S. Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report 2018. “Victims of modern slavery are exploited in every region of the world, compelled into service for labor or commercial sex in the real world of industry and on the pages of the internet. The enormity of the problem necessitates the development of a unified, comprehensive response from world leaders to collectively address a crime that defies all borders.”

Data fluctuate year to year due to the hidden nature of trafficking crimes, shifts in government efforts and lack of uniformity in reporting structures. Most figures, however, suggest that 36 million people worldwide are victims of human trafficking. Nearly two-thirds of them have ties to the Indo-Pacific region.

“Human trafficking is one of the most tragic human rights issues of our time,” Rex Tillerson, then-U.S. secretary of state, said in a letter marking the release of the Trafficking in Persons Report 2017. “It splinters families, distorts global markets, undermines the rule of law, and spurs other transnational criminal activity. It threatens public safety and national security. But worst of all, the crime robs human beings of their freedom and their dignity. That’s why we must pursue an end to the scourge of human trafficking.”

Multilateral and regional organizations have worked to foster a consensus to create common goals, commitments and norms to combat trafficking. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), for example, has collaborated to standardize research and data collection methods at the regional and subregional levels, with the ASEAN Convention Against Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children becoming legally enforceable in March 2017.

The ASEAN convention provides for specific actions within member states’ domestic laws and policies, as well as relevant international obligations, to address regional challenges in the prevention of human trafficking, protection of victims; law enforcement and prosecution of human trafficking crimes; and regional and international cooperation and coordination.

Specifically, the plan calls for awareness campaigns to educate all levels of society on trafficking; capacity building of law enforcement and other relevant officials needed to prevent trafficking; and enhanced cross-border cooperation and sharing of intelligence and exchange of information to disrupt trafficking operations, among other things.

“While some ASEAN member states are considered countries of destination, others are considered countries of origin and transit,” according to the ASEAN Plan of Action Against Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children. “Depending on whether they are origin, transit or destination countries, the challenges, national priorities and strategies of ASEAN member states are different. Nonetheless, they share a common interest and commitment in preventing and combatting trafficking in persons.”

BE MY PROTECTOR

Two Malaysian nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) launched a first-of-its-kind mobile application in April 2018 that’s designed to report suspected cases of human trafficking.

Called “Be My Protector,” the application allows either a victim or any individual who has identified a potential trafficking victim to upload photographs, describe the situation and define the severity. Tenaganita and Change Your World, the two NGOs behind the application, conduct an initial investigation, then forward details to police and other authorities as necessary. The NGO investigation would begin within 24 hours of receiving a complaint. The application developers expected 100,000 downloads by the end of 2018 and 1 million downloads by 2023.

Malaysian government officials, meanwhile, have increased prosecution of suspected traffickers during the past few years. In 2017, authorities prosecuted 282 human trafficking cases, compared with 131 in 2016 and 26 in 2015, according to Benar News.

In 2017, Malaysia was upgraded to Tier 2 due to the Malaysian government demonstrating increasing efforts to curb trafficking, compared with the previous year’s reporting period. In the 2018 report, however, Malaysia was slightly downgraded to a Tier 2 Watch List. Both reports urged authorities to do more to identify
trafficking victims and protect them. “It is a huge problem because we have a lot of migrant workers here, and Malaysia will be measured globally by how we treat the victims of human trafficking,” said Hannah Yeoh, former speaker of the Selangor State Legislative Assembly, Benar reported.

Government officials have used that spotlight to continue striving for better. Malaysian authorities say they expect to be in full compliance with the United States’ minimal trafficking standards by 2020.

**FIGHTING ORPHANAGE TOURISM**

Southeast Asian children are often stripped from their homes and placed in orphanages as part of a scheme to generate financial donations. Such scams are known as “orphanage tourism,” and countries like Australia say enough is enough.

“We have created the problem for the region, so now we have to work with other countries to fix it,” said Australian Sen. Linda Reynolds. “We need to be part of the solution, and we are not waiting to act.”

These child victims are often given up by their families and become tourist attractions for orphanages that use them in a scam to beg for money and other support. Australians have historically been among the top donors for such orphanages in the region, according to Reuters.

“Our volunteers — many young people and students — are unwittingly taking part in human trafficking ... paying up to AUS $2,000 to do so,” said then Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop. “We don’t want to add to the misery of children in the region. We need to address this scourge.”

Australia launched a “Smart Volunteering” campaign to discourage citizens from taking part in short-term, unskilled volunteering projects in overseas orphanages.

Cambodia has a growing number of orphanages, Reuters reported. That increase has been spurred by appeals from Australians and others who assume they’re doing a good deed, when they’re really being deceived.

About three out of four children living in an orphanage in Cambodia have at least one parent, according to
was introduced to the Australian Parliament on June 28, 2018. If passed, this bill would increase reporting on modern slavery practices criminalized under Commonwealth law but does not provide for financial penalties for non-reporting.

**COLLABORATE TO ELIMINATE**

Authorities consider the Philippine city of Angeles a trafficking hot spot in Southeast Asia. Police, prosecutors, other government agencies and NGOs have joined forces to educate the population to prevent them from being trafficked and to help identify suspected victims.

“We need to be proactive and focus on prevention to break the cycle of trafficking,” said Cecilia Flores-Oebanda, founder and head of the Manila-based anti-trafficking charity Visayan Forum Foundation, according Reuters. “We see a lot of raids and rescues ... but the culture has not changed, and people need to be aware of the crime.”

The Philippines is the only Indo-Pacific nation to receive the U.S. government’s Trafficking in Persons Report’s top ranking for two consecutive years for its efforts to combat human trafficking. Yet, nearly 400,000 people — or 1 in 250 of the population — are victims of modern slavery, according to the 2016 Global Slavery Index by the Walk Free Foundation.

One segment of the trafficking conversation offering help is the victims themselves.

Some survivors already working with the Salvation Army’s anti-trafficking campaign say receiving education, training and jobs can help them rebuild their lives and set an example for others.

“Survivor leaders can give hope to those starting their journeys in freedom, offering an example of what is possible in the future,” Dang, a survivor-turned-activist who was sold for sex during childhood, told Reuters.

India has provided jobs for making clothes and furniture to survivors. The United States offers catering and coding jobs. Worldwide, countries have increasingly sought ways to put slavery survivors to work as they start their new lives.

It’s the connections among victims, governments, NGOs and communities themselves that must continually be fostered to break the cycle.

“In this age of interconnected markets, mobile workforces, and digital communication, human traffickers are developing newer and more sophisticated ways to exploit their victims. Traffickers are particularly skilled at identifying and cultivating vulnerability in those they exploit, taking advantage of difficult circumstances and instability, and exploiting government policies and activities in unexpected ways,” the Trafficking in Persons Report 2018 concluded. “No matter how effective national policies are in fulfilling their intended goals, governments should continuously examine and test their policies to ensure they do not enable traffickers or otherwise contribute to human trafficking.”

Without such measures, human trafficking will continue to flourish, the report said. “Some governments’ pursuit of national security and regional stability may also indirectly enable human trafficking. At times, government support for and operational coordination with armed services and groups can unintentionally empower them to exploit people through forcible recruitment into armed groups, recruitment and use of children, or sexual exploitation,” the U.S. Department of State report said.

“Governments that support militaries and armed groups should ensure they understand the full scope of such organizations’ activities and how they put government resources to action. Governments should encourage the public to report abuses, establish transparent processes by which to review accusations, and take appropriate action including to hold perpetrators accountable and ultimately to end support and coordination with such groups.”
Understanding NORTH KOREA
Another long challenge shared by the Indo-Pacific region

LT. GEN. (RET.) CHUN IN-BUM/REPUBLIC OF KOREA ARMY

A long and challenging negotiation process is ahead for the United States and North Korea. The focus is North Korea’s illicit nuclear weapons capability as well as other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means. To understand the full scale of challenges that faces any nation that must work with North Korea, one must understand North Korea and its military capabilities.

Although North Korea’s conventional forces operate obsolete tanks and aircraft with limited proficiency, its Korean People’s Army is still invested in areas that make it a force to be reckoned with. First, in addition to maintaining a garrison nation and a standing army of over 1 million troops, North Korea maintains a fitter and better-equipped ground force that it views as special forces. North Korea’s special forces are inferior in equipment and training compared to most modern militaries, but they are motivated and physically fit. The North Koreans have also armed themselves with more than 10,000 man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS), which are shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles that are typically guided weapons and a threat to low-flying aircraft, especially helicopters. Many of the MANPADS are mounted on armored personnel carriers, tanks and self-propelled artillery. The large number of MANPADS-equipped vehicles, combined with North Korea’s wide variety of conventional anti-aircraft artillery, would make rotary aircraft operations difficult and dangerous, especially during daytime.

Second, North Korea has been investing in GPS-jamming capabilities and the use of cheap disposable drones. The potential consequence would be disruption of precision munitions from air, sea and land platforms and the likely threat of drone reconnaissance, jamming and weapons delivery to include biological and chemical agents. Up to this point, South Korea has had difficulty detecting these drones, let alone shooting them down. This will be another form of North Korean capability that is hard to react to not only because of a lack of counter capability but also because of the potential for misunderstanding and escalation.

The third and alarming threat is North Korea’s cyber capability. North Korea is a cyber superpower. North Korea’s cyber capability stems from its ability to recruit from its entire population. Talented and gifted people...
can be directed to work as cyber warriors without factoring any personal considerations. Because the North Korean government operates without any moral or legal inhibitions, it can experiment with and execute operations that provide its cyber operators more experience and expertise. North Korea’s cyber recruitment and training programs have been going on for at least 20 years. Security analysts have verified that North Korea is involved in international cyber theft activities and capable of cyber intimidation, sabotage and direct attacks on infrastructure.

**Subjugation from birth**

Finally, there is an aspect of North Korea that is disturbing: Deeply ingrained in its culture is the practice of discriminating against people on the basis of their origin of birth. This is more than a social issue. North Korean society uses Songbun, a caste system, to maintain control over its people. The oppressive system proved effective for the regime, withstanding the famines in the 1990s.

The North Korean leadership divides its population essentially from birth into three large categories and now has 45 subcategories of the population. At the top is the “core” of North Korean society. This group contains descendants of revolutionaries, those who were born from parents who fought in the wars against the Japanese and Americans, Communist Party members, elites in the military and so forth. Membership in the core is a birthright, not something someone attains through work and endeavor. Approximately 28 percent of the North Korean population falls under this category, or about 6 million to 7 million people. Nearly half this number are privileged to live in Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea.

The second category is the “base” or “wavering” class. These are descendants of merchants, salesmen, Chinese-Koreans and Japanese-Koreans, draftdodgers
MILITARY BALANCE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

Comparison of Major Hardware

- **Armored personnel carriers**
  - North Korea: 2,500
  - South Korea: 3,600

- **Tanks**
  - North Korea: 2,418
  - South Korea: 4,000

- **Artillery and air defense guns**
  - North Korea: 22,100
  - South Korea: 11,368

- **Active troops**
  - North Korea: 0.5 MILLION
  - South Korea: 545

- **Combat aircraft**
  - North Korea: 556
  - South Korea: 525

- **Helicopters**
  - North Korea: 286
  - South Korea: 602

- **Principal combat vessels**
  - North Korea: 3
  - South Korea: 383

- **Coast, patrol vessels**
  - North Korea: 116
  - South Korea: 2,672

- **Landing craft, hovercraft**
  - North Korea: 70
  - South Korea: 23

- **Submarines**
  - North Korea: 23
  - South Korea: 70

**Nuclear capability**
- Conducted 6 nuclear tests, most recent September 2017

**Chemical weapons**
- 2,500-5,000 ton stockpile

**Hwasong 15**
- Intercontinental ballistic missile tested, November 2017

**Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)**
- Anti-missile system deployed in March 2017

**U.S. Support to South Korea**

- **Hardware**
  - F-22 fighter jet
  - B-2 stealth bomber (Nuclear capable)
  - B-52 bomber (Nuclear capable)

- **Personnel**
  - 28,500 troops stationed in South Korea

Sources:
- Military Balance 2017, International Institute For Strategic Studies; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute; The Changing Military Balance In The Koreas And Northeast Asia, Center For Security And International Studies; Agence France-Presse
A DECADE OF NORTH KOREA’S CYBER CRIMES

Criminal investigators have tied a host of cyber attacks worldwide to North Korea hackers, sponsored by the regime. Sometimes the hackers steal money and information; other attacks aim to disable infrastructure such as utility systems. Still others target perceived detractors of Kim Jong Un.

2009

2010-2014
75,472 cyber attacks against South Korean government, state agencies.

2011

South Korean farm co-op Nonghyup targeted, crippling bank, denying customers access to funds for more than a week.

2012

Major South Korean banks, broadcasters shut down as North Korean news agency KNCA relayed regime’s message pledging to destroy the South’s government.

2013

Infiltrated Sony Picture Entertainment’s networks, leaked info online to counter release of “The Interview,” a satire film about journalists killing Kim Jong Un.

2014

· Regime actors distribute WannaCry ransomware including EternalBlue by the Shadow Brokers that paralyzed companies around the globe.
· U.S. electricity companies attacked, reports firm FireEye.
· Covertile hackers, connected to North Korea, hit consumer energy organizations in the U.S., Europe and East Asia.

2015

2016

· Classified information stolen from South Korea’s military command using malware-contaminated intranet server.
· U.S. $81 million stolen from the Central Bank of Bangladesh’s Federal Reserve account via malware. Also hit banks in the Philippines, Vietnam.

2017

· Regime actors distribute WannaCry ransomware including EternalBlue by the Shadow Brokers that paralyzed companies around the globe.
· Cryptojacking malware unleashed to mine cryptocurrency worldwide. Illegal proceeds funneled to Kim Il Sung University.
· Malware-laden Android apps inserted on Google Play aimed at North Korean defectors, journalists covering the regime.
· Attempt to disrupt IT systems at Metrolink, Ontario, Canada’s transportation agency.

2018

· Millions of dollars stolen from cryptocurrency exchanges.
· Cryptojacking malware unleashed to mine cryptocurrency worldwide. Illegal proceeds funneled to Kim Il Sung University.
· Malware-laden Android apps inserted on Google Play aimed at North Korean defectors, journalists covering the regime.
· Attempt to disrupt IT systems at Metrolink, Ontario, Canada’s transportation agency.

Sources: ZDNet; International Institute for Strategic Studies report, “The conventional military balance on the Korean Peninsula,” 2018
and practitioners of superstition for the most part. About 45 percent of the North Korean population falls under this category. This group comprises about 14 million to 15 million North Koreans. They are the laborers and workers who maintain the system for the core to exist and function.

The third category is the “complex” or “hostile” category. These are descendants of landlords, clergy, anti-party forces, defectors’ family members and so on. Approximately 27 percent of the population falls under this category, or about 6 million people. They are the outcasts who are forced to work in antiquated mines and other hard and hazardous working areas. About 150,000 to 200,000 people from this category reside in concentration camps, analysts estimate.

The government’s system essentially categorizes every resident based on family line to determine how politically risky they may be. Almost every aspect of North Koreans’ lives from profession and education to how much food they receive is determined by their classification. For example, during the famine of the 1990s and other chronic food shortages, the regime cut off food to politically undesirable populations, such as those in the northeast. As much as 30 percent of the people in North Hamgyong province died during the worst famine in the 1990s, according to analysts. A majority, or roughly 60 percent, of North Korean refugees come from this province.

The social system is reinforced with heavy indoctrination. A North Korean child goes to preschool, and the first thing that he or she learns is that the “great” leader Kim Il Sung single-handedly defeated the Japanese and brought freedom to the Korean people. Another popular theme is that all problems stem from the United States and its puppets in South Korea. Moreover, Juche, or self-reliance, is the only path that the Korean people should follow under the leadership of the Kim family.

These methods are supported by a surveillance system and network of spies and informants that make it impossible for anyone to express any doubt in the North Korean political system. Public executions by firing squad, hanging and even burning at the stake are common.

**Social vulnerabilities**

North Korea is a tough nut to crack, but its rigid social restrictions might be the weakest link — and the most attackable — in North Korea. The North Korean leadership is probably more concerned with the threat of information operations armed with truth about freedom and democracy than any kiloton bomb or even the threat of a nuclear attack.

In negotiations with North Korea, a look into some aspects of the prevailing conventional wisdom might be useful. Hundreds of years of war in Northeast Asia have taught people that there are no morals or honor in war. To cheat, lie, fool and trick the enemy is just another tool in the bag.

When Tokugawa Ieyasu (1543-1616) was fighting over control of Japan, Toyotomi Hideyori, the son of Toyotomi Hideyoshi who first united Japan, held Osaka castle, which was thought to be an impregnable fortress. Ieyasu sent an emissary to Hideyori and offered peace. Hideyori, weary of war, accepted, and Ieyasu’s men were allowed to fill in the moat. Ieyasu’s men attacked. Hideyori and his mother committed suicide.

Later, Ieyasu replied to criticism of his betrayal of his word of good faith. Ieyasu said: “Any general foolish enough to trust the word of one’s enemy deserves death.” Ieyasu was the first shogun of Japan, and his family ruled for 260 years. □
Fluctuations in geopolitical ties and strategic partnerships are nothing new to the Indo-Pacific, and in 2018, Russia manoeuvred to exploit such wavering alliances to wield regional influence.

While some countries have welcomed Russia’s appetite for more sway, others warn their added competition could erode military and economic stability.

“Greater power competition — not terrorism — is now the primary focus of the U.S. national strategy,” then-U.S. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis said in January 2018, his remarks directly aimed at Russia’s increased aggressiveness in the Indo-Pacific, The Associated Press reported.

The “free and open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) strategy initiated by the United States could complicate Russia’s attempt to shape the region by ensuring international norms and the rules-based order are followed.

Strong alliances and partnerships create the foundation of the U.S. security strategy. Alliances underpin the regional stability that has allowed the Indo-Pacific region to flourish economically and politically.

The United States has a vested interest in fostering relationships that maintain peace and propel growth.

For its part, the U.S. continues to form networks of partnerships, including trilateral and quadrilateral mechanisms on mutual interests, to advance shared economic, security and governance goals in the region.

These are the kinds of values, however, that often appear incompatible with the modus operandi of Moscow and Beijing.

“China and Russia challenge American power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity,” according to the U.S. National Security Strategy. “They are determined to make economies less free and less fair, to grow their militaries and to control information and data to repress their societies and expand their influence.”

SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES

Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte continues to expand his country’s ties to other countries. While doing so, Duterte courted Russia, inviting it to become the Philippines’ new ally and protector. Russia’s ambassador to the Philippines, Igor Anatolyevich Chovaev, said in January 2018 that Moscow stood ready to supply the Philippines with sophisticated weapons as they worked toward becoming close friends.

“We welcome our Russian friends. Any time you want to dock here for anything, for play, [to] replenish supplies or maybe [as] our ally to protect us,” Duterte told Rear Adm. Eduard Mikhailov, head of a Russian Navy Pacific Fleet flotilla, in January 2018, according to the Philippines Lifestyle News website.

In addition to the Philippines, Russia is also selling arms to Southeast Asian countries Indonesia and Burma, the Dhaka Tribune newspaper reported in April 2018.

Vladimir Putin unsurprisingly won re-election in March 2018, giving him a fourth term as Russian
president and keeping him in office until 2024. Confirmation of his continued leadership could be a contributing factor to Russia’s increasingly assertive reach into the Indo-Pacific.

“President Vladimir Putin’s actions in the recent past are clearly indicating that he not only has a growing appetite for power beyond Russia’s borders, but also feels that Russia can fill the void in parts of the world where the U.S. once wielded unipolar influence,” according to the Dhaka Tribune.

Another Southeast Asian nation that wants more Russian participation is Vietnam — which also continues to nourish its relationships with the U.S. and the PRC.

“The party, state, national assembly, government and people of Vietnam have greatly treasured the traditional friendship and efficient cooperation with Russia and have always attached importance to developing the comprehensive strategic partnership with the country — regarding it as one of top priorities in their foreign policy,” General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam Nguyen Phu Trong said in January 2018, according to Viet Nam News.

The defense relationship between Russia and Vietnam dates to the beginning of the Cold War, predating the Vietnam War. A recently updated defense agreement between the pair outlines activities through 2020 that include cooperative endeavors, meetings and drills (though few public details have been released). The Russian Navy Command has suggested re-launching a marine logistics base for Russian warships, saying that the main point of the base would be to provide support for Russian vessels combating piracy in the Indian and Pacific oceans.

“Russia and Vietnam share views on the problems of the world order and call for respecting the international law, the central role of the United Nations, a collective approach to solving any issues and solely peaceful methods of settling any disputes,” Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said in March 2018 following talks with his Vietnamese counterpart, Pham Binh Minh, according to the Russian News Agency.

Russia and Vietnam seek to set up “such an architecture of cooperation which would ensure sustainable development and meet interests of security” of all countries of the Indo-Pacific, Lavrov said. “Military and military-technical cooperation between Russia and Vietnam fully meets these criteria.”

UNRESOLVED CONFLICT

Ongoing disputes, however, and Russia’s own aggressive activities may stymie Moscow’s ambitions to assert influence in the broader region.

Russia and Japan, for example, continue to clash over
a volcanic archipelago stretching 1,300 kilometers from Hokkaido, Japan, to Kamchatka, Russia. Both nations claim land masses within the Kuril Islands, where Russia wants control of an airstrip on the island of Iturup, known as Etorofu by Japan.

More than 2,500 Russian troops asserted dominance during drills in the Kuril Islands in April 2018, prompting Japan to lodge an official diplomatic complaint.

“Boosting the military presence on the four islands contradicts Japan’s position,” Japanese government spokesman Yoshihide Suga said, according to news.com.au.

Soviet troops seized the island region in 1945 after Japan agreed to terms of the Potsdam Declaration, which dictated Japan’s World War II surrender. The territorial dispute has prevented Japan and Russia from concluding a post-World War II peace treaty.

Tanks, artillery units and ships from Russia’s Pacific Fleet participated in the exercise, which included live-fire training, according to Japanese broadcaster NHK World.

Russia announced in January 2018 that it intends to base military aircraft in the Kuril Islands. That announcement came amid diplomatic talks with Japan to ratify the official peace treaty ending World War II. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe accused Russia of negotiating in bad faith and threatened to withdraw from the talks.

“Building a relationship of mutual trust and understanding between the peoples of the two nations is an important step toward concluding a peace treaty,” Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Kono said in March 2018 following a meeting with his Russian counterpart, according to The Japan Times newspaper.

Deeper in the Pacific, Russia has ruffled Australia’s feathers by sending strategic bombers to conduct exercises in neutral waters off Indonesia.

“It’s a reminder that Russia is here and wants to be a player in Pacific security and will use military force to demonstrate that,” said Peter Jennings of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, according to The Guardian newspaper.

The Australian Department of Defence said “there was a brief period of increased readiness” in December 2017 when the Russian bombers conducted patrols after taking off from Indonesia’s Biak airfield, The Guardian reported.

Jennings said the Australian Defence Force may have had concerns about Russia conducting an intelligence-gathering operation “because they wouldn’t come this far south without wanting to look at the one significant Allied presence in this part of the world,” he said, according to The Guardian.

The newspaper also listed a series of demonstrations by Russia to promote influence in the region. In 2016, Russia sent a secret shipment of 20 containers of weapons and military hardware to Fiji, followed by Russian personnel to provide weapons training; in 2014, Russia incited uneasiness by moving its naval vessels north of Australia days before the G20 Summit in Brisbane as tensions between Moscow and Canberra ran high, according to The Guardian.

Tensions between Russia and Australia prompted the Australian government in March 2018 to warn citizens of anti-Western sentiment and harassment they could face should they travel to Russia.

“While the Australian government is not aware of any increased difficulties for Australians traveling in Russia at this time, you should follow the security and political situation closely and keep up to date with this travel advice,” the Australia Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade said in a statement. “Remain vigilant, avoid any protests or demonstrations and avoid commenting publicly on political developments.”

The following month in April, as many as 400 Australian businesses became victims of a cyber attack. Australia, Britain and the United States accused Russian government-backed hackers of infecting computer routers around the world in a cyber-espionage campaign targeting government agencies, businesses and critical infrastructure operators.

“We know that they were behind these attacks and that’s a very important escalation,” Australian Cyber Security Minister Angus Taylor told the Australian Broadcasting Corp. “The most important thing at this point is to attribute it. To say we know where this came from, we are working with our partners ... and it’s unacceptable behavior.”
INDIA AND CHINA FACE OFF
India and China are fast emerging as major powers of the Indo-Pacific. As their wealth, power and interests expand, they are increasingly coming into contact with each other, including in the maritime domain. How these countries get along could be one of the key strategic challenges for the Indo-Pacific in the 21st century.

The security relationship between India and China is complex. They have many unresolved issues between them. Not least is China’s growing presence in South Asia and elsewhere in the Indian Ocean region (IOR). For its part, New Delhi perceives China to be shaping the strategic environment and forming alignments that could be used against India. This shows some big differences in how India and China understand their status and roles in the region.

**CHINA’S STRATEGIC IMPERATIVES**

China’s growing interests in the IOR likely will drive ever-greater military presence in coming years. China’s most important interest is the protection of its trading routes over which energy is carried from the Middle East and Africa. Beijing is keenly aware that these sea lines are vulnerable to threats from state and nonstate adversaries, especially at the narrow chokepoints of the Strait of Hormuz and the Malacca Strait.

China, however, has many other interests in the IOR, which may well end up becoming even more important drivers of China’s growing military presence. These include the need to provide security for Chinese people and investments in unstable countries and having the capability to evacuate Chinese nationals in response to local crises. Other interests include the need to support United Nations peacekeeping operations, conducting humanitarian aid and disaster relief/search and rescue operations and, potentially, the desire to conduct interventions against violent extremists or to support local partners. In addition, the Chinese government is increasingly subject to domestic political pressures that may force it to respond to an event when it may not have otherwise done.

All these factors are leading China to develop a military presence in the IOR. This began with a semi-permanent naval presence in the Arabian Sea in 2008, proceeding more recently to the establishment of China’s first overseas military base in Djibouti. To be sure, China’s capabilities in the region are primarily focused on peacetime military operations, but this will likely evolve over time toward greater sea denial and even sea control capabilities.

Much of the public focus has been on the Chinese navy, which is moving to a two-ocean strategy that incorporates the Indian Ocean as a normal part of China’s military reach. Furthermore, the presence of Chinese land forces in the region is likely to grow, including the People’s Liberation Army’s Marine Corps, which is now being expanded to 100,000 troops. As it did in Africa, Beijing may also rely heavily on Chinese private security contractors for local security tasks.

China’s growing military presence will require expanded basing in the region, which likely includes naval and air bases in Pakistan and probably elsewhere in the IOR, such as East Africa and the eastern Indian Ocean.

The nature of many of China’s relationships in the IOR is changing, including the developing semi-military alliances, building dual-use port facilities for possible use by the Chinese navy, and increasing Chinese arms transfers into the region.

**INDIA’S RESPONSE TO CHINA**

China’s growing presence in the IOR is provoking a sharp reaction from India. India has long harbored ambitions to be recognized as a leading power with special security responsibilities in the region. Many in New Delhi consider India the natural leader of the Indian Ocean, at least in the long term.

India’s colonial history has led to a strong aversion to the presence of other major powers in the IOR. In the 1970s and 1980s, these concerns were directed at the U.S. Navy, but they are now very much directed at China.

India’s ambitions in the Indian Ocean are not just defensive. They also reflect broader aspirations to be acknowledged as a major regional power, and potentially a great power that sits at the world’s top table.
The Sino-Indian dynamic in the Indian Ocean is just one part of a multifaceted relationship that combines elements of cooperation, coexistence and competition. China’s presence in South Asia and the broader IOR is viewed with suspicion and anxiety. China’s growing relationships with countries in the region are generally not perceived in New Delhi as being a legitimate reflection of Chinese interests, but as being directed against India, to encircle it or keep it off balance.

India’s claims to a special regional security role and its views on the legitimacy of China’s presence create fertile conditions for competition between the two countries. This is exacerbated by another factor: India’s desire to maintain China’s strategic vulnerability in the Indian Ocean.

In most dimensions of the strategic relationship between the two countries — including nuclear weapons, the conventional military balance in the Himalayas or economic power — India is at a disadvantage. The geography of the Indian Ocean, however, is the one area in which India holds a clear military advantage over China.

India’s strategy of building its naval capabilities near Indian Ocean chokepoints involves an implicit threat of blocking China’s trading routes. Beijing is concerned that, in the event of a conflict between the two states on their shared border, India might escalate the conflict to the Indian Ocean.
For these reasons, China’s projection of naval power into the Indian Ocean has become the Indian Navy’s principal long-term source of concern and is now an important driver of India’s growing security relationship with the United States and others. India sees the need to work with Washington and others, such as Japan, Australia and France, to balance or delay the growth of China’s presence in the Indian Ocean. India is actively building its own network of regional security relationships and basing facilities across the Indian Ocean, including with partners, such as Oman and Indonesia.

CHINESE PERSPECTIVES ON INDIA’S ROLE

Beijing takes quite a different view from New Delhi on the legitimacy of China’s presence in the IOR. For a start, many Chinese strategists believe that India lacks comprehensive national power and tend to give it a status below other powers such as Russia or Japan. This may sometimes make China less respectful toward India compared with other powers.

There is also a pronounced asymmetry in threat perceptions: India tends to regard China as a significant threat, whereas China is much more focused on the United States.

Beijing also strongly resists any suggestion that India has a right to restrict China’s relationships in the IOR or that India should be recognized as having a sphere of influence in the region. China takes the view that it is free to enter relationships as it chooses with India’s neighbors, such as Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Nepal.

These differences in perceptions mean that Beijing pays little heed to Indian sensitivities about China’s relationships in the region. For example, China’s growing military and economic links with Pakistan are brushed off as unimportant because they are “not directed at India.” None of this is of any reassurance to India.

Some argue that China suffers from strategic “blind spots” in understanding the perspectives of its neighbors, particularly with India. Strong Chinese beliefs about their country’s history may make it difficult for Chinese to put themselves in their neighbor’s shoes and reassure them about China’s growing power. These beliefs may also tend to make China dismissive of Indian fears.

This negative dynamic is exacerbated by China’s approach toward its One Belt, One Road (OBOR) policy in which China is building a series of infrastructure projects throughout the IOR, many of them in India’s immediate neighborhood. Beijing claims these initiatives are purely economic and takes the position that it does not require India as a partner in the region. Beijing believes it need not explain its regional initiatives to India nor ask for India’s cooperation.

This approach has only fueled Indian suspicions about the OBOR. There is currently little indication that India is interested in buying into the OBOR in any significant way. Overall, there seems to be little chance that India will be a willing partner with China in the IOR and much more likely that it will oppose many Chinese initiatives.

WHAT DOES THIS MEAN FOR THE REGION?

Competition between India and China is becoming an increasing factor in regional political dynamics in South Asian countries such as Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh as well as several island states in the Indian Ocean, such as the Maldives.

Some countries are trying to capitalize on competition to extract economic, political and military benefits from one or both sides by playing them off against each other to attract more investment in major infrastructure projects. While this can lead to benefits, for small countries it is also a potentially dangerous game to play.

Competition between China and India can lead to political instability. Over the past few years, controversies over major Chinese infrastructure projects have contributed to changes in government in Burma and Sri Lanka. There will likely be more jostling for influence throughout the region in coming years. The political crisis that occurred in the Maldives in early 2018, when its President Abdulla Yameen defied a Supreme Court ruling to reinstall opposition military police and release political prisoners, was exacerbated by Sino-Indian competition, and this is continuing to play out.

Overall, it seems likely that strategic competition will lead to the greater militarization of the IOR, because India feels the need to respond to China’s moves. While the United States has been the unchallenged predominant power in the IOR for several decades, this is changing. We are seeing the rise of major powers such as India and China, as well as a host of several new middle powers. This will make the Indian Ocean a much more multipolar and complex strategic environment. This will require the United States to work with new partners and in new ways.
In the Indo-Pacific — the world’s most disaster-prone region — clear communication between militaries, civilian governments and humanitarian agencies can save thousands of lives. Roads are reconstructed. Relief supplies are delivered, and homeless disaster victims are housed when military assets complement the work of humanitarians and governments.

A commitment to civilian-military dialogue “is rising fast up the agenda,” said Ken Hume, civil-military relations coordinator for the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies after speaking at the military exercise Cobra Gold 2018 in Thailand. “It’s really, really important to us. We are putting more resources into it.”

This dialogue is especially vital in the Indo-Pacific, which experiences earthquakes, tsunamis, tropical storms, flooding, landslides and volcanic eruptions that affect millions of people every year, according to the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA).

More than 2 million people — an average of 43,000 per year — were killed by natural disasters in the Indo-Pacific from 1970 to 2016, according to the United Nations. In 2016 alone, disasters caused 5,000 deaths and U.S. $77 billion in economic losses in the region. The Indo-Pacific accounted for 57 percent of the global death toll from natural disasters between 1970 and 2016, and the region’s residents are five times more likely to be hit by a natural disaster than someone anywhere else in the world.

To reduce these deaths and better respond to disasters, government agencies, humanitarians and militaries have been putting together an infrastructure in recent years to improve coordination. The Regional Consultative Group (RCG) on Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination for Asia and the Pacific was established in 2014 as a regional forum that brings together these diverse elements.

Humanitarian workers also are taking an increasingly active role in military exercises.

Cobra Gold is an annual multinational and multiservice exercise co-sponsored by the Royal Thai Armed Forces and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. Cobra Gold 2018 included a humanitarian assistance and disaster response exercise (HADR-X), which incorporated a HADR tabletop exercise and senior leader seminar.

The RCG in the Indo-Pacific focuses a great deal of its operational planning on the five most vulnerable countries, which are also known as UNOCHA priority countries. They are Bangladesh, Burma, Indonesia, Nepal and the Philippines. One of its first recommendations was to develop a common understanding of response practices to “enhance the predictability of the civil-military coordination mechanisms, and their respective functions, during response.”

This common understanding can speed response times, avoid duplication of effort and save lives. “For disaster response in peacetime, preparedness is the key to it,” Hume said. Having dialogue through such events as the Cobra Gold exercise creates shared knowledge, so when a flood or earthquake occurs, “we know who brings what to the party, and we understand each other’s methodology — and it works.”

In addition to knowing responders’ capabilities, experts say it is important to work out regional and international cooperation agreements before disasters strike to avoid bureaucratic delays. Issues including visas, customs clearance and overflight of a country can hamper the ability of foreign militaries to bring in life-saving equipment or even to arrive at all.

Each of the five vulnerable countries has developed its own plans for civil-military dialogue during disaster, Viviana De Annuntiis of the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ Regional Office for
Victims of Cyclone Sidr in Gabtala, Bangladesh, receive emergency supplies.

THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
Asia and the Pacific wrote in a 2018 report. The plans aim to increase the “speed, volume and quality of life-saving assistance provided in the initial phase of a response and by augmenting efforts led by the affected state.”

A look at the disaster histories of the five countries shows the need for response synchronization.

BANGLADESH CYCLONES
Bangladesh braced for the worst in November 2007 when Tropical Cyclone Sidr raked the country, killing 4,200 people and forcing the evacuation of 600,000 residents. The death toll, while tragically high, illustrates a “significant reduction in the death toll experienced in Bangladesh over the period of some four decades of severe tropical storms,” according to a 2017 case study report by the RCG, which was funded by the Australian Civil-Military Centre.

When Sidr struck Bangladesh on November 15, 2007, with sustained winds of 260 kilometers per hour, it flattened shacks, houses and schools and scattered trees throughout the country. Although local officials described the damage as worse than that caused by the 1991 Cyclone Gorky, the death toll was far lower. Gorky killed about 140,000 people near the city of Chittagong, and Cyclone Bhola on November 12, 1970, left a death toll as high as 500,000, The Associated Press reported.

The track of Cyclone Sidr was like that of its predecessors, but preparedness had improved. Evacuees were housed in 1,800 shelters in 2007 and given emergency disaster kits that contained clothing, blankets and food. The military established medical camps to augment civil health care. To support humanitarian efforts, the Bangladesh Air Force mobilized 18 helicopters and transported relief goods. The military also cleared roads and restored communications.

Hume said that in a well-coordinated civilian-military response, the military comes in to help with critical infrastructure repairs and then scales back its response quickly as humanitarian agencies and governments continue to deal with medical care, food and rebuilding. “The military can provide infrastructure support, opening roads, building bridges, transport,” he said. “The military can provide critical capabilities.”

Following Cyclone Sidr, Bangladesh worked with the United States to build 88 new schools that also serve as shelters during emergencies. Funded by the U.S. and
managed by the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers, the schools house 200 students daily and accommodate 1,800 people during an emergency.

The U.S. also funded the construction of several Coastal Crisis Management Centers across Bangladesh. The buildings are designed to withstand an 8.0 Richter-scale earthquake and wind speeds of up to 260 kilometers per hour.

**INDONESIA: A VOLCANIC SITUATION**

Situated across three tectonic plates, Indonesia has the most volcanoes of any country — 500 — with 128 still active, the RCG report stated. Typhoons, storm surges, landslides, floods and droughts also plague the country due to its location along the Pacific typhoon belt.

Indonesia averages 20 small earthquakes per day and has experienced significant forest fires over the past two decades. Between 1975 and 2015, disasters caused economic losses and damage of about U.S. $18.3 billion. In 2016 alone, disasters killed 522 people and displaced 3 million. In 2006, the Yogyakarta earthquake killed 5,778 people and caused U.S. $3.1 billion in financial losses.

What is believed to be the deadliest tsunami in history started just off the coast of Indonesia. The so-called Boxing Day tsunami — a tsunami named after the holiday celebrated in some countries on the day after Christmas — was triggered by a massive quake on December 26, 2004, off the northern tip of Sumatra. The tsunami killed more than 230,000 people across 14 countries. Indonesia was the hardest-hit with more than 130,000 deaths, followed by Sri Lanka, India and Thailand.

Due to the huge number of events, Indonesia has worked hard to develop mechanisms for civil-military dialogue and to adopt mechanisms “specifically for incoming foreign military capabilities in the event of a large-scale disaster,” the RCG report stated. While militaries often play a supporting role in times of disaster, the Indonesian military operates as a primary responder. The frequency and scale of disasters played a role in this decision as well as the military’s capability to rapidly deploy resources.

In 2017, the Indonesian government completed its National Disaster Response Framework, which is the country’s primary guidance document for all stakeholders in disaster response.
BURMA WARMS TO ASSISTANCE

Burma is highly exposed to flooding, drought, earthquakes and cyclones. Its worst recorded disaster occurred May 2, 2008, when Cyclone Nargis killed at least 138,000 people and caused U.S. $4 billion in property damage.

Although Burma has been marked by a history of military rule and limited foreign engagement, over the past decade it has made “notable transformations in civil-military coordination” and has taken significant steps to strengthen disaster management capabilities, the RCG report said.

Burma now participates in regional HADR exercises and holds workshops with key stakeholders to improve civil-military communication.

Burma has in the past strictly limited the amount of foreign military assets allowed to deploy during a disaster, the RCG report said. It has, however, arranged to receive help from bilateral agreements with neighboring countries and other member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

CHALLENGES FOR NEPAL

With its annual rainy season and mountainous terrain, Nepal experiences frequent landslides and flooding. Its biggest danger, however, comes from its location on the boundary of the Eurasian and Indian tectonic plates, a great source of seismic activity.

Lessons learned from the response to the April 25, 2015, Gorkha earthquake are informing disaster-response plans throughout the region. The quake killed nearly 9,000 people and injured about 22,000. It triggered a landslide on Mount Everest that killed 21 people, making it the deadliest day in the mountain’s history.

The earthquake drew an enormous international response, including assets from 18 foreign militaries and many thousands of humanitarian workers. The Red Cross and Red Crescent alone had 8,000 responders on the ground, Hume said.

In their reviews of the response, representatives of the Nepalese Army and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, which sent personnel and equipment to Nepal, discussed the success of a humanitarian-military operations coordination center (HuMOCC), which was part of a new coordination strategy by the U.N.

“The HuMOCC is an emerging practice in U.N. civil-military coordination globally as well as in Asia and the Pacific,” the RCG report said. “It facilitates information sharing, task division and the coordination of operational planning between humanitarian and military actors in natural disaster responses.”

The civilian-led operations center provided
assessments for operational planning, including the use of foreign militaries; offered advice on the appropriate level of foreign military support and where they should be deployed; identified benchmarks for when to transition from military to civilian assets and when to draw down and redeploy military forces.

PHILIPPINES IN THE EYE OF STORMS
On November 8, 2013, Super Typhoon Haiyan (called Yolanda in the Philippines), a category 5 storm and the strongest tropical cyclone to ever make landfall, cut a devastating path across the central Philippines. The storm killed more than 7,300 people, affected 12.9 million people and caused U.S. $10 billion in damage. Disaster relief was provided by 57 nations, including 22 countries that deployed military personnel.

From its vantage point in the western Pacific, the Philippines is exposed to a range of natural disasters from typhoons to landslides and monsoons. The country averages nine tropical storms each year.

In a report prepared by the Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance (CFE-DM) based in Hawaii, experts who reviewed the disaster response to Haiyan developed three best practices to save lives.

1. A commonly understood “end-to-end” warning system prepares a nation for crisis. An end-to-end system includes scientific modeling, data, technology and forecaster expertise.

2. Bilateral commitments executed through a multinational coordination center promote the best civilian use of foreign military assets.

3. When closely coordinated with the government, the private sector multiplies a nation’s surge capacity to meet the life-saving needs of the population.

A subsequent report by the CFE-DM looked at how these lessons learned from Haiyan were put into effect a year later with Typhoon Hagupit. The study, “Advances in Civil-Military Coordination in Catastrophes: How the Philippines turned lessons learned from super Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) into Best Practices for Disaster Preparedness and Response (2015),” is available at https://www.cfe-dmha.org/.

Paul Baker, the International Committee of the Red Cross delegate for military and armed groups in Southeast Asia, said it’s vital for civil-military cooperation to be simulated in exercises such as Cobra Gold. It’s a chance to develop shared knowledge when bullets aren’t flying in a conflict zone. Exercises bring the disaster-response community together to “shape people’s minds to help people understand how we are going to operate when it all goes wrong,” he said.
THAILAND deploys peacekeeping forces
Thailand has contributed troops to United Nations peacekeeping efforts in places such as Darfur, Haiti and Timor-Leste. Can you describe the POC’s role in preparing troops for these deployments?

Uniquely established, the Peace Operations Center is the only organization within the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF) mandated to be fully responsible for the pursuit of peace operations in a holistic manner. Its roles span working levels, ranging from representing the Armed Forces in the Cabinet decision-making process for Thailand’s contribution of peacekeeping forces at the interministerial level down to formulating peacekeeping strategies and policies at the Ministry of Defense level. The center implements peacekeeping capability buildup plans, coordinates and manages the deployment of Thai peacekeeping contingents and develops and executes predeployment training courses.

When preparing troops for deployment, the center ensures that troops deployed to U.N. peacekeeping operations are selected, generated, equipped and trained according to U.N. standards.

For individual deployment, the center’s role is to implement a preparation system called the “On-Call List.” The process is designed to manage the selection and preparation of RTARF officers to become professional peacekeepers and employ them for U.N. peacekeeping operations according to their areas of specialization.

For collective or contingent deployment, the center complies with the U.N. Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System [PCRS]. According to Thailand’s commitment made by Prime Minister Gen. Prayuth Chan-o-cha at a U.N. peacekeeping summit in 2015, three RTARF military units — a horizontal military engineer company, a level II hospital and a well-drilling unit — are now registered into PCRS level II with the goal of achieving deployments to U.N. missions.

Under the PCRS system, the center has played a key role in two phases. At the preauthorized phase in which the deployment of a contingent has not been confirmed, the center ensures that units registered in the PCRS system are generated and sustained to operation readiness and timely deployment. For overseas operations, the center in conjunction with military headquarters is authorized to call for the Army, Navy and Air Force to supply personnel for the generation of peacekeeping task forces. The sustainment of unit readiness involves periodical predeployment and rehearsal training. Currently, there are two units—a level II hospital and a well-drilling unit—being prepared.

At the deployment phase, the center liaises with the U.N. and other organizations for arrangements that include leading the Thai reconnaissance team to mission areas, producing and submitting cargo and passenger load lists and manifests for clearance and transportation arrangement, coordinating strategic air and sea lifts as well as establishing a line of national logistic support in forwarding supplies to units operating in the area of responsibility.

A QUESTION & ANSWER
WITH ROYAL THAI ARMED FORCES REAR ADM. NUTTAPONG KETSUMBOON

He serves as director of the Peace Operations Center (POC) for the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF). He spoke with FORUM about Thailand’s commitment to international peacekeeping following the multinational military exercise Cobra Gold 2018, which Thailand and the United States co-hosted.

Please describe your responsibilities as director of RTARF POC.

The responsibilities of a commanding officer or director are primarily defined by the mandates of the organization that he/she commands. Similarly, it is important to
APPLICATION OF PREDEPLOYMENT TRAINING FOR CONTINGENT UNITS NORMALLY INVOLVES:

**PHASE 1 starts with U.N. peacekeeping training.** This course is for contingent units and consists of CPTM, specialized training materials and reinforcement training courses. The CPTM is the basic course for training all peacekeepers while the specialized training materials will be specific to the role played by each contingent. An infantry contingent, for example, requires specialized training for protecting civilians and dealing with conflict-related sexual violence. The reinforcement training emphasizes certain aspects that are vital to success.

**PHASE 2 training involves technical and professional training.** The training is related to the specific tasks expected of a contingent. It may be patrolling or convoy protection for an infantry contingent or the construction of a road for an engineering and construction contingent.

**PHASE 3 targets mission-specific training.** It normally commences once a contingent is aware of the mission and the sector where it likely will be deployed. The training is based on the assessment of the operational environment from reconnaissance. The training may cover country study, mission background, mission leadership and mission mandates.

**PHASE 4 is collective and integrated training.** This step is the culmination of all types of training carried out beforehand and involves a mix of command post exercises and field training exercises for all personnel under deployment. The exercise simulates the unit operating within a deployment location.

**PHASE 5 can be any type of training that would enhance the capability of a deployed contingent.** It may repeat training to sustain a unit’s operational readiness if a deployment is pending or postponed.
two deputy directors, I must exercise disciplinary and commanding authority over four subordinate units — the plan and policy division, operation division, training and education division, and an administrative and support section.

**Provide a broad overview of what United Nations peacekeeping operations (UNPKO) training involves.**

RTARF POC realizes that before being engaged in peacekeeping operations, Soldiers and units must go through appropriate preparation for modern peacekeeping missions. Given that, predeployment training plays a significant role in ensuring that Soldiers as well as contingent units are equipped with the knowledge, skills and attitude to meet the evolving challenges of peacekeeping operations and to perform their specialist functions effectively. RTARF POC, acting as a national peacekeeping institute, has a primary responsibility to adopt national peacekeeping predeployment training curriculums and deliver them to Soldiers committed to peacekeeping missions.

RTARF peacekeeping training is tailored for certain types of deployment and contingent units. Its curriculum is developed in accordance with U.N. training standards while accounting for national doctrines and military practices. (See chart for training details on page 41.)

**Who receives training at the center? Is it available for foreign troops as well as Thai forces?**

Peacekeeping training conducted by the RTARF POC targets different audiences. I categorize them in four main groups:

- **Individually deployed peacekeepers:** The center conducts two training courses, namely the U.N. Staff
Officer Course (UNSOC) and the U.N. Military Experts on Mission annually. The courses target 40 to 45 officers at the rank of captain to lieutenant colonel who are qualified and selected to be prelisted for deployments within one year.

- **Contingent units:** The center conducts a peacekeeping predeployment training for a contingent course annually. The course is attended by 40 key officers, and the center produces trainers to spread the course information to the three units in PCRS.
- **National instructors:** The center produces a cadre of 40 military instructors to teach predeployment courses on peacekeeping to all target troops. The trainers are nominated by the Army, Navy, Air Force, units in PCRS and the POC instructor.
- **International trainees:** In partnership with peacekeeping training centers in member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), RTARF sponsors nine officers from nine ASEAN member states to take up the UNSOC each year. The center is considering nominating the course for U.N. accreditation by 2020. Once achieved, the course will be opened to countries beyond ASEAN. In addition to the UNSOC, the center, together with the Australia Armed Force Peacekeeping Training Center, co-hosts the regional peacekeeping exercise PIRAP-JABIRU biennially. The exercise offers opportunities for up to 50 foreign officers from more than 22 counties in the Indo-Pacific region to participate.

**Please describe the importance of cultural training that teaches troops to respect the customs and values of local cultures in peacekeeping operations.**

RTARF POC places great importance on respecting diversity. The center acknowledges that peacekeeping operations involve peacekeepers from many backgrounds working in a mixed institution, both culturally and institutionally. Its success requires respect for the local
population, which will have its own cultural norms and traditions. The mission’s success depends on each peacekeeper’s ability to maintain respectful relationships, which will build trust and confidence in the peacekeeping mission and contribute to the safety and stability within areas of operation. Respecting diversity and local culture is instilled in all peacekeeping personnel deployed by the center. Respect for diversity is one of three core U.N. values. The other two are integrity and professionalism. Failing to maintain these values will jeopardize the mission.

I am very proud to say that, throughout 60 years of its contribution to UNPKO, not a single case of a Thai peacekeeper committing misconduct or mistreating the local population has been reported. I am convinced that diversity training has played a key role in maintaining the integrity of Thai peacekeepers. Some evidence of success was shown by the expression of appreciation from the then-U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, who said in an official letter to Thailand in 2012, “The Thai battalion has performed commendably and has made an extremely positive impact in West Darfur. In addition to their strong military performance, the men and women of the Royal Thai Armed Forces have worked determinedly to foster positive relations with the people of Darfur. The battalion’s initiatives to support the local community, in particular with agricultural projects, are highly appreciated by the population.”

Respecting local culture is even more important to Thai contingents operating in the Indo-Pacific region. Thailand believes there is an intertwined relationship among peace, security and development. Peace cannot be solely achieved without security. In addition, security and stability will not be present if communities remain poorly developed. Peace, security and development must be addressed in complement to one another. As such, Thailand, when contributing forces to UNPKO, always brings across the King Rama IX’s initiative of sustainable development to assist the local population in improving quality of lives and enabling self-reliant communities. Success of the Thai contingents has been obvious in many peacekeeping missions, Timor-Leste and Darfur, for example, where agricultural projects introduced to communities by the Thai contingents have laid down foundations for local populations to be competent in earning a living, develop their economies and become self-reliant. These successes cannot be possible without cultural training.

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Culturally speaking, how important is it to train male and females for peacekeeping operations?

Sincerely speaking, Thailand has long had a culture of a male-led society. From the ancient time until today, males play a leading role in almost every society. There is no difference in the peacekeeping community in which the
majority of peacekeepers around the globe are males. However, Thailand realizes that conflict affects women differently than men. Women often have fewer resources to protect themselves and, with children, frequently make up the majority of displaced and refugee populations. War tactics such as sexual violence specifically target them. Women and girls are often abducted and raped and used as sexual slaves. Women and girls who are abducted may be rejected by their families and might find it difficult to find partners after the conflict has ended. In these situations, the need to establish rapport with the local population is vital — not only for intelligence gathering but also to implement early warning systems, conduct capacity building and build trust. However, because women and children are the main victims of violence in such conflicts, particularly sexual violence, it is often difficult for male Soldiers to cross social and cultural boundaries to build this trust. This is where female peacekeepers can fill a gap by providing women and children with a greater sense of security and by being able to foster their trust and gather valuable information for the mission. In preparing for contributions to a UNPKO, RTARF POC acknowledges essential roles of female peacekeepers and incorporates gender perspectives in every effort. In supporting the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1325(2000), RTARF stresses the importance of increasing participation of individually deployed female peacekeepers to reach up to 15 percent of the deployed peacekeeping force. The Armed Forces are also actively engaging with international communities to voice support for global efforts in this agenda. In November 2017, the deputy chief of staff of the RTARF representing the minister of defense led a Thai delegation to attend a U.N. peacekeeping meeting in Vancouver, British Columbia, where he addressed the Armed Forces’ agenda to increase the participation of Thai female officers in UNPKOs. In January 2018, he held a dialogue with Canadian Sen. Marilou McPhedran in Bangkok reiterating the RTARF strategy empowering female peacekeepers. In addition to the empowerment of female peacekeepers, the POC is committed to ensuring

that its predeployment training delivered to both male and female troops addresses gender perspectives and conflict-related sexual violence, sex exploitation and abuse. The training further addresses the essential role of women peacekeepers as mentioned previously.

How does participating in peacekeeping operations affect Thailand's overall military capacity and operational effectiveness?

To answer this question, I would like, at the outset, to clarify that Thailand is a medium-size, peace-loving country. The highest agenda of its Armed Forces is to defend the country and safeguard its sovereignty, territory, integrity and national interest from internal and external threats, so preparation and sustainment of combat-credible military forces is essential. But when it comes to the issue of conflict, we believe in the peaceful settlement of disputes in which political settlement must lead the effort while military solution should be the last resort. In the context of global peace, the Armed Forces believe in a collective approach for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and to bring about by peaceful means and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes. That approach must be taken by the organization whose authority is generally respected, the U.N., in particular. Thailand is aware that conflict arising in one region is no longer easily confined. Its adverse impacts will unavoidably spill across to other regions or continents. Conflicts in Syria and Libya are good examples. Thailand further believes that making the world peaceful is the best solution in defending the kingdom.

In addition, Thailand, as a member of the United Nations, is determined to support the U.N. in the maintenance of international peace and security.

As such, the RTARF considers its contributions of military service to UNPKO as an intrinsic agenda of its military strategy in deterring threats to the kingdom. Therefore, the Armed Forces builds up, trains and sustains its peacekeeping capabilities in accordance with its military strategy. Its contributions have been made in correspondence to its military capabilities. This means Thailand's participation in UNPKO will have no adverse effects on overall military capacity. In case of crisis in which a higher level of force is required, RTARF also has an effective system to mobilize and train reserve forces.

RTARF remains actively committed to supporting the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace. From the past to present day, RTARF, in service of peace, has contributed its military contingents, resources and services to more than 20 peacekeeping missions worldwide with four out of these 20 missions remaining active. Those are the African Union–United Nations Hybrid Mission in Darfur, the U.N. Mission in South Sudan and the U.N. Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan. In addition, the Armed Forces are in the process of contributing a horizontal military engineer company at the strength of 273 troops to South Sudan, with the deployment scheduled in July 2018.

The RTARF is determined to intensify its efforts in supporting the U.N. in the maintenance of international peace to make the world safer and more peaceful.
In today's world, with the rapid technological innovation and climate changes, critical infrastructures and social structures are more threatened by natural and man-made disasters. Disasters have always been part and parcel of human existence. The world is witnessing more natural disasters than ever in terms of the frequency and intensity. The population of the Indo-Pacific region is five times more prone to being affected by a natural disaster than people in other regions.

The Indo-Pacific, home to more than 61 percent of the world’s population, has accounted for 57 percent of deaths globally from natural disasters since 1970. However, not a single entity, sector or force by itself possesses the capacity to address such massive challenges that can impact human life and impose severe suffering. Collaboration and cooperation among various stakeholders structured across a multilateral approach is a leading option to minimize risk in complex disaster events.

NEPAL'S RISK

Nepal is the world’s 20th-most disaster-prone country, and when it comes to seismic vulnerability, it ranks as the 11th most at-risk country in the world. In the past few years, Nepal faced at least three types of disasters: the massive Gorkha earthquakes of 2015, floods in the Southern plains of 2017 and the U.S.-Bangla Airlines crash of 2018. In the aftermath of the 7.8 magnitude and 7.5 magnitude temblors that struck the Gorkha region in April and May 2015, a multilateral approach and engagement with international partners were key factors for restoring normalcy. In the latter two disasters, Nepalese citizens and government forces — in particular, the Nepalese Army — were key responders in overcoming the crises after the floods killed more than 140 people and displaced 460,000, and the crash at the Kathmandu airport killed 51 passengers.

However, a unilateral approach to resolve megadisasters may not always suffice. Instead, the situation may warrant that a nation opts for a multilateral framework for humanitarian aid and disaster relief as Nepal did after the Gorkha megaquakes that killed nearly 9,000 people, injured more than 20,000 more and destroyed 600,000 homes, displacing more than 650,000 families.

Nepal is party to various multilateral frameworks such as the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015-2030) and the earlier Hyogo Framework of Action (2005-2015). The National Risk Reduction Consortium and its five Flagships Programs, although not a multilateral approach, is a platform for disaster risk reduction supported by international stakeholders such as the Asian Development Bank, World Bank and donor agencies.

The newly promulgated Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act as well as the National Disaster Response Framework offered a means for requesting foreign assistance when a country is overwhelmed by a disaster. The framework provided for a Multi-
National Military Coordination Center (MNMCC) as a coordination platform within the Nepalese Army where foreign military and civil defense assets (MCDA) can report to render assistance.

Nepal also is a member country of the Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT), a cooperative effort among 31 nations with Indo-Pacific interests, which aims to enhance multinational military response during a crisis. Using this platform as part of our disaster preparedness, the Nepalese Army organized several exercises in collaboration with United States Indo-Pacific Command. An important feature is the collaboration and coordination with stakeholders that turned out to be useful during the actual disaster. This was amply proven during the megaquakes when the high degree of cooperation among multinational agencies and the immediate establishment of MNMCC were ensured due to effective policies and various seminars held in the past.

### MULTILATERAL SUCCESS STORY

MNMCC was one of the remarkable platforms that helped integrate multilateral support. Within hours of disaster and the government’s appeal for foreign assistance, the Nepalese Army established the MNMCC. In total, 34 countries acting through 18 military and 16 nonmilitary entities became involved in MNMCC after the 2015 Gorkha earthquakes. Although this was the first time the Nepalese Army had integrated multilateral support, previous experiences from MPAT simulation exercises helped to quickly set up the MNMCC and systematically mobilize and coordinate the MCDA that arrived in Nepal. The Multinational Coordination Center model of Multinational Force Standing Operating Procedure was used as a reference to establish the MNMCC.

The management of the airport and incoming flights was a herculean task due to the facility’s limited capacity and an influx of large-scale...
assistance and relief materials from Nepal’s international partners. For adequate management of the airport and smooth flow of relief materials, a separate dedicated airport management team and reception and departure center were established as part of MNMCC at the airport.

Each team that reported to the center was given a temporary base and linked with MNMCC through an air liaison cell and a medical operation cell, respectively. The civil military coordination and collaboration with larger humanitarian actors and civilian counterparts was another important facet of MNMCC to help streamline multilateral support. The MNMCC collectively shouldered the brunt of the response. Search and rescue, medical support, air transportation, debris clearance and epidemic control were the major areas where multinational actors offered support. The assistance from MCDA was stopped as the demand for rescue and relief became within the reach of Nepal’s own resources.

Overall, the multilateral framework for the Gorkha earthquakes was a crucial factor in responding to the disaster. Although the Nepalese citizens and the security agencies acted as first responders, unilateral effort was not sufficient to respond to the level of devastation, which required large-scale resources and relief materials. Establishment of the MNMCC was a major aspect in implementing a multilateral approach during the Gorkha earthquake of April 25, 2015.

**FUTURE PREPARATIONS**

Nevertheless, a high degree of preparedness, awareness programming and planning are necessary for possible future disasters.

In every crisis or disaster, it is the people who are the first responders. Therefore, a citizen awareness program should be part of any preparedness program. This also helps build national capacity. During the flood in the Southern plains of Nepal, the people and local authorities responded and mobilized for rescue and relief efforts. After the U.S.-Bangla Airlines crash in March 2018 at Tribhuwan International Airport, the standby force of government agencies responded immediately, minimizing damage. Continuous joint training among the government and security agencies is required to respond in such incidents, and the training should be reinforced to ensure interoperability. Therefore, a preparedness mechanism must be developed to increase the national capacity and decrease reliance on foreign counterparts.

To coordinate with friendly foreign countries and national and international stakeholders, many simulation exercises have been organized. Some examples are the Disaster Response Exercise and Exchange and the MPAT Tempest Express and Table Top Exercises. These engagements helped to test civil-military coordination principles, create synergy, understand modalities and synchronize efforts to support disaster management and emergency response plans. The output can be framed in the form of standing operating procedures or guidelines for coordination and communication.

The Oslo guidelines, which have evolved since 1992, address the use of MCDA after a natural, technological or environmental emergency during times of peace. They provide a framework that can be used to improve the effectiveness of multinational agencies and MCDA in large disaster relief operations. Adherence to these guidelines also eases the process of integrating multilateral support. Furthermore, a broader strategy is needed for involving stakeholders and government agencies to establish a humanitarian military operations coordination center or joint coordination center and to formalize and implement procedures for mobilizing experts, skilled manpower and relief materials. An analysis of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats should be conducted.

The nation must designate infrastructure to store relief materials before or during emergencies. Storage of essential resources can ease pressure in the immediate aftermath of disaster. For the smooth flow of relief materials from multinational agencies, joint training can prepare skilled manpower for communication and control of air and ground traffic.

The unprecedented scale of disaster and the vulnerability of the region to disaster requires a country like Nepal to be vigilant and prepared for emergencies. Multilateral approaches to resolving such emergencies ensure division of effort, an increase in skilled manpower, increased synergies and provide immediate rescue and relief effort to affected areas. Multilateral approaches optimize resources, prevent duplication, strengthen relationships and promote coordination. Various multinational discussions, exercises and symposia need to be conducted to prepare effective multilateral approaches.

The multinational response to the Gorkha earthquakes is testimony to the effectiveness of multilateral approaches. There were many lessons learned from that disaster, but the one that stands out is that all stakeholders need to address such challenges multilaterally to be prepared for future emergencies.
Sri Lanka Navy’s experience provides lessons to maritime nations on bolstering counterterrorism strategies.

LT. COL. ALEX CARTER/U.S. ARMY
AND CAPT. DAMIAN FERNANDO/SRI LANKA NAVY
Any country with maritime borders must have a plan for countering terrorist threats at and from the seas as part of its national counterterrorism strategy. Any strategy that lacks such a plan to safeguard maritime borders is inherently flawed and dangerously incomplete.

Too many counterterrorism strategies have neglected the nuances and threats of maritime domain in favor of the easier and more definable land domain out of convenience, ignorance or both.

Terrorists plan and execute attacks on maritime targets, often with devastating effect. The Sri Lanka Navy’s experience with battling terrorists at sea offers insights on how navies, large and small, may improve the efficacy of their counterterrorism strategies by using small boats to combat the terrorist threat on water.

Use of the sea and swarming tactics

The motivation and likelihood for terrorist actions at sea can be measured by several factors. These include the degree of state sponsorship that a terrorist organization may have, how well-networked the organization is with other terrorist groups, the degree of involvement in drug trafficking, and whether the terrorist organization can base operations in safe havens, as Victor Asal and Justin Hastings described in a 2015 issue of the journal *Terrorism and Political Violence*. Any one or more of these factors can motivate terrorist organizations to initiate or mature their maritime strategies to achieve political goals through violence.

Such terrorist attacks at sea have taken many forms. Land-based teams can use trained divers to place improvised explosive devices on board ships, attack craft, suicide craft and even sea mines. Supporting technologies have ranged from speedboats, scuba, sea scooters — all helped typically by GPS, according to a 2001 report by security analyst Rohan Gunaratna in *Jane’s Navy International*. In one study, 15 terrorist groups, including Hamas, al-Qaida, Abu Sayyaf Group and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), conducted at least one maritime attack between 1998 and 2005, Asal and Hastings wrote.

For many terrorists, the sea is undoubtedly an attractive place to carry out activities and operations that support their objectives. The sea can serve as a theater for an attack against high-value maritime targets such as a warship, oil platform or a port, according to Dr. Norman Cigar, now a research fellow at the Marine Corps University, Quantico, Virginia. The sea can also serve as an avenue of approach, line of communication and economic asset, as Cigar described in a May 2017 monograph titled *The Jihadist Maritime Strategy: Waging a Guerrilla War at Sea*.

Terrorists can use the sea to routinely move equipment and personnel from one location to another. The sea can also be used as an escape route, providing a way for terrorists to quickly leave an area once operations have been conducted on land. Economically, the sea can also be viewed as an asset by terrorists who can control and profit from illegal activities such as sea-based smuggling operations, such as human trafficking, illegal oil shipments and other oil-related trade, Cigar explained.
Due to any combination of the reasons and motivations stated, terrorist organizations have, over the years, conducted many successful attacks on high-value maritime targets. The most significant was the al-Qaeda attack on the USS Cole in 2000, which killed 17 U.S. Sailors. Another was in 2002, when al-Qaida undertook its first successful attack against a commercial French supertanker, the Limburg, using a small boat packed with explosives. The attack was launched when the Limburg was 12 nautical miles off the coast of Yemen, killing one crew member, injuring 12 others and causing a spill of 90,000 barrels of crude oil along more than 72 kilometers of coastline. Terrorists also attacked Pakistani naval facilities in 2009 and 2011. An organization linked to al-Qaida or the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) carried out an attack on an Egyptian naval vessel in 2015.

It is, however, the Sri Lankan government’s fight against LTTE that offers the richest source of documentation and history regarding terrorist maritime attacks. At the height of the LTTE’s military effectiveness, it destroyed about one-third of Sri Lanka Navy coastal patrol craft, ocean patrol vessels, fast attack craft and gunboats, Jane’s Navy International reported.

From the onset, the LTTE likely needed to conduct such devastating terrorist operations at sea because it “required secure sea lines of communications to supply their forces with the apparatus of modern warfare and used the open maneuver space of the sea to attack the Sri Lankan armed forces, government and economy,” Paul Povlock wrote in the Small Wars Journal in September 2011. The first maritime terrorism operations in Sri Lankan waters took place in 1990 when the LTTE launched its first suicide missions against the Sri Lanka Navy surveillance command ships Abeertha and Editharain. In 1994, a suicide attack was launched against a Sri Lanka Navy patrol vessel, Jane’s Navy International reported in 2006. This vessel, the Sagarawardena, was Sri Lanka’s largest warship in the sub-chaser class. In 1998, the LTTE damaged two Sri Lanka Navy vessels, killing over 50 Sri Lankan Soldiers. In 2000, LTTE suicide attack craft conducted seven separate attacks on Sri Lanka Navy vessels, destroying four fast-attack craft and killing or wounding 13 Sailors. In 2006, LTTE suicide attack craft conducted nine attacks, destroying six inshore and coastal patrol boats and killing or wounding 58 Sailors, according to the Sri Lankan Ministry of Defence. A key battlefield tactic in these cases was the use of “swarming,” asymmetric warfare designed to overwhelm the target. Justin Smith wrote in a 2011 edition of Small Wars & Insurgencies that the LTTE’s suicide craft, “often indistinguishable and hidden among [the] attack craft, were used in swarm and suicide boat attacks.” An understanding of swarm tactics is of particular relevance to other navies struggling to deal with the terrorist threat at sea.

Swarming, according to a 2000 Rand Corp. study titled “Swarming and the Future of Conflict,” is an ancient form of fighting that is finding increasing popularity in the modern era. Swarm organizations typically show autonomous or semiautonomous behavior, a coordinated way of striking from all directions with sustainable pulsing of force or fire, stand-off and close-in capabilities, and an ability to disrupt cohesion of an adversary, the study said. Military swarming can strike at the target from different directions, with large numbers of small units that are well-connected from a communications or networked perspective as well as from a geographic or physical one, according to the study. Like the wolf pack in the animal kingdom or German U-boats and Japanese kamikaze pilots during World War II, terrorist groups can swarm on the open water and high seas by coming together at a precise moment and location to inflict damage and then disperse quickly, the study said.

The implications are that “militaries may need to re-examine their close-in fighting capabilities and doctrines,” the Rand study said. For example, terrorist groups such as Hezbollah have used swarming to confront Israeli commando raids in southern Lebanon. This may explain Israel’s tactical withdrawal from southern Lebanon — an inability to adapt to its adversary’s swarming practices.

Swarming is an unconventional tactic for conventional militaries. This is particularly true with the challenges that navies around the world face in combating terrorist threats from the sea. In the case of the Sri Lanka Navy that faced many terrorist attacks from the LTTE at sea, the Navy grappled with how to develop doctrine and tactics to counter the LTTE’s swarming tactics. The Sri Lanka Navy’s experiences with the LTTE’s small boats can inform other navies struggling with this type of warfare.

Sri Lankan Experience
Sri Lanka’s maritime challenges are vast. The South Asia region “sits above a vital sea line of communication along which significant amounts of trade, including energy, travels from Southwest Asia, via the Malacca Strait, to industrial Asia,” Dr. Christopher Snedden, a Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies professor, wrote in 2016. Thus, the strategic location of Sri Lanka in the Indian Ocean makes it not only important to the region but also to global commerce, much of which flows through the shipping lanes just south of Sri Lanka. A strong navy is paramount in protecting economic interests.

From a maritime perspective, the Falklands War in 1982, between the United Kingdom and Argentina, is the last known conventional naval conflict, in which two navies engaged each other on the seas. In the modern era, most navies have limited conventional combat experience in repelling and destroying aggressors at sea. Since 1982,
Sri Lanka Sailors watch as the Samudura warship enters the Trimcomalee naval base in September 2007 as the civil war was ongoing.

THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
however, the Sri Lanka Navy has been the only navy in the world to engage in naval combat operations of any significance in the Indo-Pacific region. These operations were against a credible threat: the LTTE. During Sri Lanka’s civil war, which began in 1983, the LTTE fought to create an independent Tamil state called Tamil Eelam in the north and the east of the island. Combat occurred on land and sea, in conventional and unconventional ways over 26 years. Finally, in 2009, the government of Sri Lanka defeated the Tamil Tigers.

During the height of the war, the LTTE fielded a sizable naval capability to combat the Sri Lanka Navy and government. The LTTE fleet consisted of upward of 4,000 personnel working in operations, logistics, communications, intelligence and other sections. The fleet had indigenously built, Fiberglass fast-attack vessels such as the four-man Thrikka-class craft, the six-man Suddai-class craft, the Muraj-class craft, and the two-man Idayan-class small boats used for suicide attacks on maritime targets, as Povlock describes in the Small Wars Journal. All craft, except for the Idayan-class small boats, were fitted with one or more heavy machine guns. The Idayan-class small boats contained explosives designed to detonate on impact with the target. Small boats were deliberately employed for several good, tactical reasons.

Small boats are hard to detect by most sensors — they lie low in the water and can take any shape. Additionally, the ease of moving a small boat or boats creates flexibility in choosing the time, place and mode of attack against a naval or commercial platform. Moreover, an innocent-looking fishing vessel, a personal water craft, a pleasure boat or any other specially designed small fast boat can easily be converted to a lethal suicide boat to carry explosives to inflict heavy damages. Small boats have the advantage of being able to maneuver in small places at slow speed such as through channelized shipping lanes or in areas with traditionally high numbers of vessels. Armed with a high payload, a small boat can cause extensive damage and destruction at the most inconvenient location and at the most inconvenient time.

Small boats are a perfect and deadly tool of choice to employ devastating swarming tactics to achieve violent effects at sea. Small boats disguised as fishing boats in congested areas can easily target merchant ships. The majority of global commerce is carried out on the oceans, and a single such attack on an oil or chemical tanker or even a passenger ship or cruise liner would have major impacts, politically as well as economically. A terrorist organization could easily use small boats to jeopardize the international maritime trade of Sri Lanka by damaging
A Sri Lanka Navy sailor patrols a Dehiwala beach near Colombo in March 2009; two months before the civil war ended.

REUTERS
or sinking large container ships such as a Maersk Triple E-class ship in Sri Lanka’s capital and main port, Colombo. A naval fleet can also be targeted by small boats at chokepoints, such as harbor entrances. A delay in harbor operations for even a few days, let alone weeks, would be devastating.

The devastating effect the sea-borne LTTE suicide small boats had on the Sri Lanka Navy prompted changes in strategy and doctrine. Sri Lanka Navy Vice Adm. Wasantha Karannagoda developed a creative approach he called the “small boat concept,” based on new equipment and new tactics, as Smith wrote in Small Wars & Insurgencies. In effect, the new tactic was to “out-guerrilla the guerrilla,” as Povlock described. New tactics were desperately needed to combat the LTTE’s swarm tactics using small boats, some of which were the Idayan suicide boats. The Sri Lanka Navy doctrine grew to combat LTTE’s small attack boats with a much larger number of its own small boats, swarm against swarm. The small boat concept was to counter the LTTE’s swarming and suicide tactics with high-speed, heavily armed inshore patrol craft, Smith wrote.

According to one of the authors who participated in combat operations against the LTTE, the Sri Lanka Navy’s strategy and thinking behind the small boat concept was heavily influenced by a theory developed by a British engineer during World War I. Lanchester’s square law essentially states that the casualty ratio varies inversely as the force ratio. That is, a force outnumbering an opponent can expect to incur fewer casualties than the weaker opponent. Lanchester also showed the ability of modern weapons to operate at long ranges dramatically changed the nature of combat, with a stronger modern force being more powerful by a factor of two. This theory and set of principles fully supported the initiation and fielding of the Sri Lanka Navy’s small boat units.

Beginning in 2006, the Navy recruited officers and Sailors to operationalize the small boat concept. Two types of units were created — first, the Special Boat Squadron (SBS) and then the Rapid Action Boat Squadron (RABS). SBS recruits underwent extensive training, including some advanced training from U.S. Navy Seals, U.S. Green Berets and Indian commandos, Povlock wrote. Their mission was to use small boats to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance inside LTTE territory. The RABS recruits were trained to operate small boats using swarm tactics, employing up to 30 craft during a combat engagement against the LTTE Sea Tigers. The results were crippling for the LTTE; attacks on the Sri Lanka Navy declined steadily and then sharply from 2006 to 2008. The new small boat tactics “shattered the Sea Tigers,” according to Povlock. In fact, the “pivotal element of the government victory was the evolution of a successful maritime interdiction strategy by the SLN [Sri Lanka Navy],” Smith wrote.
Way Forward

The Sri Lanka Navy continues to evaluate and plan improvements in the near and long terms. Sri Lanka’s journey may be instructive, particularly to nations with developing navies that face traditional and nontraditional threats from the sea.

The Sri Lanka Navy deliberately chose to rebalance the size and scope of its naval fleet by building up its small boat fleet and maximizing its naval capabilities. For example, the concept of combining smaller boats with the bigger vessels gave the Navy the ability to better protect its traditional vessels, such as frigates and battleships, while providing a robust defensive capability through the small boats to address unconventional attacks from terrorist attacks at sea.

There must be greater awareness within the fisheries community about the importance of their role at sea. They must be more vigilant in identifying and reporting any suspicious or illegal activities. Failure to do so should be met with real consequences under the rule of law. Proper vetting and accreditation of local fishermen and their fishing vessels curbs many black-market activities. Along a similar theme of awareness and collaboration, education and coordination among the Navy, the Coast Guard and the police can also be improved as each service understands the capabilities of the others and, perhaps, participates in joint exercises to test integrated and joint capabilities against threat-based scenarios.

Creating more opportunities for shared dialogue is also key for security. Sri Lanka holds an annual international maritime symposium called Galle Dialogue, which provides a setting to discuss the maritime terrorist threat. From a South Asia regional perspective, this topic should be part of the agenda at the South Asian Regional Conference to provide opportunities for discussions that lead to bilateral or multilateral arrangements and resource-sharing agreements.

Sri Lanka, like other developing nations, has opportunities to engage with partner nations such as India, Japan, South Korea and the United States to pursue joint training, education and intelligence sharing to collaborate against global terrorist threats.

As the ancient Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu said, “The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the enemy’s not coming, but on our own readiness to receive him; not on the chance of his not attacking, but rather on the fact that we have made our position unassailable.”

A counterterrorism strategy evolves based on the threats that a government must consider. While the land domain has been the scene of many terrorist events in the past, the maritime domain may receive more attention from bad actors in the future. The Sri Lanka Navy’s experiences fighting the LTTE at sea should reinforce the reality that it is not if, but when terrorists will strike ports, harbors, waterways and even on the open ocean. The use of small boats, although not high-tech or glitzy, to counter such threats should resonate with developing nations that are grappling with how to resize, refit and rebalance their navy forces to prepare for the worst-case scenario.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Sri Lankan Ministry of Defence or any agency of the government of the United States of America.
RISING Sharp Power

AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES CHINA AND RUSSIA INCREASINGLY MANIPULATE, BULLY AND DISTRACT TO ADVANCE THEIR AGENDAS IN DEMOCRATIC NATIONS
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russian governments are waging a new form of information warfare that increasingly relies on what is becoming known as “sharp power” — a term coined by researchers Christopher Walker and Jessica Ludwig in a December 2017 report by the National Endowment for Democracy.

The two authoritarian states have spent billions of dollars over the past decade to influence democracies in ways that have evolved beyond conventional conceptions of charm initiatives or propaganda campaigns. While most nations want to shape how the rest of the world sees them, these nations’ tactics are coercive, the authors revealed in the 156-page report, “Sharp Power: Rising Authoritarian Influence,” published by the Washington, D.C.-based foundation and think tank.

“What we have to date understood as authoritarian ‘soft power’ is better categorized as ‘sharp power’ that pierces, penetrates or perforates the political and information environments in the targeted countries. In the new competition that is under way between autocratic and democratic states, the repressive regimes’ ‘sharp power’ techniques should be seen as the tip of their dagger — or indeed as their syringe,” Walker and Ludwig wrote. Walker is vice president for studies...
and analysis at the foundation; Ludwig, a research and conference officer.

“This authoritarian influence is not principally about attraction or even persuasion; instead, it centers on distraction and manipulation. These ambitious authoritarian regimes, which systematically suppress political pluralism and free expression at home, are increasingly seeking to apply similar principles internationally to secure their interests,” the authors wrote.

“Sharp power, the deceptive use of information, is a type of hard power,” Joseph Nye explained in a January 2018 analysis of the report published in Foreign Affairs. Nye, a distinguished U.S. political scientist, introduced the term “soft power” to the world in a 1990 book. Although the PRC, like many nations, has used culture, visas, grants and investments to win foreign hearts and minds, its activities have become more subversive and pervasive.

In a 2017 interview with The Economist magazine, Anne-Marie Brady of the University of Canterbury in New Zealand described the PRC’s aggressive disinformation campaigns as a “new global battle” to “guide, buy or coerce political influence.”

Walker and Ludwig contend that democratic governments and societies must re-examine the way they respond to sharp power tactics, especially given the volume, nature and velocity of information moving online and through social media. Democracies should not only “inoculate themselves against malign authoritarian influence” but also “take a far more assertive posture on behalf of their own principles,” they argued in the report.

The authors analyzed case studies of the PRC’s and Russia’s activities in Argentina and Peru in South America and Poland and Slovakia in Central Europe for the report. They also reviewed evidence of the insidious ways the regimes are injecting their political narratives into other democracies, from Australia and New Zealand to Europe and Africa.

“Taken separately, authoritarian influence efforts in particular countries may seem fairly harmless or ineffectual. However, when the seemingly disparate...
activities of Russia and China around the world are added together, a far more disturbing picture emerges,” they concluded.

**EXPLOITING ASYMMETRY**

Although the PRC and Russia use different approaches, they both exploit the openness of democratic countries, while closing their own borders real and virtual to external influences, Walker and Ludwig explained.

The PRC, foremost, uses sharp power to suppress challenges to the regime’s presentation of itself, effectively manipulating and censoring messaging and behavior, the authors wrote. “The Chinese government often aims to portray the country as either a benign foreign influence or a successful example of economic development without democratic political institutions.” In addition, “embedded within China’s campaign to defend and promote its own one-party system is a tacit criticism of democracy as inefficient, chaotic, and a poor catalyst for economic development.”

The PRC has co-opted many of the conventional vehicles of democratic societies to deliver its sharp power initiatives and make the single-party regime seem more palatable to young democracies. It uses state-funded research centers, media outlets, language-training offerings through its Confucius Institutes and people-to-people exchanges to entice politicians, journalists, academics in young democracies in Latin America and elsewhere to alter policies and influence broader constituencies. In Australia, for example, Chinese entities have donated funds to political parties, individual candidates and universities, bought up space in newspapers to promote state views and suppressed debate on Australian campuses by controlling Chinese students, according to various news reports.

Ironically, inside China’s and Russia’s civil society sectors, unknown to many local actors in newer democracies, such avenues are closed to their citizens. “These efforts are part of the larger aim of Moscow and Beijing to get inside democratic systems in order to incentivize cooperation and neutralize criticism of their authoritarian regimes,” the authors explained. Moreover, they found that the PRC often pressures local allies, which usually include Chinese immigrant populations that the PRC has historically spied upon to control, to silence opposing voices and actors.

Sharp power “seeks to penetrate and subvert politics, media and academia, surreptitiously promoting a positive image of the country, and misrepresenting and distorting information to suppress dissent and debate,” Nye elaborated in his *Foreign Affairs* analysis. “China’s sharp power has three striking characteristics — it is pervasive, it

**FIVE KEY MESSAGING STEPS TO COUNTER THE ATTEMPTED COERCION OF DEMOCRACIES BY CHINA’S AND RUSSIA’S REGIMES**

**ADDRESS THE SHORTAGE OF INFORMATION ON THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC) AND RUSSIA.** In the four democracies examined, information concerning the Chinese political system and its foreign policy strategies tends to be extremely limited. There are few journalists, editors and policy professionals who possess a deep understanding of the PRC and can share their knowledge with the rest of their societies. The same holds true for Russia in places such as Latin America, though knowledge of today’s Russia is stronger in Central Europe.

**UNMASK AUTHORITARIAN INFLUENCE.** PRC and Russian sharp power efforts rely in large part on camouflage — disguising state-directed projects as the work of commercial media or grassroots associations, for example, or using local actors as conduits for foreign propaganda and tools of foreign manipulation. To counteract these efforts at misdirection, observers in democracies should put them under the spotlight and analyze them in a comprehensive manner.

**INOCULATE DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES AGAINST MALIGN AUTHORITARIAN INFLUENCE.** Once the nature and techniques of authoritarian influence efforts are exposed, democracies should build up their internal defenses. Authoritarian initiatives are directed at cultivating relationships with the political elites, thought leaders and other information gatekeepers of democratic societies. Moscow and Beijing aim to get inside democratic systems to win supporters and to neutralize criticism of their authoritarian regimes.

**REAFFIRM SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC VALUES AND IDEALS.** If one goal of authoritarian sharp power is to legitimize illiberal forms of government, then it is effective only to the extent that democracies and their citizens lose sight of their own principles. Top leaders in the democracies must speak out clearly and consistently on behalf of democratic ideals and put down clear markers regarding acceptable standards of democratic behavior.

**RE-CONCEPTUALIZE ‘SOFT POWER.’** Finally, journalists, think tank analysts and other policy elites need to recognize authoritarian influence efforts in the realm of ideas for what they are: corrosive and subversive “sharp power” instruments that do real damage to the targeted democratic societies. The conceptual vocabulary that has been used since the Cold War’s end no longer seems adequate to describe the contemporary situation.

breeds self-censorship and it is hard to nail down proof that it is the work of the Chinese state.”

FINANCIAL COUPLING
Authoritarian states combine economic leverage with sharp power to further their political agendas, the National Endowment for Democracy report authors also found. “China is especially adroit in this regard, applying pressure with varying intensity and through indirect channels that are not always apparent unless one examines Chinese business activities in conjunction with Beijing’s other influence efforts.”

Money is instrumental in the PRC’s sharp power initiatives throughout Latin America, according to Juan Carlos Cardenal, a researcher at the Center for the Opening and Development of Latin America who authored report chapters on Latin America. In late 2016, Chinese President Xi Jinping pledged that China would train 10,000 Latin Americans by 2020. People-to-people engagements such as free trainings, exchange programs and scholarships in China have proven highly effective in winning over Latin America’s regional elites, Cardenal wrote.

The PRC uses various types of economic leverage around the world, according to Evan Feigenbaum, a senior fellow at the Asia Forum of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The PRC uses its foreign direct investment to shape rules and norms in other countries to favor China. In Africa it has essentially forced nations to convert debt owed to China to equity, buy and hire Chinese workers, adopt Chinese technical and engineering standards and procurement rules, Feigenbaum wrote in a July 2017 article on the foundation’s website.

The PRC also applies economic pressure by restricting access to its domestic markets. For instance, China shut out the South Korean company Lotte Group, a chewing-gum maker and retail giant, after it provided the land to the South Korean government to house the terminal high-altitude area missile defense’s (THAAD) batteries. Within months of the signing of the land swap deal in February 2017, Chinese regulators closed most of the 112 Lotte Mart stores in China over supposed fire code violations, Reuters reported.

The PRC can also use a punitive approach. In November 2017, Mongolia allowed the Dalai Lama to visit its capital, Ulaanbaatar. In response, China implemented cross-border fees on Mongolian commodity exports, according to Feigenbaum. Then in January 2018, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said the Chinese government hoped Mongolia had “learned its lesson” and wouldn’t invite the Dalai Lama to return, The UB Post, Mongolia’s English-language news outlet, reported.

RUSSIA’S TACTICS
Meanwhile, Russia’s approach to sharp power more directly strives to undermine the health and credibility of democratic states.

“Whereas Beijing attempts to raise its profile and expand its power mainly through aggressive investment, co-optation, and dishonest salesmanship, Moscow hopes to level the playing field largely by dragging down its democratic adversaries, either in appearance or in reality,” the report authors explained.
Russia preys upon existing frustrations and cynicism of local communities to provoke unrest and corrupt public policies, according to Jacek Kucharczyk, president of the Institute of Public Affairs, a Polish think tank. Kucharczyk authored a chapter on political polarization in Poland for the National Endowment for Democracy report.

Russia employs similar tactics to those used by the PRC to undermine its enemies in the international community. The Russian government has worked to undermine Poland’s support for Ukraine’s new democratic government by keeping narratives about historic tensions between two countries alive, Kucharczyk found. The Russian government also strives to destroy Poland’s and Slovakia’s sense of belonging to the European and trans-Atlantic communities, as well as their democratic governance, according to the report.

There are “many dangerous liaisons between specific political narratives employed by homegrown populists and Russian propaganda, as well as calculated efforts by the PRC to portray itself as an ultramodern, benevolent power featuring an authoritarian political system that offers a better incubator for economic growth than liberal democracy,” Kucharczyk wrote.

Russia, even more than the PRC, has expanded its state media internationally and dissemination of disinformation into other countries, including its efforts to interfere in foreign elections. In Poland, for example, third-party websites often pick up stories from Russian media, making it more credible to the local population, which would be less likely to trust a Russian source, Kucharczyk explained. At the same time, authoritarian regimes, and the PRC in particular, restrict their citizens’ access to the internet and use of social media platforms and censor news and online content. In this way, the regimes exploit advantages of globalization, but reject the tenets of free and open exchanges and transparency inside their borders.

Moreover, the PRC’s and Russia’s targeting of newly created democracies, which are more vulnerable, is especially troubling, given the strategic value of these nations to democracies, Walker and Ludwig concluded.

The United States and its allies and partners must adopt new measures and tools that build upon democratic values to counter the PRC and Russia in their international campaigns for control of information and ideas. The authors caution that if “powerful democracies do not rise to the challenge, they will be abdicating their leadership roles, abandoning their allies, and neglecting their own long-term security.”

“Should these and other well-resourced autocratic regimes maintain their current momentum for the foreseeable future, their efforts could do grievous damage to the integrity of young democracies. This in turn would deliver a devastating blow to the rules-based international order that has underpinned global security and prosperity,” they warned.
As India’s politico-military orientation is adjusting to the change in the United States’ geostrategic orientation from the Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific, the region of Pacific islands will get more strategic attention from India.

To start with, India’s maritime strategic orientation is toward the rimlands of Eurasia, which is reflected in it giving greater strategic importance to the littoral areas in the greater Indo-Pacific region (such as the Bay of Bengal, Arabian Sea and South China Sea). The region of the Pacific islands had long been neglected in India’s maritime strategic thinking.

This is about to change. India’s maritime disposition seems to envision having command of the sea in the Indo-Pacific, apart from securing its interests in the coastal areas.

Geospatially, the Pacific islands are getting increased attention from India as it connects Australasia to the Latin American subcontinent. Further, the region will face increased maritime traffic once the Trans-Pacific Partnership is finalized.

The Pacific islands are a part of the wider Asia-Pacific and now under the even wider Indo-Pacific region. Therefore, with U.S. Pacific Command having been renamed as U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, it’s expected that India’s force structure — including its maritime strategic orientation — will also shift to include the South Pacific and Pacific islands.

As India is expanding its maritime reach to the Pacific islands, the region falls organically into China’s maritime strategic thinking and expansion as a part of its oft-stated “island chain” strategy. Beijing largely benefited from good terms with Washington during the Cold War, paving the way for its politico-military expansion in the Pacific islands (which began quietly in the early 1980s).

India’s maritime presence in the Pacific islands is limited, as its Eastern Fleet based in Visakhapatnam, India, has operations up to the Malacca Strait but not as far as the Pacific islands. This may change if India acquires another fleet based in the strategically located Andaman and Nicobar islands for greater maritime engagement. Though not openly articulated, India’s ambitious approach in the Indo-Pacific as spelled out by the Indian Navy’s Maritime Security Strategy Document 2015 could only be achieved if it gets another fleet in the Andaman and Nicobar islands, which will improve India’s military engagement with the South Pacific.

At present, India doesn’t have a permanent military presence in the Pacific. Diplomatically, however, India has shown interest in South Pacific affairs by participating in the Pacific islands Forum annually since 2002. India also has begun to provide foreign aid to the islands in the South Pacific by offering soft loans for development projects.

The above aspect got increased attention during the second summit of the Forum for India-Pacific Islands Cooperation in Jaipur, India, in August 2015, which pushed the limits of India’s Look East and Act East policy to the South Pacific region. During that summit, 12 of the 14 Pacific island countries pledged their support for India’s permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council (the two others, Cook Islands and Niue, don’t have a vote in the United Nations).

Earlier, during Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s trip to Fiji in November 2014, the scope and range of India’s diplomatic engagement with the Pacific islands was mooted. The trip was a turning point in India’s outreach to the Pacific islands: Modi invited the heads of state of all 14 Pacific island countries to Suva, Fiji’s capital city, as part of the first Indo-Pacific...
Founded in 1971, the forum includes 18 members: Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, French Polynesia, Kiribati, Nauru, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Marshall Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.

THE PACIFIC ISLANDS

PACIFIC ISLANDS FORUM
Founded in 1971, the forum includes 18 members: Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, French Polynesia, Kiribati, Nauru, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Marshall Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.

MELANESIAN SPEARHEAD GROUP
Founded in 1986, the group includes the four Melanesian states — Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu — and the Kanak and Socialist National Liberation Front of New Caledonia.
Islands Summit, largely modeled on India’s engagement with African countries through the Indo-African Summit. It established the Forum for India-Pacific Islands Cooperation.

One important aspect during Modi’s trip was the absence of India’s diplomatic establishment from New Zealand at the summit. That changed during Indian Minister of State for External Affairs V. K. Singh’s visit to Suva in May 2017 as part of the India and Pacific Islands Development Conference, with the Indian high commissioner of New Zealand’s participation. The Indian diplomatic mission in New Zealand has concurrent accreditation to three Pacific islands — Kiribati, Nauru and Samoa — making it a mix of primarily Micronesian and Polynesian diplomatic outreach.

India has permanent diplomatic postings only in Fiji and Papua New Guinea, none with military attaches.

However, India has had military attachments in Chile. This South American country qualifies as a South Pacific power, thanks to its considerable maritime reach in the South and Southeast Pacific. India’s military attachment in Chile involves active military cooperation, which helped Chile’s Maritime Forces develop amphibious and logistics capabilities.

India also will engage with Indonesia. In fact, during Modi’s recent trip to Indonesia, India endorsed Indonesia’s much-debated concept of the Maritime Fulcrum Vision, which calls for Jakarta’s maritime expansion in the Indo-Pacific region. Indonesia will follow suit by endorsing India’s Act East Policy stretching to the Pacific islands.

Diplomatically, as well, Indonesia will help expand India’s reach in the Pacific islands. Indonesia is a part of the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG), which is composed of the four Melanesian states — Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu — and the Kanak and Socialist National Liberation Front of New Caledonia. In June 2015, Indonesia was recognized as an associate member.

The MSG is an alternative to the traditional Pacific Islands Forum, where India’s engagement has been increasing economically and diplomatically over the years. India is expected to seek membership in the MSG as a tactical move to counter China’s expansion in the South Pacific region, especially in the Melanesian countries where its influence is increasing.

With China reportedly contemplating a naval base in Vanuatu, India’s maritime presence in the Pacific islands may be welcomed by countries such as Australia, New Zealand, the United States, Indonesia and France. A Chinese base in Vanuatu would have the potential to be turned into a military “intelligence platform,” especially due to its vicinity to Australia and New Zealand, both close allies of the United States and part of the Five Eyes intelligence alliance.

Interestingly, France has military bases and overseas territories in the South Pacific. Paris recently signed a Logistics Exchange Agreement with New Delhi, similar
to the India-U.S. Logistics Exchange Agreement. The India-France agreement provides Indian access to French military bases in the western Indian Ocean. The scope of the India-France agreement will be extended to the South Pacific, where India might be given the opportunity to construct bases in the Pacific islands.

Military cooperation might include Indian forces operating alongside their French, New Zealand and Australian counterparts in such exercises as the biennial Croix du Sud. A further development of India’s engagement in the Pacific islands will include India sharing more active intelligence from France, Australia, New Zealand and the United States.

THE FIJI FACTOR

India’s greater engagement with the Pacific islands will be tested by Fiji’s elections this year. Despite Fiji being considered a Melanesian country just outside the Polynesian Triangle, its culture and politics are influenced by Polynesia. It also has a significant Indo-Fijian population, about 40 percent of the total population, wielding political influence, despite the coup in 1987 aimed against them.

In the past 12 years, Fiji has come a long way politically and economically under Frank Bainimarama, who took power through a coup in 2006 and then consolidated the power as prime minister in 2014 following the general elections. If Bainimarama further consolidates his power in the 2018 elections, Fiji may start asserting its political weight through membership in other regional forums, such as the Polynesian Spearhead Group, in addition to asserting its position in the MSG.

Bainimarama has supported the idea that Fiji, with its strategic location, could be converted into the South Pacific’s Singapore — largely helped by economic investment from overseas, especially from China but also India. India was a part of Fiji’s Look North Policy, which began in 2006.

China has used its economic leverage to fund and undertake numerous infrastructure projects such as port dredging and road building that have a dual-use potential. They can be used for civilian and military purposes alike.

As India tries to expand its reach in the Pacific islands, MSG countries may set up a regional security force named Legion with its headquarters in Suva. The Legion will be staffed by MSG administrators and consist of military, police, border control and customs personnel. Fiji and Papua New Guinea will be contributing the bulk of personnel to the Legion’s military and policing units. It’s expected that the Legion will be patronized with active Indian military and technical aid, especially after the 2018 Fijian elections.

Through such initiatives, the military dimension of India’s diplomatic endeavors in the region will predate Indian military bases and military attaches (especially naval attaches) in the Pacific island countries. India can also expand its presence in the South Pacific through its diaspora. India has a considerable diaspora in Australia, New Caledonia, Fiji and New Zealand, which provide an open conduit for information exchanges between the Southwestern Pacific neighbors and the Indian homeland.

Unlike the Chinese diaspora in the South Pacific, the Indian expatriate community is diverse in its loyalties and not as unified in its support for the Indian state or any political party. It is therefore not considered to be a source of espionage or influence-peddling in the same way as its Chinese counterpart, a welcome sign among the countries in the South Pacific.

In conclusion, India’s expanding reach in the South Pacific and Pacific islands will be a part of its expanding maritime reach. India will be improving its existing diplomatic, economic and cultural ties in the region as an overall part of its strategic outreach in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.

Balaji Chandramohan is a visiting fellow with Future Directions International. This article originally appeared in the online magazine The Diplomat on June 13, 2018. It has been edited to fit FORUM’s format.
Many of Madagascar’s people rely on the ocean to survive. As the world’s fourth largest island, it has 5,000 kilometers of coastline.

As global fish stocks are increasingly threatened with collapse, people in southern Madagascar have pioneered safer fishing alternatives to protect the country’s natural resources.

“When I was a kid, I went fishing with my dad and there was plenty,” said Clin Ratsimbazafy, who is part of a grassroots initiative to stop overfishing.

“But that changed, and we had nothing, until we learned how to preserve marine resources,” he said while repairing his nets in the late afternoon sun in Andavadoaka, a village on Madagascar’s southwest coast.

Madagascar’s first locally managed marine area (LMMA) was set up in 2006 and is called Velondriake, which means living with the ocean. It has blossomed, spawning more than 100 LMMAs on the island and as far afield as Fiji and Costa Rica.

Visitors have come all the way from Mexico to learn about Velondriake’s octopus reserves – areas closed to fishing to allow octopuses to grow to full size, replenishing stocks and maximizing catches.

“Once we told them about how the depletion of the resources would negatively affect them, they realized how important it is to protect the resources that they use every day,” said Velondriake President Richard Badouraly.

Working with the government, communities now manage 11 percent of the Malagasy coastline, often using customary environmental law known as the dina, according to Blue Ventures, a United Kingdom-based conservation group supporting the initiative.

Velondriake is the largest locally managed marine reserve in the Indian Ocean, spanning 640 square kilometers.

Badouraly hopes that other communities will adopt the grassroots conservation approach before endangered species become extinct. “My hope for the future is that all communities will be satisfied with the harvest of the sea, and everything will grow.”

REUTERS

Sweden has started construction on a factory that will test whether steel can be made without burning fossil fuels.

Utility firm Vattenfall – led by managing director and CEO Magnus Hall, pictured – has teamed up with steel company SSAB and mining firm LKAB to build the U.S. $158 million pilot plant.

Existing plants produce large amounts of carbon dioxide, a greenhouse gas, when coal is used to turn iron into hardened steel.

The new factory being built in the northeastern town of Lulea by 2020 will use hydrogen instead of coal and coke, which is a solid fuel made by heating coal. The companies’ joint venture, called HYBRIT, aims to have an industrial process in place by 2035, Vattenfall said in June 2018.

The technology could potentially cut Sweden’s carbon dioxide emissions by 10 percent, helping meet the country’s goals under the Paris climate accord, Vattenfall said. THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
EU LAWMAKERS CALL FOR GLOBAL BAN ON ‘KILLER ROBOTS’

The European Union (EU) took a stance against “killer robots” in mid-September 2018 when the European Parliament passed a resolution calling for an international ban on the development, production and use of weapons that kill without a human deciding to fire.

Autonomous weapons are machines programmed to select and attack targets using artificial intelligence, without human control. Opponents fear they could become dangerous in a cyber attack or because of a mistake in their programming.

“I know that this might look like a debate about some distant future or about science fiction. It’s not,” Federica Mogherini, the EU chief of foreign and security policy, said during a debate in Parliament the day before the vote.

The resolution strives to preempt development and use of autonomous weapons.

Countries, including the United States, China, Israel, South Korea, Russia and the United Kingdom, are moving closer to autonomous weapons systems, with precursors such as armed drones, according to the nonprofit group Human Rights Watch.

Russian news agency TASS reported in 2017 that Russian arms maker Kalashnikov had developed an automated weapon that was able to “identify targets and make decisions.”

Most members at the European Parliament debate favored the resolution, saying that the use of such weapons was an issue of human rights and humanitarian law. Some were concerned that legislation could limit scientific progress on artificial intelligence for everyday use.

Another concern stressed by the parliamentarians was the security risk the bloc would face if it banned the use of the weapons while others did not.

“Autonomous weapons systems must be banned internationally,” said Bodil Valero, security policy spokeswoman for the EU Parliament’s Greens/EFA Group. “The power to decide over life and death should never be taken out of human hands and given to machines.”

The resolution calls for the EU to establish a common position before international negotiations scheduled at the United Nations in November 2018.

At the U.N. level, 26 governments are demanding artificial intelligence weapons be banned, according to a statement from the Greens/EFA group.

“This resolution adds important momentum toward further steps to prevent their development and use,” said peace organization PAX in a statement after the September vote. Reuters
As gunshots ring out in one of South Africa’s most dangerous neighborhoods, a new technology detects the gun’s location and immediately alerts police.

South Africa is the first country outside the United States to implement the gunshot detector audio technology, which is also being used to fight wildlife poaching on the other end of the country in Kruger National Park.

The technology’s use in Cape Town’s notoriously violent Cape Flats area has contributed for the first time in 2018 to a conviction in a gang shooting. Police hope more will follow.

“About 13 percent of gunshots are reported by the public. Now we respond to every single incident, very rapidly,” said Cape Town Alderman J.P. Smith, who instituted the technology in the Manenberg and Hanover Park neighborhoods in 2016. “It’s accurate to between 2 meters and 10 meters (6 feet to 33 feet) of where the shot was fired.”

The recovery of illegal guns has jumped fivefold in the areas where the shotspotter is used, Smith said. The technology also provides accurate data about gun violence.

The technology operates by acoustic sensors, which are placed throughout a neighborhood. Cape Town plans to expand its use from the current 7 square kilometers to 18 square kilometers.

South Africa has one of the highest rates of murder in the world. In September 2018, police announced that the rate was up about 7 percent, with 20,336 people murdered between April 2017 and March 2018, compared to 19,016 in the previous year. Many were linked to gang violence in Western Cape province, whose capital is Cape Town.

The national homicide rate of 34 per 100,000 people spikes in parts of the Cape Flats to 250 per 100,000, according to the University of Cape Town.

“Violence begets violence,” said University of Cape Town criminologist Guy Lamb. “Since 1994 we’ve had high levels of unemployment, poverty, inequality and these dynamics have fed into the high violent crime rate.”

One Manenberg resident, Shakier Adams, explained what life is like on the Cape Flats.

“Growing up, you are literally caught in crossfire on a daily basis. You have to be careful who you speak to, where you go, whoever you associate yourself with.” — The Associated Press

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**EUROPE GIVES INTERNET FIRMS 1 HOUR to remove extremist content**

European authorities are planning to slap internet companies such as Google, Twitter and Facebook with big fines if they don’t take down extremist content within one hour of its posting.

European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker said in a September 2018 speech that the commission is proposing the new rules as part of efforts to step up the bloc’s security.

He said that removing material within an hour is important because it’s “the critical window in which the greatest damage is done.”

The European Union’s (EU’s) executive body said “propaganda that prepares, incites or glorifies acts of terrorism” must be taken offline. Content would be flagged by national authorities, who would issue removal orders to the internet companies hosting it. Those companies would be given one hour to delete it.

The proposal, which still needs approval from EU lawmakers and member states, would be a departure for the EU, which until now has allowed online companies to take a voluntary approach to battling extremist content. The one-hour rule was among a series of recommendations the commission made in March 2018 to fight the spread of extremist content online.

Under the proposal, internet companies would have to take measures, including installing automated systems, to prevent content from being re-uploaded after being removed the first time. Companies that fail to comply would face fines of up to 4 percent of their annual global turnover.

For Google, which owns YouTube, that could amount to as much as U.S. $4.4 billion, based on parent company Alphabet Inc.’s U.S. $110.9 billion in revenue for 2017.

“We share the European Commission’s desire to react rapidly to terrorist content and keep violent extremism off our platforms,” Google said. “We welcome the focus the commission is bringing to this and we’ll continue to engage closely with them, member states and law enforcement on this crucial issue.” — The Associated Press
Members of the Japan Self-Defense Forces’ honor guard prepare for a ceremony for Adm. Philip S. Davidson, commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, at the Defense Ministry in Tokyo, Japan, on June 21, 2018. During his trip, Davidson met with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Japanese Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera and assured them of the U.S. commitment to Japan’s defense and the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of North Korea, Reuters reported. “We need to closely watch North Korea’s steps toward denuclearization. The Japan-U.S. alliance plays a crucial role in this,” Onodera said.

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