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ABOUT THE COVER:
The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyer Kurama leads the fleet during a review at Sagami Bay.
Dear Readers,

Welcome to Indo-Asia-Pacific Defense FORUM’s fourth-quarter edition for 2016, which emphasizes the importance of sharing best practices and lessons learned from regional maritime activities. This issue explores the changing seascape, approaches to resolving conflict in the region, and increasing shared maritime awareness to bolster security and stability while protecting the environment and its resources. We created this edition in recognition of the need for a comprehensive look at maritime information sharing, which underpins all maritime operations and informs good maritime policy.

In recent years, nations across the region have made progress in balancing multilateral and bilateral mechanisms to successfully respond to everything from natural disasters and health crises to trafficking and piracy at sea. Success stories from Mongolia to New Zealand reveal responsible reactions and resolutions to issues in the region through multilateral approaches.

Lately, tensions in the South China Sea have been mounting. The conflicts are especially challenging, given the complexity of the disputes and the underlying economic, political, military and legal situations. Nations contest who owns various land features in the region and where to draw maritime boundaries. Meanwhile, jurisdictional disputes regarding regulatory rights within specific zones have set a number of nations at odds with each other.

Despite these complexities, countries across the region have increasingly engaged responsibly to resolve challenges such as territorial disagreements. The prospect of multilateral mechanisms successfully resolving disputes in the South China Sea depends on each individual nation’s — and especially China’s — ability to understand how cooperation can protect sovereignty, bolster security, and manage economic, environmental and resource concerns.

This issue of FORUM examines the importance of multilateral responses to regional disputes and discusses how powers can achieve peaceful resolutions through cooperation and partnerships.

I hope that you find this edition insightful and thought-provoking, and I welcome your comments. Please contact the FORUM staff at iapdf@iapdforum.com with your perspectives.

All the best,

HARRY B. HARRIS, JR.
Admiral, USN
Commander, U.S. Pacific Command
DR. ERIKA TECHERA and DR. JADE LINDLEY write about maritime crime for this issue. Techera, a law professor at the University of Western Australia, researches in the area of international and comparative environmental law. Her particular research interests include marine environmental governance; cultural heritage law; and environmental management in small island states. Prior to joining academia, she practiced as a barrister in Sydney for more than seven years. Lindley, a research fellow at the University of Western Australia Faculty of Law and the Oceans Institute, worked as a researcher for state and federal government, international organizations and in academia. Her research interests include transnational organized crime and international law. In 2015, she published the book *Somali Piracy: A Criminological Perspective*.  

CMDR. JONATHAN V. ZATA leads the Philippine Navy’s Maritime Security and Safety Unit of the National Coast Watch Council Secretariat. A former ship captain, he is an alumnus of the Naval Officer’s Qualification Course “Charlie” and earned a degree in computer science before joining the Navy in 1991.  

ADM. SCOTT H. SWIFT was promoted to admiral and assumed command of the U.S. Pacific Fleet on May 27, 2015. He is the 35th commander of the fleet since its establishment in February 1941 with headquarters at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Prior to assuming command at U.S. Pacific Fleet, he was assigned to the Pentagon as the director, Navy Staff. Swift has been recognized as the commander, Naval Air Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet Landing Signal Officer of the Year; along with other personal, unit and service awards.  

SHAHID SADIQ and JACOB DOYLE write about Pakistan refugees for this issue of FORUM. Sadiq is Security Coordinator for the International Rescue Committee in Pakistan, where his primary responsibility is the day to day security management related to the committee and its partners. Shahid has worked in security in Pakistan’s international nongovernmental organization sector since 2010. Previously, he served as an officer in the Pakistan Army for over a decade, including service as Personal Staff Officer with the Senior Army command and as a liaison officer with U.N. Observers. Doyle, a veteran journalist with over two decades of experience, has written for publications such as the *Budapest Business Journal* and *Czech Business Weekly*. He is based in Turkey.  

VICE ADM. TIM BARRETT, Chief of Navy of the Royal Australian Navy, joined in 1976 as a seaman officer and later specialized in aviation. A dual-qualified officer, Barrett received a Conspicuous Service Cross in 2006 for his achievements in naval action and became a member of the Order of Australia in 2009 for his service as director of Naval Officers' Postings and Command Navy Aviation Group. He became an officer of the Order of Australia in 2014 for his leadership of Border Protection Command and the Australian Fleet.
Turning to bamboo to rebuild after quake

Bamboo, nicknamed “vegetable steel,” is coming in handy in Nepal as it rebuilds homes and schools after devastating earthquakes in 2015 left hundreds of thousands homeless.

“Bamboo is a great material. The biggest enemy [in a quake] is weight, so bamboo is perfect because it is light, flexible and very strong,” said Nepalese architect Nripal Adhikary.

“It can be as strong as steel, but it’s much more ecological because it doesn’t need energy to produce. People call it ‘vegetable steel.’ ”

Twin earthquakes in April and May 2015 killed almost 9,000 people and destroyed nearly a million buildings in the Himalayan nation. Donors have pledged U.S. $4.1 billion for reconstruction, but rebuilding has been delayed by a political crisis.

Adhikary said the government had approved the use of bamboo to rebuild schools and was expected to approve its use for reconstructing homes. Bamboo is suited for rebuilding in Nepal’s mountainous terrain because it grows widely and is easier to transport than heavier materials, Adhikary said, adding that building with bamboo is also about 50 percent cheaper than with other materials.

Technological advances have improved its durability, he said, while new systems for joining bamboo lengths mean it can be used to build larger structures than in the past.

The International Network for Bamboo and Rattan is working with Nepal’s government on a U.S. $800,000 pilot project using bamboo to build 150 homes and 10 schools, which it hopes other agencies will replicate. 

The Philippines has launched the first public immunization program for dengue fever, seeking to administer to a million schoolchildren the world’s first licensed vaccine against a mosquito-borne disease that the World Health Organization (WHO) estimates infects 390 million people a year globally.

As the program began in April 2016, hundreds of fourth-graders at a public school in metropolitan Manila’s Marikina city were given the first of three shots of Dengvaxia.

The Philippines had the highest dengue incidence in the WHO’s Western Pacific region from 2013 to 2015, recording 200,415 cases in 2015, according to the nation’s Department of Health.

Health Secretary Janette Garin called the program’s launch “a historic milestone” in public health. “We are the first country to introduce, adopt and implement the first-ever dengue vaccine through [the] public health system and under a public school setting,” she said.

The government is spending 3.5 billion pesos (U.S. $76 million) to administer the free vaccines, which it bought at a discounted cost of 3,000 pesos (U.S. $65) for three doses for each child. Free vaccine programs ensure that “health should be for all, rich or poor,” Garin said. 

The International Network for Bamboo and Rattan is working with Nepal’s government on a U.S. $800,000 pilot project using bamboo to build 150 homes and 10 schools, which it hopes other agencies will replicate.
India said it is revising its drugs law to make it easier for companies to do business while ensuring the safety and efficacy of medicines. The decision is Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s latest move to encourage industry.

Until 2015, India was trying to tweak its archaic Drugs and Cosmetics Act of 1940, and an amendment bill was introduced in the upper house of Parliament in 2013. That has now been withdrawn.

Ministers decided the current law cannot effectively regulate areas such as biological drugs, stem cells and regenerative medicines, medical devices and clinical trials, according to a government statement.

Draft guidelines to regulate the medical devices industry have already been prepared after consultations with stakeholders.

So far, medical devices in India have been regulated as drugs, but companies have been clamoring for separate rules over the years as the industry has grown to roughly U.S. $5 billion.

With Modi championing a “Make in India” campaign, the government statement said the medical products sector is “poised for exponential growth in the near future” and “has the potential to become an international hub.”

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China will give greater financial rewards to innovative academics and small research bodies in a drive to convert interesting scientific ideas into commercial realities and rev up its high-tech industries as wider economic growth stalls.

China’s State Council said research bodies and university units that transferred their work to outside firms to develop and market should receive no less than half the net income earned from the product as a reward.

China is trying to boost its high-tech industries, from medicines to computer chips, to offset a slowdown in manufacturing and exports that has dragged its economic growth to its slowest level in a quarter of a century.

“It is important to speed up the transfer of scientific achievements, open a channel between science and the economy and quickly create a new productive force,” the State Council said in February 2016.

Academics are to have greater freedom to do part-time work with external firms to develop products, the State Council said.

Wang Bin, deputy head of the China Association for Promotion of Private Sci-Tech Enterprises, told the Xinhua News Agency that researchers often worried about getting into commercial projects for fear of harming their academic careers.

“The new policies will encourage more to venture into business,” he said.
A security guard watches Malaysia’s iconic Petronas Twin Towers in Kuala Lumpur. Inspector-General of Police Khalid Abu Bakar said police raised Malaysia’s security alert to the highest level after a January 2016 attack in Jakarta, Indonesia.

THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
Muslim-majority Malaysia had been on high alert since militants carried out an armed attack in the capital of neighboring Indonesia in January 2016.

Three months later, Malaysian investigators arrested 15 people, including a police officer, who were suspected of links to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and of planning an attack in the country.

Some of the suspects received orders from Muhammad Wanny Mohamed Jedi, a Malaysian ISIL recruiter in Syria, to launch an attack on Malaysia, Inspector-General of Police Khalid Abu Bakar said in March 2016.

They were involved in collecting funds to be channeled to an ISIL-linked group in the southern Philippines and arranging the movement of “two foreign terror suspects” from Malaysia to a Southeast Asian country, Khalid said.

Other activities included attempting to acquire chemicals to make bombs, recruiting Malaysians to join ISIL in Syria, collecting funds from ISIL sympathizers in Malaysia and setting up working arrangements with militant groups around Southeast Asia, he said.

“Between 22 and 24 March, the special branch counterterrorism unit launched an operation in seven states, including the capital of Kuala Lumpur,” Khalid said, adding that the terrorism suspects included an aircraft technician and a Muslim preacher.

Malaysian Home Minister Ahmad Zahid Hamidi said earlier in March 2016 that police had foiled an ISIL plot to kidnap Prime Minister Najib Razak and other senior ministers in 2015. Khalid also announced that Malaysian police will add counterterrorist units in each of its states, according to a March 2016 report in the local newspaper, The Star.

Authorities apprehended the suspects in Kuala Lumpur City and in six Malaysian states, including Kedah, Penang, Perak, Perlis, Selangor and Terrengganu, The Star reported. “We have to take action on the slightest information we have on those involved with [ISIL] and even the sympathizers. We cannot afford to wait and see, as some others did,” Khalid told The Star.

At least 160 people have been arrested in Malaysia since January 2015 on suspicion of being involved in militant activities.

Criminologist P. Sundramoorthy told The Straits Times newspaper that although expanding the counterterrorism department to all states is a positive step, it “will not solve the root cause of the problem.” He said that communities must provide information to help police and law enforcement authorities.
Countries should look at multinational approaches to regulating and limiting illegal fishing, trafficking, smuggling and other sea crimes

DR. ERIKA TECHERA AND DR. JADE LINDLEY
Maritime crimes plague the Indo-Asia-Pacific region and disrupt the global trade that passes within it. These crimes affect not only those nations within the region but also countries that receive goods from it as cargo. Reportedly, maritime criminals operating in this region commit illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing; commit piracy; traffic in drugs; and smuggle people into forced and free labor. These transnational crimes attract criminal syndicates that pursue smaller-scale crimes to fund the clandestine movement of drugs bound for Australia, New Zealand, Japan and the United States. Authorities intercept countless illicit drugs transiting the Indo-Asia-Pacific region each year. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes (UNODC) estimates that East and Southeast Asia are the largest markets for amphetamine-type stimulants in the world. Trafficking of methamphetamine and heroin in this region alone generates more than U.S. $42 billion annually, according to UNODC data.

While vast sea trade routes provide opportunities to commit these crimes, official corruption and lax legal frameworks enable criminals to undermine regulatory control. This article provides an overview of maritime crimes occurring within the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, explains existing legal and regulatory frameworks, and offers some best-practice solutions to enhance the security of food and people within that region.

Increasing Awareness of Complex Threats
Indo-Asia-Pacific countries border a wide expanse of ocean, and each nation differs from the next in terms of size, population, development status, socio-cultural and politico-legal context. The vast geographic nature of the region lends itself to oceanic exploitation and clandestine activities because oversight is limited. In the past five years, illegal fishing, facilitated by forced labor aboard vessels and its links to transnational organized crime, has emerged as a priority on the global agenda. Increased exposure through research and media attention has improved global awareness of not only the direct impact of such crimes on economies in the region but also of the interconnections between these maritime crimes and the health of the whole of society.

Investigations by international bodies, governments and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), such as the Environmental Justice Foundation, exposed such problems in Southeast Asia and in particular Thailand. Illegal fishing facilitated by forced labor is a multifaceted problem. Aided by weak governance and, in most cases, corruption, it damages fishing stocks and breaches basic human rights on many levels. The persistence of IUU fishing using forced labor, often involving people trafficked into the industry, anchors those vulnerable people in permanent poverty, damages the livelihoods of legitimate fishers, and undermines good governance by supporting organized criminal networks and weakening security infrastructure.

Maritime piracy and IUU fishing have always had a presence in the Southeast Asia region. The scale of these traditional maritime crimes was manageable by regional regulators and until recently, maritime piracy posed little threat to passing vessels.
Maritime piracy involves illegal acts of violence on the high seas. During the sharp rise of Somali piracy in 2008, naval vessels operating under the European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) coalitions increased their presence off the Horn of Africa to guard vulnerable vessels transiting that region. Naval vessels previously deterring piracy in the Malacca Strait and South China Sea moved to the Indian Ocean, leaving the Asian region exposed to a piracy surge. During the peak of Somali piracy between 2008 and 2011, Indonesian pirates committed 129 attacks, compared to 786 Somali attacks. In the four years that followed, International Maritime Bureau data revealed a reversal in this trend. There was a threefold increase in Indonesian piracy attacks to 395 a year; meanwhile, Somali attacks declined to 101. Worse still, the Indonesian pirates adopted the modus operandi of Somali pirates, firing upon steaming vessels, hijacking and taking hostages for ransom, rather than boarding berthed or anchored vessels and stealing money, supplies and portable cargoes at knifepoint. In the absence of naval vessels guarding against Southeast Asia piracy, opportunistic pirates apparently plundered.

In addition, Somalia’s piracy turnaround may be attributed to several factors: NATO- and European Union-backed naval ports, ships hiring onboard riflemen and, perhaps more importantly, a new Somali government working to stabilize its lawless coast.

ECONOMIC IMPACTS
Declining catches and therefore reduced profits mean fishers and fishing companies seek out cost-cutting methods. Forced labor often involves desperate people facing poverty being sold, smuggled or trafficked into working for long periods at sea. Because fishing vessels operate farther offshore, the slave labor aboard these vessels is difficult to monitor, just as IUU fishing is largely hidden in these areas. Although it was abolished in the 19th century, slavery continues to occur in developing and developed countries in various forms. The U.N.’s International Labour Organization estimates that nearly 21 million people are victims of forced labor — with 11.4 million estimated to be women and girls and 9.5 million estimated to be men and boys. Modern-day slavery involves restricted movement, control of personal belongings and lack of fully informed consent.

Forced labor at sea involves workers who have no choices, no means of escape and must work under extreme conditions for little or no pay; this essentially amounts to slavery. These cases often involve children, men and women who have moved within and across borders and who, as part of the journey and/or at the end point, are exploited and abused. As well as being cheap labor, children are forced into work in the fishing industry all over the world because their fingers can retrieve fish from smaller nets.
In addition, vulnerable women are trafficked to “service” the men onboard vessels, while men are forced to work in appalling and dangerous conditions with little sleep and minimal food. They often face being thrown overboard if they become ill or injured.

In 1999, the International Labour Organization began addressing forced labor in the fishing industry, specifically reporting on Indonesian fisheries. The resulting report reveals that some forced workers onboard fishing vessels are trafficked — recruited and transported by coercive means for exploitation — while others are smuggled and moved across borders for profit. In this way, smugglers also skirt and effectively undermine migration laws.

While early attention was paid to forced labor in the sex industry for women and forced labor in the agricultural and hospitality industries for men, only recently has the focus expanded to the fisheries sector. Increasingly, governments are realizing the need to strengthen border control and law enforcement to help mitigate factors that enable and encourage maritime crimes.

**LEGAL CONTROL MEASURES**

The law and policy framework for controlling fishing, maritime security and labor issues is complex, with rules and regulations contained in a number of international and regional instruments. Despite

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**DATA SUPPORT THE NEED TO REMAIN VIGILANT AGAINST PIRACY**

A total of 200 incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships (187 actual incidents and 13 attempted incidents) were reported to the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships (ReCAAP) Information Sharing Centre in 2015. Of these, 11 were acts of piracy and 189 were incidents of armed robbery against ships. Compared to 2014, there has been a 7 percent increase in the total number of incidents in 2015.

Incidents reported in 2015 were less severe compared to 2014, with fewer incidents involving more than nine perpetrators, fewer cases involving perpetrators who were armed, and fewer incidents with reports that crew was threatened, held hostage or assaulted.

Continuous zeal among the littoral states and cooperation between the authorities and shipping industry demonstrates the determination and commitment in clamping down on this illegal maritime crime. With a decline in the number of incidents reported in the last quarter of 2015, and more perpetrators being put to task, more needs to be done to decrease the number of incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia.

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**LOCATION OF INCIDENTS**

*Number and location of incidents reported in Asia during 2014-2015*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>2014 Actual</th>
<th>2014 Attempted</th>
<th>2015 Actual</th>
<th>2015 Attempted</th>
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<tr>
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<td>India</td>
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<td>10</td>
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<td>Strait of Malacca and Singapore</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>Overall Total</td>
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<td>16</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*SOURCE: ReCAAP 2015 annual report executive summary*
these laws, monitoring and enforcement are leading challenges for effective marine governance. The vastness of the Indo-Asia-Pacific region further hinders effective oceanic surveillance. Littoral states struggling with poor governance and limited resources typically prioritize essential services such as education and healthcare ahead of monitoring their territorial waters and exclusive economic zones. Lack of policing has led to overfishing (fishing beyond authorized catch limits) and IUU fishing, aided by technologies focused purely on increasing fishing yield. With depleting fish stocks, fishers (legitimate and otherwise) operate farther from shore often in other countries’ territorial waters or on the high seas — a place of freedom exempt from inspections and monitoring.

There is clearly a significant role for regional organizations in addressing the critical issue of monitoring and enforcement. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is highly organized and coordinates regulatory cooperation for its members. However, it faces challenges in effectiveness. Developing a one-size-fits-all legal framework for the ASEAN member states remains an elusive goal. While all 10 ASEAN members have equal membership, their cooperation, contribution and return is unequal. Given this diversity, one of the major challenges for ASEAN is that one member’s crooks are another member’s nationals.

Criminal activities within the Pacific islands are far less understood than those occurring in the Asian region. The Pacific islands are themselves a suitable base for criminal organizations, given their central location between Australia, New Zealand, Japan and the U.S. The vastness of the region and transnational links help organized criminals evade law enforcement. Porous borders and weak border control render much of the Pacific (except Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the United States) unprotected and open to illegal activities.

Ship rider agreements between the U.S. and Pacific nations such as the Cook Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Samoa, Tonga and Tuvalu can be valuable in bridging the capacity and capability gap by providing patrols by the U.S. Coast Guard on open waters. Ship rider operations typically occur when U.S. vessels embark foreign nation law enforcement officials for the purpose of enforcing laws in their EEZ. The U.S. Coast Guard, using ship rider agreements, patrols the Pacific approximately 70 days each year.

Enhanced U.S. Coast Guard ship rider agreements negotiated with Palau and the Federated States of Micronesia strengthen enforcement of local laws. Expanding enhanced bilateral ship rider agreements with other Pacific islands or multilateral agreements would introduce a layer of regulatory control to protect against IUU fishing and other maritime crimes.

**STRENGTHENING REGULATIONS AND ENFORCEMENT**

Focusing on the issue of fisheries, regulatory control involves a complex combination of international and domestic laws. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) establishes that each country has sovereign rights over its territorial waters, which extend 12 nautical miles (22 kilometers) from shore. A nation’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) lies between 12 and 200 nautical miles, and coastal states can explore and exploit living marine resources up to a total allowable catch, based on an assessment of the maximum sustainable yield. The high seas exist beyond the EEZs, in which no country owns or controls the resources. UNCLOS requires that state parties cooperate to manage high seas fisheries, mainly through regional bodies and agreements, with only broad state obligations to protect and preserve the marine environment.

Intentionally vague, UNCLOS encourages regional bodies to determine and regulate living resources as deemed appropriate for the region. Regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs) develop conservation management measures to limit or restrict catches of certain stocks, but RFMOs do not address organized crime, forced labor or other maritime crimes. According to one RFMO, the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission, IUU fishing costs U.S. $1.5 billion annually within its region.

Monitoring and enforcement are integral to effective governance; however, the RFMO may only police activities occurring within its jurisdiction, and realistically has significant control only over its own members. The absence of comprehensive and cohesive global regulatory frameworks for fisheries governance has not assisted sustainable management where complex factors are at play.

In addressing the intersection of IUU fishing, maritime crime and forced labor, a plethora of relevant international institutions exist and legal frameworks apply. However, none comprehensively addresses these issues and their interconnections. The combination of cheap or no-cost labor, limited capability and capacity to police IUU fishing, and the inability of those in the supply chain (and consumers) to distinguish legitimate from illegal products in the marketplace renders the issue an ongoing challenge.

Combining direct and indirect policing can guard against maritime crimes within an at-risk region. Direct policing may involve increasing the presence of coast guards to identify and track suspect vessels for interdiction. Undertaking covert operations, involving authorities acting undercover as fishers, may increase access to vessels. However, this form of intense policing is unsustainable in the long term, particularly in a region with limited resources and more pressing priorities. The effectiveness of direct policing depends on a constant presence and the expectation of all
vessels being boarded and inspected. Indirect policing through technology and advanced vessel identification may provide a means to overcome the challenges of monitoring and surveilling vast oceanic regions.

Embracing emerging technologies also assists by increasing awareness of activities occurring at sea to better inform police, governments and fishers. For example, Palau tested the use of unmanned drones to detect and deter illegal fishers operating in its EEZ. Drones are able to isolate the location of a vessel operating illegally as well as its specific International Maritime Organization-issued identification number (for vessels of 100 gross-tonnage and above) and continuous synoptic records (for vessels of 500 gross-tonnage and above).

Autonomous underwater vehicles provide additional guardianship operating as a platform for sensors or as a tool to gather evidence. Other technologies include radar and satellites to monitor vessels remotely. Microwave heat differentials can determine warm from frozen cargo to detect fishery (and human trafficking) infringement.

These tools transmit data to allow authorities to intercept vessels at sea or at port and potentially provide evidence for use in court. These measures may also be effective for information sharing among RFMOs, coast guards and other stakeholders.

**FUTURE DIRECTIONS**

Controlling maritime crimes, including illegal fishing, in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region necessitates the adoption and implementation of best-practice governance. Lucrative fishing grounds are accessible illegally. Strengthened government efforts will provide protection for them.

Consideration should also be given to peripheral risk factors on land and at sea that increase the likelihood of human trafficking and forced and low-cost labor. A necessary first step is to adopt relevant international conventions, and bi- and multilateral agreements supporting policymakers and regulatory agencies to develop a toolkit for enforcement.

Improved and enhanced policing capabilities can be achieved by combining technology and regional cooperative arrangements to remotely monitor the vast region and reduce opportunities for clandestine offending. Finally, and importantly, increasing transparency about maritime crimes among consumers, in particular IUU fishing, is essential to encourage informed choices and sustainable purchases.
Bangladesh Navy frigate BNS Abu Bakar, foreground, participates in a multinational maritime exercise off the coast of China in April 2014. REUTERS
Future Capabilities and Lasting Friendships

The Bangladesh Navy focuses on solidifying itself as a distinguished regional partner

Forum Staff
It began in 1971 with two gunboats patrolling the Bay of Bengal and surrounding waterways in a country with swift-flowing rivers and low-lying terrain prone to flooding. Decades later, the Bangladesh Navy has transformed into a maritime force on the threshold of reaching its goal as a “three-dimensional” operation with air, sea and underwater capabilities by 2030.

“Modernization of the armed forces is one of the major commitments of the present government. In order to build up the Army, Navy and Air Forces as prudent and efficient forces, modernization is essential,” according to Bangladesh government documents outlining priority spending areas through 2017. “To protect the national sovereignty and security, it is necessary to acquire essential arms, ammunitions and modern war-equipment in order to increase [the] capability of the armed forces.”

Bangladesh began plotting its course for a pre-eminent Navy — known nationally as Forces Goal 2030 — more than 20 years before the target achievement date. The country recently ramped up military equipment acquisitions and purchase orders, all the while striving to remain an active regional partner as Armed Forces personnel upgrade their skills through additional training at home. These training opportunities include lessons on modern war techniques and expanded knowledge of new information technology — both aimed at increasing the efficiency of all Bangladesh defense forces.

“We have a bright future planned,” retired Adm. Muhammad Farid Habib, who served as chief of Naval Staff when he oversaw the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) gathering in Dhaka in January 2016, told FORUM. The Bangladesh Navy holds chairmanship of IONS through 2017.

He said the Navy’s course allows it to retain the country’s best and brightest by offering a wider set of career path options to newly enlisted cadets. “If they want to be a pilot, if they want to be on a submarine, they have all these opportunities,” Habib said. “The Navy is progressing very well, expanding. We have all new state-of-the-art ships at our hand. They [new recruits] will have a much bigger role to play in the future.”

Bangladesh once lacked the number of ships it needed to accomplish necessary patrols, Habib told FORUM. As IONS 2016 concluded in Dhaka, the country added two Chinese-built frigates to the Bangladesh Navy fleet during a ceremony at the Chittagong Port. Navy officials called them the most advanced frigates in their fleet, capable of detecting, identifying and destroying surface and aerial targets, according to the online news agency BDNews24.

The Navy also planned to add helicopters and commission two submarines, ordered from China, to its fleet by mid-2016, allowing the

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**Indian Ocean Naval Symposium Expands Reach**

The inaugural Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) seminar was hosted by the Indian Navy in 2008. Subsequent seminars have been held by the United Arab Emirates Navy in 2010, the South African Navy in 2012, Royal Australian Navy in 2014 and the Bangladesh Navy in 2016. IONS includes 23 nations that permanently hold territory that abuts or lies within the Indian Ocean and seven observer nations.

**Members**

**South Asian Littorals:** Bangladesh, India, Maldives, Pakistan, Seychelles, Sri Lanka and United Kingdom (British Indian Ocean Territory)

**West Asian Littorals:** Iran, Oman, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates

**East African Littorals:** France (Reunion), Kenya, Mauritius, Mozambique, South Africa and Tanzania

**Southeast Asian and Australian Littorals:** Australia, Burma, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand and Timor-Leste

**Observers**

China, Germany, Japan, Madagascar, Malaysia, Russia and Spain
country to better protect its exclusive economic zone, Habib said.

As much as the country has focused on internal priorities, it continues to push for expanded cooperation with allies across the Indo-Asia-Pacific.

“In today’s world, there is no alternative to inclusiveness,” Habib said. “Mutual cooperation is indispensable for attaining the desired benefits from the ocean. Given the growing strategic and economic importance of the Indian Ocean region — vis-à-vis the quantum of challenges encountered here — a meaningful partnership among the littorals is vital.”

He said no littoral state can address maritime challenges alone. All must work together “hand in hand” to develop a “robust cooperative mechanism” designed to face today’s challenges, Habib said.

“The geostrategic and geoeconomic importance of the Indian Ocean today has made this region the pivot and prime mover of the world economy in the 21st century,” Habib said. “It is thus essential to explore these historic opportunities through robust maritime cooperative engagements.”

He described Bangladesh’s foreign policy as “friendship to all and enemies to none.” That has remained evident in Bangladesh’s long-standing support and participation in the United Nations peacekeeping program. Bangladesh sent its first deployment of peacekeepers in 1988 and has become one of the largest peacekeeper contributors, sending more than 8,000 personnel over the years, according to the United Nations.

“The Bangladesh Navy always works together with friendly nations and friendly neighbors,” Habib told FORUM. “Whatever cooperation is occurring, we will be there. We want to see a peaceful life for our next generation. We want to leave a good world for our next generation. If we can work together and share each other’s experience and technology, everybody will be benefited.”

Toward the Bangladesh Navy’s vision of a more cooperative Indo-Asia-Pacific, Habib said Bangladesh plans to expand the working relationship among all navies operating in and around the Indian Ocean during the Bangladesh Navy’s chairmanship of IONS. He wants to see the symposium’s 35 members gather some time in 2017 to participate in a humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HADR) exercise — a first of its kind for IONS.

“If we become closer to each other, then probably our problems will be easier to solve,” Habib said. “We want to work in harmony in a very congenial atmosphere, so that together, we can secure our Indian Ocean for our nations.”

Given the universal concern for natural disasters, Habib said an HADR exercise seems like the natural way to begin increased cooperation among IONS members — outside of its existing forums. However, he said, other issues remain equally important, like maritime terrorism.

“Any time terrorist groups try to penetrate or enter through our coastal regions, we need to stop them,” Habib told FORUM. “If every country is serious about stopping these intruders in their area, then together, we can stop this menace.” □
Reclaimed WATERS

Maritime crime declines in Southeast Asia as countries adjust strategies to discourage sea bandit activity and prevent piracy

A small boat makes its way amid larger ships in the Singapore Strait.
Shipping crews and maritime officials who routinely navigate waters across Southeast Asia received a bit of good news as the first quarter for 2016 ended, when a team of analysts reported that piracy in the region had fallen to its lowest point in a decade.

“The first three months of 2016 have visibly demonstrated the dynamic nature of maritime crime and how effective action to combat it can turn the tide in favor of the good guys,” said Ian Millen, chief operating officer for Dryad Maritime, an England-based team of maritime operations and intelligence specialists who examine activity across the maritime environment. It released the first quarter figures. “There are some welcome causes for optimism in certain regions, notably the Indian Ocean where Somali piracy remains broadly contained, and in Southeast Asia, where we have seen a remarkable turnaround in a little over six months to deliver our lowest first quarter figures in a decade.”

Dryad reported 13 cases of maritime crime in the first quarter of 2016 compared with 35 incidents during the same period for 2015 — a more than 50 percent decline. The most serious incident occurred in March 2016, when sea bandits hijacked an Indonesian-flagged oil ship carrying coal from Indonesia to the Philippines, then held its 10 crew members prisoner and demanded a U.S. $1-million ransom. Authorities believed the criminals to be members of the terrorist organization Abu Sayyaf Group.

Other agencies have also captured and presented data on the downturn in reported incidents, but some — like the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) — evaluate such information cautiously. The IMB, which established a reporting center in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in 1992, said a key factor in this recent global reduction was the drop in attacks against small fuel tankers around Southeast Asia’s coastlines.

“IMB particularly commends the robust actions taken by the Indonesian and Malaysian authorities in the arrest and prosecution of two gangs that hijacked tankers. We also applaud the subsequent arrest of some of the alleged masterminds,” IMB Director Pottengal Mukundan said in a February 2016 statement on IMB’s website.

According to IMB data, 15 vessels were hijacked in 2015 compared with 21 in 2014; 271 hostages were held on their ships in 2015 compared with 442 in 2014; and no hijackings were reported during the fourth quarter of 2015.

Despite reductions in what IMB calls “key areas,” bureau officials say piracy hot spots persist around the world. Mukundan cautioned shipmasters to maintain “strict anti-piracy and robbery watches” since Southeast Asia continues to account for most of the world’s incidents, according to IMB.

“Conditions can change quickly, for good and for ill, so we are by no means complacent. Without the comprehensive, international response to the Somali pirate threat, we wouldn’t be in the favorable position we find ourselves in today,” Millen said. “A great deal of credit must go to international naval forces and maritime security industry whose warships, helicopters and armed guards have deterred and defeated attempts at
Bateman commends the Singapore-based Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) for classifying attacks based on level of violence used and economic loss incurred. Of the 200 attacks ReCAAP recorded in 2015, 153 were deemed minor incidents involving petty theft and no harm to the crew, Bateman wrote.

“Differentiating between incidents of ‘piracy’ and what the International Maritime Organization defines as ‘armed robbery against ships’ is important,” Bateman wrote. “Piracy occurs on board ships on the high seas, while armed robberies against ships occur in waters within a state’s sovereign jurisdiction — its internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial sea. Most incidents in Asian waters are in fact ones of ‘armed robbery against ships’ and thus the responsibility of the relevant coastal state to take enforcement action. The strict definition of piracy establishes piracy as ‘a crime against humanity’ outside the jurisdiction of a coastal state against which any state is entitled to take action.”

Rear Adm. Achmad Taufiqpoerrochman M., commander of Western Fleet Command for the Indonesian Navy, agrees that properly labeling an incident of maritime crime makes a difference when it comes to a region’s reputation on how local authorities manage sea bandits and pirates.

“We must use the right terminology,”
Experts encourage countries to remain as vigilant on issues of sea crime as they did during the height of the problem.

“Despite the good progress in some regions, we should remember that criminal enterprises — maritime or otherwise — are adaptable, flexible and unconstrained by ethics, morality or international corporate law,” said Millen of Dryad Maritime. “We know that they are no less business-savvy than legitimate, law-abiding enterprises and will adapt to changing market conditions, finding new, less risky and more profitable ways of acquiring their ill-gotten gains. Keeping one step ahead of the criminals is the key to success, and the foundations of success lie in understanding the threat and engaging in ways of mitigating the risk that they may pose.”

Taufiqqoerrochman described the Malacca Strait as narrow. For some time, criminals had an advantage over Indonesian authorities because their boats were faster and smaller, making it easier for them to navigate the strait. Indonesia equipped its Navy with similar boats to match the speed and agility of the sea bandits, Taufiqqoerrochman told FORUM.

In addition to the capability change, Indonesia began working closer with Malaysia to exchange information on suspected sea bandits, and hopes to increase cooperation with Singapore. The admiral said increased regional cooperation helps naval officials obtain evidence to prosecute the criminals, who often disperse money to banks in Malaysia and Singapore.

The Indonesian Navy is also working more closely with police and the Coast Guard to track down tips about sea bandits who escape to shore before naval authorities can capture them. Taufiqqoerrochman said tips and interagency cooperation have allowed the Indonesian Navy to pursue criminal charges against more sea bandits.

The good news of declining incidents is no reason to relax. In fact, as security concerns rise regarding terrorist groups targeting shipping lanes, Southeast Asian officials continue looking for ways to increase joint patrols and maintain safer passages for all vessels.
Maritime Modernization

Geopolitical forces propel military upgrades across the Indo-Asia-Pacific
Throughout the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, nations are investing in the modernization of their armed forces — particularly their maritime forces. They’re upgrading military hardware, investing in cutting-edge defense technology, and replacing planes and ships that are 30 or 40 years old.

Chinese leaders are working to increase the capabilities of their country’s huge armed forces. They’re developing new warplanes and revamping a command structure that dates back to the Cold War. China’s first domestically built aircraft carrier, weighing 50,000 tons, is on its way.

Japan is testing its first stealth fighter while building new drones and jets in a quest to maintain air superiority over China. In the water, Japan’s fleet now boasts its biggest warship since World War II.

India is upgrading its Navy with 40 new warships, 12 more submarines and the first India-designed and built aircraft carrier.

In South Korea, they’re creating a modern blue-water Navy capable of projecting power farther from the nation’s shores.

In Australia, they’re launching a 20-year plan to bolster naval strength. This includes a $50 billion in Australian dollars (U.S. $40 billion) deal with France to build a fleet of 12 diesel-electric Barracuda submarines.

Defense analysts say that China’s rising power and North Korea’s continual provocations are some of the perceived threats propelling these trends.

They say the region’s growing military muscle is primarily a reaction to Beijing’s increasing assertiveness — its tenacious claim to more than 80 percent of the South China Sea. Beijing has staked this claim by dredging sand to build islands topped with airfields and other military facilities. A second impetus behind the regional military buildup is the threat of North Korea’s nuclear bomb and missile ambitions in combination with its regime’s unpredictable behavior, which worries South Korean and Japanese leaders in particular.

“Decisions on arms acquisitions in the Asia-Pacific continue to be driven by a multitude of strategic rationales and domestic factors,” Sheryn Lee of the Australian National University’s Strategic and Defence Studies Centre wrote in an analysis for the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. “Maritime disputes between China and its neighbors have increased tensions and affected countries’ military modernization programs. These tensions have driven the requirement for greater surveillance capabilities and signals intelligence systems as well as more surface combatants with longer endurance and platforms able to launch anti-ship missiles, submarines and long-range aircraft.”

STRENGTHENING DEFENSES

Just about every major military in the Indo-Asia-Pacific has begun upgrading its arsenal.

Thailand has been pursuing a long-deferred dream of buying submarines. Vietnam has embarked on its biggest military buildup since the Vietnam War. Indonesia has acquired advanced anti-ship missiles and is replacing 30-year-old aircraft with new fighter jets.

The Philippines is flying its first supersonic aircraft in a decade. In Dhaka, they’re decommissioning old Bangladesh Navy vessels and deploying new or refurbished ones in their place. Taiwan is building its own fleet of submarines.

The trend isn’t slowing down.

Militaries across the Indo-Asia-Pacific will spend roughly a combined U.S. $100 billion more annually by 2020 than they did in 2015, rising from a total of U.S. $435 billion in 2015 to a projected U.S. $533 billion by 2020, according to a fiscal year 2016 defense budget analysis produced by IHS Jane’s Defense.

The jane’s report said countries are spending strategically to attain greater regional influence.

Five countries in the region appeared on an IHS Jane’s list of top 15 defense budgets for 2015 after the U.S., which came in at No. 1: China at No. 2; India, No. 6; Japan, No. 7; South Korea, No. 10; and Australia, No. 11. Meanwhile, Russia was ranked at No. 5.

“Rising tensions in the Asia-Pacific have seen a long-overdue process of military modernization move up the political agenda in a number of countries,” Craig Caffrey, principal analyst at IHS Jane’s, said in the report. “The Philippines, Indonesia, Japan and Vietnam are all following China’s lead, and we see no sign of this trend coming to an end.”
JOINING FORCES

At the same time, increasing volatility in the Indo-Asia-Pacific is spurring closer defense ties among a network of key nations, according to many officials in the region.

For example, Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop made this point in a March 2016 speech in Tokyo. Pointing to tensions in the South China Sea and “random acts of destabilization” such as a recent North Korea nuclear test, Bishop said political turbulence in the region was leading to more strategic cooperation between Tokyo and Canberra, Reuters reported.

“Australia will weather global and regional volatility, but that means our relationship with trusted partners like Japan is even more important,” Bishop said.

For its part, the United States is seeking to foster closer cooperation between its Indo-Asia-Pacific allies and partners. Washington is encouraging them to shoulder a larger security role as China’s rise alters the balance of power, according to analysts in the region. This dynamic is acting as another catalyst for nations’ modernization of their armed forces.

“The [U.S.] administration has focused on strategic efforts to balance China’s actions by increasing America’s forward military presence, strengthening its allies and partners’ capabilities, and deepening security partnerships across the region,” Ashley Townsend, a researcher at the Center for Asia-Pacific Cooperation and Governance at Fudan University, Shanghai, wrote in an April 2016 report for the Australia-based Lowy Institute for International Policy.

The result: Strategic partnerships are strengthening as nations join forces to maintain stability in the region.

A prime example is the Philippines, which has been receiving assistance from partners such as Australia, Israel, Japan, South Korea and the U.S. to upgrade its Armed Forces, according to media reports and official statements.

Japan is enhancing its military coordination with both the Philippines and Vietnam in addition to engaging in a continuing trilateral dialogue with India and Australia to advance maritime security, according to a March 2016 analysis in the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post newspaper.

India and the U.S. announced in April 2016 that they were nearing a breakthrough on a defense logistics deal, according to The Associated Press, and the countries are planning to work together on India’s next aircraft carrier.

Australian officials are pushing to bolster defense ties with Vietnam, the Philippines and Singapore, according to news coverage in Australian media.

Across the region, the bulk of the military upgrades are focused on maritime forces.

“Regional navies are also modernizing — above all by buying submarines,” The Economist magazine noted.

“ Besides Vietnam’s purchases [of six submarines], India has ordered six from France, and Pakistan has bought eight from China, which is also providing two to Bangladesh.

Germany is to deliver two to Singapore and five to South Korea, which has sold three of its own manufacture to Indonesia. Australia is to buy between eight and 12.”

Here is a review of how Indo-Asia-Pacific nations are upgrading their armed forces:

**China**

The world’s largest military is conducting a top-to-bottom modernization of its forces, although analysts say China would have a long way to go before matching the U.S., which maintains the world’s most powerful military. While land forces still account for nearly three-fourths of China’s total troop strength, it is shifting resources to its navy and air force.

Intent on asserting its maritime claims, China is steadily stocking its fleet with new frigates, destroyers and nuclear submarines, according to media and government reports.

The most notable addition: the Liaoning, a secondhand Soviet-era aircraft carrier that China rebuilt and commissioned in 2012. In early 2016, China confirmed that it’s building another carrier entirely with its own technology. A 2015 Pentagon report said China could build multiple carriers during the next 15 years.

In the skies, China’s warplanes lag behind those of the U.S. and its close allies, but Beijing is continuing to develop modern and stealthy fighter jets, military experts say. It is struggling to master advanced aircraft engines that would enable its planes to match Western fighters in combat, foreign and Chinese industry sources told Reuters in January 2016.

Aside from its nuclear missiles, China keeps adding to its stockpile of 1,200 conventionally armed ballistic missiles, along with an arsenal of surface-to-air missiles and anti-ship missiles, defense analysts say.
India
The oldest active aircraft carrier in the world, the British-built INS Viraat, is finally to be decommissioned from the Indian Navy and turned into a tourist attraction, according to The Times of India newspaper. India’s other carrier is the Russian-built INS Vikramaditya, a Kiev-class aircraft carrier that entered service for the Indian Navy in 2013 after being modified to support so-called fixed wing, short take-off but arrested recovery (STOBAR) operations. Now India is designing its first domestically manufactured carrier, the Vikrant, due to be finished in 2018 or 2019. New Delhi is seeking U.S. assistance with state-of-the-art electromagnetic launch technology, which can launch heavier planes, U.S. Chief of Naval Operations Adm. John Richardson told Reuters in February 2016. That would be the two countries’ most significant military collaboration to date.

India’s Navy is concerned by Chinese naval forays into the Indian Ocean and China’s drive to build port infrastructure in countries ranging from Pakistan to Djibouti, Reuters reported in February 2016. With that in mind, the Indian Navy has plans for a dozen new submarines and 40 more warships. Its first domestically produced nuclear-powered submarine, the INS Arihant, is ready for operations, according to April 2016 news accounts.

Seeking to replace squadrons of Soviet-era warplanes, India’s Air Force is negotiating to buy dozens of modern combat planes from France, Reuters reported in February 2016. New Delhi hopes to fill out the bulk of its Air Force fleet with a long-awaited domestically produced fighter jet.

Australia
Australia will boost defense spending by nearly U.S. $21.6 billion during the next decade, acquiring new frigates, armored personnel carriers, strike fighter jets, drones and submarines, Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull told an Armed Forces audience in Canberra in February 2016, Reuters reported.

His government produced a strategic document, the Defense White Paper, which said the military buildup was necessary to maintain peace in the region. It said Australia was “particularly concerned by the unprecedented pace and scale of China’s land reclamation activities” in the South China Sea, according to The Associated Press.

The white paper “sets out the most ambitious plan to regenerate the Royal Australian Navy since the Second World War,” Marise Payne, minister for defence, wrote in a foreward to the report. It “reaffirms the Government’s commitment to a strong, internationally competitive and sustainable Australian naval shipbuilding industry. Key to the successful delivery and sustainment of our enhanced defence capabilities will be a new level of collaboration with Australian defence industry and science and technology research organisations.” The government will invest U.S. $1.24 billion over the next decade to increase competitiveness.
and promote innovation, the white paper said. A new continuous shipbuilding plan will advance the Australian Defence Force’s “Future Frigate” program, Agence France-Presse reported, adding nine frigates and 12 patrol vessels. The new frigates are to be the Navy’s workhorses during the next few decades, said Royal Australian Navy Vice Adm. Tim Barrett. Australia will add 12 new “regionally superior” submarines, the white paper said. Australia will also purchase its first unmanned drones, sharpening its ability to protect its maritime sovereignty, according to the white paper.

**South Korea**
The Republic of Korea Navy Defense Reform Plan 2020 shifted the focus of the ROK Navy (ROKN) procurement projects to attain the status and prestige of a blue-water navy. The ROKN will seek expeditionary capabilities, operating across the deep waters of the open oceans, rather than concentrating on its traditional role of securing ROK littorals against intrusion by North Korea’s military forces or foreign fishing vessels. Since 2013, the Navy has been deploying a new fleet of 2,500-ton Incheon-class frigates and retiring 1,500-ton Ulsan-class frigates that were built in the 1980s, Korea’s Yonhap News Agency reported. By 2020, about 20 new frigates are to be launched. “Meanwhile, the addition of the Aegis capability to the surface combat ships will substantially enhance the role of these ships, both at sea and in protecting the coastal areas of the ROK against aircraft and theater ballistic missiles (TBMs). Both the Navy and Marine forces will get more helicopters, and the Marine maneuver elements will acquire improved armor, a longer-range artillery (a multiple rocket launcher), and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) capabilities for reconnaissance to a considerable distance (about 80 km),” according to a 2006 RAND Corp. analysis of Korea’s defense reform plan.

“South Korea’s postwar industrialization has made it possible to take on successively large shipbuilding projects,” the U.S. Naval Institute News website explained. “South Korea’s economy is dependent on secure sea lanes and as a result, the Republic of Korea Navy is building large, high-tech ships for a blue ocean navy.” Mingi Hyun, a research fellow at the Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy, wrote in the online magazine The Diplomat that South Korea “has acquired a range of vessels with a potentially global reach — a regional fleet surpassed in size only by Japan, China and India. Indeed, in terms of ship quality, the South Korean vessels are on par with all three.”

In the wake of North Korea’s nuclear bomb test in January 2016 and its continuing attempts to launch ballistic missiles, the U.S. and South Korea have been discussing sending more strategic U.S. weapons to the Korean Peninsula, Reuters reported.

In April 2016, South Korea announced it was deploying more of its new KM-SAM (Iron Hawk II) surface-to-air missile systems, replacing 24 older Hawk batteries that South Korea has been using for decades, Yonhap reported. The KM-SAM units are a significant improvement because they’re mobile, with launchers carried on trucks.

**Indonesia**
Indonesian President Joko Widodo has vowed to replace all old military planes after the June 2015 Indonesian Air Force’s C-130 Hercules cargo plane crash into a residential neighborhood on the island of Sumatra, which killed about 140 people. The aircraft had originally gone into service nearly 50 years ago, according to The Diplomat, an online news magazine.

The crash prompted calls for a badly needed modernization of military aircraft in the name of safety. Indonesian Defense Minister Ryamizard Ryacudu affirmed in July 2015 that the country would decommission all military aircraft more than 30 years old, according to The Diplomat.

An examination of the Indonesian military’s weapons systems and aircraft showed that more than half of the Armed Forces’ equipment had been in use for more than three decades, according to *The Jakarta Post* newspaper. However, shortfalls in funding are slowing the pace of arms modernization.

In early 2016, Indonesia confirmed its intent to purchase eight to 10 Russian Su-35 fighter jets, according to Pravda and Bloomberg News. Independent military expert Alexander Yermakov told the Russian news website defendingrussia.com that these heavy Russian fighters are well-suited for Indonesia’s geography. He said the Su-35s, which have a range of at least 4,500 kilometers, are useful in a country that has a limited airfield network across 13,000 islands spanning 5,000 kilometers.

Under Widodo’s predecessor, Indonesia had already set a course to modernize its Navy. In 2009, former President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono implemented a Minimum Essential Force plan that aimed to overhaul the Armed Forces by 2024, including expanding its Navy to a 274-ship fleet to include more submarines and corvettes, Bloomberg.com reported. When Widodo took office, Indonesia’s fleet had about 213 ships, including more than 70 patrol and coastal combatants, according to a December 2015 report, published in World Politics Review, a weekly online newsletter, although about half of them were not combat-ready. Indonesia plans to add more modern warships as funding allows, including two 105-meter SIGMA 10514 guided missile frigates built with Dutch shipbuilder DSNS and three Chang Bogo Class diesel-electric attack submarines to be produced with South Korea, Ridzwan Rahmat, a senior reporter with *IHS Jane’s Navy International* magazine in Singapore, told Bloomberg.com.
Indo-Asia-Pacific nations are spending billions more per year to upgrade their militaries, primarily focusing on maritime forces.

**India**
Designing the Vikrant, an aircraft carrier, and planning to add a dozen new submarines and 40 warships. Its nuclear-powered submarine, the INS Arihant, is ready for operations, and the Air Force is spending U.S. $8.8 billion on 36 Rafale fighter planes.

**South Korea**
Has been deploying a new fleet of 2,300 metric-ton, Incheon-class frigates since 2013. By 2020, about 20 new frigates will be launched.

**Vietnam**
Acquired six advanced Kilo-class submarines and has been in talks to buy fighter and maritime patrol planes and surveillance drones.

**South Korea**
Has been deploying a new fleet of 2,300 metric-ton, Incheon-class frigates since 2013. By 2020, about 20 new frigates will be launched.

**Japan**
Future purchases include three Global Hawk surveillance drones and 42 Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike fighter jets. Japan is testing a new stealth fighter, and the Navy’s new gem is the Izumo-class helicopter carrier.

**Philippines**
Bought 12 Korean-made FA-50 fighter jets.

**Indonesia**
Planning to buy eight to 10 Russian Su-35 fighter jets. Expanding the Navy to a 274-ship fleet and adding modern warships, including two 105-meter SIGMA 10514 guided missile frigates and three Chang Bogo Class diesel-electric attack submarines.

**Australia**
Boosting defense spending by nearly U.S. $21.6 billion during the next decade, acquiring frigates, armored personnel carriers, strike fighter jets, drones and submarines.

Sources: Reuters, The Associated Press, Bloomberg and Agence France-Presse
Thailand

Thailand military leaders have been working toward procuring two or three submarines, which would give Thailand a tool it hasn’t had for more than 60 years, according to The Bangkok Post newspaper. Officials say submarines would help Thailand defend the freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Thailand, which could be disrupted if territorial disputes in the South China Sea spill over, The Diplomat reported.

The Royal Thai Air Force’s capabilities have significantly improved in recent years with the addition of 12 Saab Gripen JAS 39C/D fighters and two Saab S100B Argus Airborne Early Warning aircraft with advanced radar, according to Asian Military Review magazine.

In 2015, officials confirmed the creation of a military-led cyber warfare unit that’s intended to counter a growing number of cyber threats, according to Agence France-Presse.

Philippines

Since 2010, the Philippines have completed 55 military upgrade projects totaling 11.71 billion Philippine pesos (U.S. $250 million), according to the diplomat.com online publication. The country’s military modernization program is motivated in part by its continuing clash with China in the South China Sea. “We need to protect what is clearly within our territorial jurisdiction. Certainly, we need to at least be able to effectively monitor the developments in the area, particularly those in disputed zones,” Florencio Abad, former secretary of the Philippine Department of Budget and Managements, told Agence France-Presse.

In 2015, Philippine Air Force Brig. Gen. Guillermo Molina told a national defense panel hearing that the Philippines had no fighters or surveillance planes to detect intrusions within its vast maritime borders, according to Reuters. He said the Navy had two former U.S. Coast Guard cutters, three and two Saab S100B Argus Airborne Early Warning aircraft with advanced radar, according to Asian Military Review magazine.

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Vietnam has been in talks with European and U.S. arms manufacturers to buy fighter and maritime patrol planes and surveillance drones. It has bolstered its air defenses with early warning surveillance radar and surface-to-air missile batteries.

Vietnam has also boosted its coastal defenses with anti-ship artillery batteries and the mobile Bastion K-300P system, which features Ornyx cruise missiles, which can also be launched from ships, planes and submarines, Reuters reported.

Today, Vietnam’s increased capacity means that it could be expensive for China to operate its Navy within 200 to 300 nautical miles of Vietnam’s shores, foreign security experts told Reuters. This wasn’t true 10 years ago, they add.

“They are not doing this for national day parades ... they are building real military capabilities,” Tim Huxley, a regional security expert at the International Institute of Strategic Studies in Singapore, told Reuters.

**Taiwan**

Starting in 2016, Taiwan has budgeted U.S. $91 million over four years for the design phase of a decades-long effort to build its own fleet of submarines. Taiwan has four aging submarines — two of them dating from World War II — although its Armed Forces are otherwise considered modern, Reuters reported.

In December 2015, the U.S. announced a U.S. $1.8 billion arms sale to Taiwan, including two guided-missile frigates, TOW anti-tank missiles, amphibious assault vehicles and Stinger surface-to-air missiles, according to The Associated Press and Reuters.

The United States’ first major arms sale to the self-governing island in four years drew an angry response from China. Taiwan’s Defense Ministry said the new weapons would enable it to maintain a credible defense.

**CONCLUSION**

*The Economist* noted in February 2016 that the Indo-Asia-Pacific now accounts for nearly half the global market for heavy weaponry — almost twice as much as the war-torn Middle East. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute reported that India, China, Australia, Pakistan, Vietnam and South Korea are six of the 10 biggest importers of such weapons.

Still, perhaps the most notable feature about the ongoing military buildup is that it’s taking place despite the region’s relative peacefulness. The region has not seen a full-scale war between countries since China invaded Vietnam in 1979 — nearly four decades ago.

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“For the past generation, Asia has known greater peace for a longer period than many expected,” Dr. Van Jackson, an associate professor in the College of Security Studies at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, wrote in an essay for *The National Interest* magazine. “The ‘Asian peace’ has been possible because of region-wide attentiveness to geopolitics. Traditional sources of conflict among nations, such as arms races or conflict spirals, have been avoided through a combination of regional diplomacy, deterrence, and U.S. security commitments — not to mention a general desire to avoid war on the part of Asian civil societies.”

Experts believe the ongoing modernization of armed forces throughout the Indo-Asia-Pacific can contribute to maintaining regional stability provided nations continue to reach out and strengthen their security and defense ties.
The Philippines is an archipelago of 7,107 islands. The waters that surround the islands of the Philippines, however, are often overlooked. We have one of the world’s longest coastlines at 36,289 kilometers, almost twice as long as that of the United States. Moreover, more than 60 percent of our country’s population live in coastal areas, with 64 out of 79 provinces being coastal provinces and with 25 major cities located along the coast.

Aside from having a long coastline, our country also has a vast maritime zone and porous maritime borders. The territorial waters, together with the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), already make up 2.2 million square kilometers. Our country also sits astride major oil tanker routes and commercial shipping lanes. The airspace above our country’s vast maritime domain also serves as a passageway for local and international civil aviation.

We have been focusing on the development of the marine environment because it is important from the standpoint of territorial integrity, national security, national patrimony, the economy and the environment. The unity of land and water is integral in the Philippines’ notion of national territory.

Being a staunch advocate of the concept of archipelagic doctrine, the Philippines was among the five archipelagic sovereign states recognized by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in Jamaica in 1982.
Young men walk atop fishing outrigger boats anchored at the mouth of a river feeding Manila Bay in May 2015. The Philippine Coast Guard banned sailing while Typhoon Noul was in the northern part of the country.
The maritime domain presents an abundance of natural resources. Most of our country's oil and gas deposits are offshore, and a wealth of seabed minerals that remain largely untapped also lies in our country's vast maritime zone.

Our country's rich fishing grounds make it one of the world's top fishing nations. In 2010, our country was the world's third largest producer of aquatic plants (including seaweeds) and the world's fifth in fisheries production. The fishing industry generates P183.1 billion (U.S. $3.9 billion) for current prices and P130.77 billion (U.S. $2.79 billion) for constant prices. It employs 1.6 million million fishing operators, of which 1.37 million are municipal fishers. Our country's top fisheries exports include tuna, seaweeds and prawn/shrimp.

The marine environment is part of our country's unique and fragile ecosystem. The Philippines falls within the Coral Triangle, the center of world marine biodiversity. Our country's teeming marine life includes commercially exploited species, as well as endangered and endemic ones found nowhere else in the world. Sustainable management and environmental conservation will help ensure the enjoyment of these resources by future Filipino generations.

Furthermore, the Philippine Department of Energy estimated that the offshore energy resources in the West Philippine Sea alone can meet our country's energy demand for the next 20 years. One major potential area, Recto Bank, is thought to contain an estimated 8.799 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, according to a 2012 report in the Business Mirror newspaper. At present, Malampaya, our country's first petroleum production facility, remits U.S. $1 billion per year at current gas prices to the national coffers and at the same time saves our country U.S. $500 million worth of annual foregone energy imports.

Securing these areas — oil and gas rigs, underwater pipelines and related infrastructure — is crucial for our country's energy security.

Along with the rich resources and vast opportunities intrinsic to the Philippines as a maritime nation, there are challenges and risks that must be appropriately managed. For one, our country's porous maritime borders pose serious security risks from foreign intrusion, maritime piracy and transnational crimes. Also, natural calamities are abundant in our county. This is seen in the numerous typhoons that form in the Pacific Ocean and the regular eruption of under-the-sea volcanoes that expose coastal areas to the danger of tsunamis, among other dangers. Further, man-made calamities aggravate the already teeming threats.

Beyond the regular occurrence of accidents at sea such as collisions or sinking, our country is along the route of oil tanker traffic and faces the hazards of maritime oil spills. The vast expanse of maritime zones of our country against the context of scarce maritime law enforcement assets also exposes our country to the threat of illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing.

All these highlight the importance of the maritime domain for our country. In response to this need for an integrated and harmonized management of a host of maritime issues, the Philippines established the National Coast Watch System (NCWS) in 2011. According to the executive order creating it, the system serves as the “central interagency mechanism for a coordinated and coherent approach on maritime issues and maritime security operations toward enhancing governance in our country’s maritime domain.”

HISTORY

Prior to the establishment of NCWS, interagency structures addressed maritime issues. The Cabinet Committee on the Treaty of the Law of the Sea in 1981 coordinated our country's implementation of UNCLOS. In 1988, the committee was reconstituted and expanded to include agencies that would study harmonizing domestic laws with UNCLOS. In 1994, it was replaced by the Cabinet Committee on Maritime and Ocean Affairs (CABCOM-MOA) with the power to formulate policies and address concerns about UNCLOS implementation and related maritime matters.

CABCOM-MOA was strengthened in 1999, further expanding its membership and functions. This included the formulation and recommendation of a national maritime policy to the president, coordinating its implementation, and periodically evaluating and refining the same.

In 2001, CABCOM-MOA was abolished and its functions were exercised by an interagency committee with the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) as the lead agency through the Maritime and Ocean Affairs Center. In 2007, this body was reorganized into the Commission on Maritime and Ocean Affairs (CMOA) which exercised overall jurisdiction and direction over policy formulation, implementation and coordination with other departments and experts, both foreign as well as local, on maritime issues. The foreign affairs department has historically played an important role in most of these past interagency bodies, either as secretariat or lead agency. However, it was recognized that there was a need to expand maritime interagency collaboration and cooperation among the different government agencies and offices beyond the diplomatic aspect.

In 2011, NCWS adopted the functions of CMOA. Moreover, the success of the Armed Forces of the Philippines-initiated Coast Watch South (CWS) project encouraged its replication on a national scale, paving the way for NCWS. CWS was established to enhance maritime security in the southern Philippines. It was conceptualized to further develop and operationalize coast watching in the Philippines through an interagency and whole-of-government approach, with the active involvement of the private sector. CWS was instrumental in the tracking and monitoring of large numbers of local and international cargo vessels carrying dangerous cargoes while transiting the waters of Western Mindanao, vessels in distress and other vessels that could be potential violators of maritime laws.
VISION
The vision of the NCWS is for our country to be a leading global maritime nation whose maritime resources are properly managed and protected. It is a state in which national, regional, local, private sector and international partners can embrace and achieve the common objective of collaborating and enjoying the richness of the maritime and marine resources for economic prosperity under the rule of law.

The projects of NCWS are geared to promote synergy and collaboration among agencies, which can help optimize the use of existing resources and capabilities for maritime law enforcement operations. At present, various agencies gather different types of information from the maritime domain with limited or no information-sharing linkages. The NCWS will establish and institutionalize information-sharing mechanisms, enabling decision-makers to monitor situations to make informed decisions.

ORGANIZATION
The NCWS has a dual mandate, exercising policy formulation and implementation. The three organizations that administer NCWS are the National Coast Watch Council, the National Coast Watch Council Secretariat and the National Coast Watch Center (NCWC). The council is in charge of formulating strategic direction and policy guidance on maritime issues and matters, while the secretariat provides technical and administrative support to the council. The center, for its part, monitors and coordinates maritime security operations.

The NCWC chairman is the executive secretary and its members include the secretaries of the following departments of the Philippines: Transportation and Communications, National Defense, Foreign Affairs, Interior and Local Government, Justice, Energy, Finance, Environment and Natural Resources, and Agriculture.

The support agencies are to provide manpower, equipment and material support to the center and its operations. Philippines law instructs all other government agencies to actively coordinate and cooperate with the council to support maritime security operations. Furthermore, the creation of NCWS will not diminish the mandates, functions and responsibilities of the support agencies.
LEVERAGING PARTNERSHIP
Critical to achieving maritime domain awareness are capabilities that allow relevant information from different sources to be aptly harnessed to make informed decisions and responses to better protect our country’s maritime domain. Leveraging our partnership with the United States provided the needed capabilities to jumpstart the NCWS, we addressed shared maritime interests through the Weapons of Mass Destruction-Proliferation Prevention Program (WMD-PPP) under the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, in accordance with the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 of 2004, on effective responses to global threats of proliferation and terrorism and the need to combat these dangers in pursuit of international peace and security.

Distinct capabilities for sustained interagency command and communications, surveillance, WMD detection and response are being provided to the Philippines’ concerned law enforcement agencies such as the Philippine Coast Guard, Philippine National Police Maritime Group, Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources and Bureau of Customs, as well as other maritime support agencies such as the Philippine Nuclear and Radiological Institute, Philippine Ports Authority and the Bureau of Quarantine.

Likewise, Australia’s contributions through the Royal Australian Navy, Border Protection Command and Customs Service to the development of the Armed Forces of the Philippines’ CWS Program were instrumental in formulating critical systems and procedures for a 24/7 interagency information-sharing center, which the NCWC is intended to be.

OUTCOMES AND THE WAY AHEAD
The completion and inauguration of the NCWC in April 2015 is an important milestone, especially in highlighting the collaborative and cooperative nature under which the system was created.

Relevant protocols in information sharing, uniform maritime action and capability development between and among the different NCWS member and support agencies were already developed to complement the concept of operations for the NCWC. Focused and sustained capacity building programs, especially for personnel staffing the center, are being undertaken to further improve skills and procedures for interagency coordination, information sharing and cooperation.

Initial successes in interagency information sharing led to positive interagency response operations, specifically in one of the country’s leading free ports in Luzon and another international port in Mindanao. This underscored the relevance of seamless interagency cooperation and coordination. The rate at which information is processed and received is critical at times for planning and executing shared awareness strategies. Complex interagency responses require a healthy mix of technological capability as well as good working rapport among different law enforcement agencies.

More capabilities are earmarked under Increment II of the WMD-PPP. These are aimed to further integrate existing surveillance systems from other maritime agencies to the center as well as to improve communications, surveillance and response during interagency maritime law enforcement operations.

The NCWC is envisioned to be our country’s single point of contact on matters pertaining to maritime concerns with regional and international partners such as but not limited to: Australia Border Protection Command; Bakamla, the Indonesian Coast Guard; Cambodian National Committee for Maritime Security;
International Maritime Organization; Japanese Coast Guard; Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency; Maritime Enforcement and Coordinating Center, Thailand; National Maritime Coordination Center, Brunei; United States Coast Guard; U.S. Pacific Command including Joint Interagency Task Force West; and the Vietnam Maritime Police.

The NCWC Secretariat is also heavily involved with technical working groups in crafting important maritime legislation such as defining the country’s maritime zones and archipelagic sea lanes.

Given that the character of a nation’s maritime sector can be seen as a microcosm of that nation, it is imperative that officials take action in improving governance. These efforts are not without their own complexities, hurdles and challenges, but the consequences of inaction far outweigh whatever risks will be faced by our country in pushing forward.

The NCWS is a fresh construct for maritime governance. The efforts of the system may be construed as initial steps in the quest to realize the Philippines’ vision of being a global leading maritime nation, but these are nevertheless a big leap in our country’s whole-of-government approach in improving governance in the maritime domain.

Philippine Coast Guard personnel board a ship during a seajacking scenario as part of the combined Philippine-Japan maritime exercise off Manila Bay in the South China Sea in May 2015.
CONNECT, COLLABORATE & CONQUER

U.S. FLEET COMMANDER ADM. SCOTT H. SWIFT
OFFERS SOLUTIONS FOR MARITIME SECURITY IN THE INDO-ASIA-PACIFIC
U.S. Pacific Fleet Commander
Adm. Scott H. Swift spoke with FORUM during the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), hosted in Dhaka by the Bangladesh Navy, in January 2016. He shared his thoughts on how settings such as IONS help navies connect to understand their common challenges, collaborate to create a solution, then work to conquer maritime challenges together. Swift also talked about force modernization across the Indo-Asia-Pacific and what Pacific Fleet (PACFLT) is doing to assist its allies, as well the challenges navies face in sustaining a ready force during an era of downsizing and budget constraints.

FORUM: How do forums like this serve to facilitate resolution on flashpoints around the region, particularly ones like the South China Sea?

SWIFT: It’s so easy to judge because it’s so hard to understand. The reason that we judge is because to understand, there’s a necessity to invest in time in a relationship. This is my fourth visit to Bangladesh. I was struck by the number of young officers who came up to me and had some remembrance, recollection of my previous visits. Forums like this take what is a specific example in any given country and expand it beyond just the region. Spain was here, the U.K. was here, Germany was here, in addition to South Africa, Middle East nations, Asian nations, Pacific nations. It was a detailed, in-depth discussion about the challenges that the Indian Ocean region faces. What struck me is the commonality of those challenges that expand both to the east of the Indian Ocean region and to the west of the Indian Ocean region. Several mentioned the stability of the Indian Ocean, which I think has been attributed largely to forums such as IONS and a concern to not let the instability that exists in both the East and to the West creep into the Indian Ocean. I wouldn’t say that this is a common view, but it’s not an uncommon view. It comes up often.

Having an inclusive forum like this brings individuals together with different experiences. The European experience — what they’re going through right now — is very different than the Pacific experience in the context of the details. But broadly and strategically, the similarities are really quite amazing. It’s those similarities that bring those ideas into an IONS-type forum so that you can be more predictive and be more focused on what may be occurring in the near term. Take those best practices in so you’re better prepared first to prevent that type of instability from occurring, but if it does occur, to restabilize the situation.

FORUM: What is PACFLT currently doing to address maritime security?

SWIFT: Participating in forums like this. Encouraging forums like this. I think it’s instructive when you look at IONS — 35 nations represented here. The level that IONS has raised itself to has brought it into much closer parity with other forums such as WPNS [Western Pacific Naval
You’ve got the Shangri-La Dialogue, you’ve got the Australian Sea Power Symposium. You’ve got multiple forums that look at similar issues but in different geographic contexts. Pacific Fleet participating in those forums, as well as in IONS, helps increase those insights with allies, partners and friends. The actionable pieces are exercises like CARAT [Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training], SEACAT [Southeast Asia Cooperation and Training], Malabar, the RIMPAC [Rim of the Pacific] exercise. I think [these] are all indications of the growing view of working together in a consensus way is the best way forward to resolve differences. I mentioned, often, while we have much more in common and in collaboration in the region, there are areas where we have competition. And it’s those areas of competition that we spend most of our time focusing. The forums that I’ve mentioned, the exercises that I’ve mentioned, enable you to focus on those areas of competition and make sure you get that deeper understanding so we don’t become unhealthy friendships. It’s the idea that you can criticize an idea without criticizing an individual. Have a dialogue about what is the intent. Break through some of that uncertainty that comes from a lack of transparency, a lack of clarity of what the intent is.

FORUM: Modernization of forces seems to be a theme of several countries around the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. What is the U.S. doing to assist in those efforts?

SWIFT: There’s multiple venues of assistance. We provide technical assistance. I’ll give an example right here in Bangladesh. We just transferred the ex-U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Rush to the Bangladesh Navy — the second one, I think, that they’ve received. They’re interested in a third one. That they’re interested in a third one is reflective of the value of that program. We’ve done the same for other countries in the Pacific region. The Philippines have profited from that as well. There was a challenge with the engineering system that’s in that ship. That’s one that Bangladesh may not be familiar with, that’s not been a part of their inventory. Instead of that being a challenge, we turned it into an opportunity. We brought a gas turbine technician from the U.S. Navy to Bangladesh to work with them to understand how best to maintain and sustain that gas turbine system. In fact, the young commander that’s in charge of that system was the commander of one of the Bangladesh ships that I had visited. He was now quite proud that he was responsible for the incorporation of the ex-U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Rush into the Bangladesh
I was aware of what we had done to assist them with a deeper understanding of the gas turbine system. He called it out, saying that was another example of our strengthening relationship. Those are just a couple of examples. We have a series of exercises, and we always seek the insights and concerns of whatever country we’re teaming with. In this case, Bangladesh. Where do they think that they need the most help? We’re happy to focus our exercises into those areas, so there’s a tangible advancement in their capability and capacity and the ability to sustain their own force.

**FORUM: How does the Navy balance maintaining a ready force in an era of downsizing?**

**SWIFT:** I think it’s a great question. It was brought up by several speakers in the IONS forums. Several have approached me and asked me about it. My response is, I’ve been in the Navy for over 35 years now, and it’s been the same all the way through. You’re never going to have enough resources as a Navy to cover down on all the challenges. The growth in maritime shipping. The emergence of piracy that occurred in 2006 when I was the deputy commander at NAVCENT [Naval Forces, U.S. Central Command]. We never anticipated that occurring, and it took awhile to come together and determine the best way forward. I think we’re in a place now because of those common efforts, where we have turned the corner on piracy and the destabilizing action that occurs. And look who it’s brought together to participate in that — Iran and China — two countries you wouldn’t think would come together in a collaborative way. They tend to work in a unilateral structure. We at least collaborate to deconflict our activities so we’re not patrolling in exactly the same areas. We look broadly across the region to find those areas where there’s tension and frictions, and how do we turn those areas of challenges into areas of opportunities?

We’ve got great capability to come together on counter-piracy, but as was mentioned before, it expands the effectiveness of the force if we can team with others. You’ve always got that balance. The challenge of how much do you spend on modernization, and how much do you spend on expanding the fleet. That continues to be a balancing act for any naval forces. I don’t think the period now is any different than it was five years ago or 10 years ago. I think the level of angst and the focus are the same as five years ago and 10 years from now. That’s not to diminish the challenge. The challenge is real. And I’m confident we’ll be able to work through it.

**FORUM: Talk about the U.S. role in security around the Arctic and Antarctic as the competition for resources in those regions increases.**

**SWIFT:** The Navy has recognized there’s an important leadership role for the United States Navy to play in both the Antarctic and Arctic region. If you look at the challenges that we have with receding ice caps, they are certainly more accessible. The northern shipping lanes are open for much longer. Some assistance is required, but you can make the argument that they are really open year-round with the support of icebreakers to keep them open. The ice caps have receded and exposed continental shelf to exploitation. And that has increased an interest in Antarctica and the Arctic region. From that competition for resources comes much the same dialogue that you see in other areas such as the Indian Ocean and Mediterranean and elsewhere. How do you reconcile national interest in what is international space — new space — that before was covered by the ice floes? There’s a strong Coast Guard leadership role to play there. The United States Navy and United States Coast Guard are working together to focus on both the new opportunities that are presented there as well as the new challenges.
UNILATERAL, BILATERAL OR MULTILATERAL INTERVENTION

An Indian Army helicopter pilot unloads relief aid for a Nepal village in the Gorkha district in April 2015. AFP/GETTY IMAGES
When a pair of massive earthquakes hit Nepal in April and May of 2015, more than 8,635 people were killed and more than 21,485 others injured, making it the nation’s deadliest disaster on record. The multilateral response to the natural disaster and level of cooperation from across the region proved unprecedented.

In the immediate aftermath, 18 countries expediently sent military personnel to provide coordinated relief. India offered 13 helicopters, including Russian Mi-17s and Indian utility machines known as Advanced Light Helicopters; the U.S. deployed seven helicopters; and China flew three helicopters to assist with search and rescue efforts, airlifting the injured and delivering relief supplies, among other activities, the website indianexpress.com reported.

Multilateral regional responses to everything from natural disasters and health crises to trafficking and piracy are increasingly proving effective in the Indo-Asia-Pacific and beyond. Besides the recent humanitarian relief supplied to Nepal, multilateral victories involving Indo-Asian-Pacific nations range from the effective response to the Ebola crisis in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea to successful anti-piracy efforts around the Horn of Africa.

Countries across the region are increasingly showing they know how to be responsible actors when it comes to resolving even more difficult and complicated issues such as territorial disagreements among nations. Consider the posturing between India and China on border disputes such as the McMahon Line that Britain, which then controlled the area, designated as a boundary in a 1914 treaty deal with Tibet. In a May 2015 news release, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi said he and China’s Premier Li Keqiang would work on a “fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable resolution” to the issue. In response, Li agreed that the two countries’ “common interests are far bigger than our differences,” the English version of the lankaherald.com website reported in May 2015.

However, when it comes to resolving tensions in the South China Sea, one key player, namely China, has repeatedly rejected multilateral interventions, as well as requests to act responsibly in the region. In August 2013, Chinese Defense Minister Gen. Chang Wanquan rebuked multilateral solutions to settle rival territorial claims in the region. “These disputes should be resolved by the countries directly concerned,” Gen. Chang said, according to a report by The Wall Street Journal newspaper. “We oppose any attempt to internationalize or complicate the disputes.” China, however, did state at the same news conference that it would negotiate with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) over a common maritime code of conduct for the region, the report said.

Provocation
Since then, China has escalated its assertive posturing in the region, often acting unilaterally to stake its claims. In late November 2013, it declared an Air-Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea, essentially claiming control of areas disputed with Japan and South Korea. Aircraft flying in such an area, even when it extends beyond a given nation’s territory, may be interrogated and intercepted for identification before crossing into sovereign airspace.

The move sparked concerns that China intends to extend the ADIZ to include contested territory in the South China Sea, which would potentially have significant economic and trade ramifications, according to a December 2013 account on the Asia Times website, www.atimes.com.

China may do just that, People’s Liberation Army Adm. Sun Jianguo said at the 2015 Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, the annual Asia Pacific security summit. “Whether we will establish an ADIZ in the South China Sea will depend on whether our maritime security will be threatened,” he said, according to a May 2015 report in The Wall Street Journal.

China’s overall provocations have been insidious. Chinese Coast Guard vessels have repeatedly harassed Vietnamese and Philippine fishermen. Meanwhile, Chinese fishermen have been spotted illegally fishing as far west as the coast of Africa, Reuters reported in May 2015.

Which approach will best resolve tensions in the South China Sea?

FORUM STAFF
security forces by shadowing aircraft, obstructing exploration work and encroaching on other nations’ territories. In June 2015, for example, China anchored a Coast Guard ship in Malaysia’s 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ), drawing protests from Malaysian officials.

Such standoffs could have diplomatic consequences, writes Vijay Sakhuja, director of the National Maritime Foundation in New Delhi in a May 2015 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) analysis. This may result “in a soured relationship and fading of the ‘charm offensive’ that has been very cleverly employed by China through a number of economic engagements with the Southeast Asian countries. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, a Chinese initiative to finance infrastructure construction in the continents, may run into serious jeopardy if China does not stop its provocative behavior in the South China Sea,” Sakhuja wrote. “Likewise, Southeast Asian countries may shy away from the Chinese 21st century maritime silk road, which could be a major setback for the Chinese leadership, which sees Southeast Asia as a springboard to launch the initiative.”

China, meanwhile, has undertaken ambitious projects, building large landing strips, helipads, a radar dome, portable concrete factories...
and assorted military support facilities such as schools for children of military personnel atop several of the disputed reefs, according to CSIS’ Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. So far, other nations’ land creation efforts such as those by Malaysia and Vietnam have been on a much smaller scale.

China’s activities contrast sharply with those of other claimants. Comparing China’s actions with those of Taiwan, for instance, provides useful insights. Taiwan has not undertaken the wholesale development of military facilities in the South China Sea, although Taiwan upholds claims similar to those of China. Taiwan is building a U.S. $100 million port on Itu Aba, which is the only island Taiwan occupies in the South China Sea, Reuters reported in May 2014. Officials told Reuters the new port would support trade and help Taiwan deep-sea fishermen and marine and mineral research in the area. Every year, about U.S. $5 trillion in goods passes through the South China Sea.

Malaysian Armed Forces chief Gen. Zulkifeli Mohd. Zin challenged China’s motivations behind its land creation activities during the Shangri-La Dialogue, The Wall Street Journal reported in May 2015. “We do not know what they are trying to do,” he said. “It would be good if China can come out publicly and announce what they are doing, so that they can be seen to be more transparent.”

A growing chorus of international players and experts suggests that multilateral intervention and regional cooperation may maximize Indo-Asia-Pacific allies’ and partners’ abilities to address Beijing’s assertive actions in the South China Sea and achieve peaceful resolutions in keeping with international norms.

Roots of Regional Cooperation
Since the 1960s, ASEAN has served as a source of regional multilateralism and has long been at the forefront of resolving disagreements in the South China Sea. In 2002, ASEAN and China signed a Declaration on
the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. The agreement strove to “enhance favorable conditions for a peaceful and durable solution of differences and disputes among countries concerned.”

Although China’s relations with ASEAN had been getting stronger in the decades since the declaration was signed, a viable resolution has still not emerged. Claimant nations have since called for a formal Code of Conduct to supplant the previous declaration and incorporate challenges that have emerged since the turn of the millennium. For its part, the United States supports ASEAN assuming a leadership role in achieving a resolution to the disputes.

China’s refusal to enter into multilateral commitments in the South China Sea seems curious. The nation has successfully engaged in multilateral solutions to resolve other situations, including Asian border disputes, which demonstrates that the nation can successfully work multilaterally and is not limited to bilateral agreements that have historically been its fallback approach to maintaining the status quo.

Although China supports regional security dialogues in general, when it comes to action, it typically avoids committing to institutionalized agreements. In this sense, China employs multilateralism selectively in general and particularly in the South China Sea.

In recent decades, multilateral responses to disputes in the region have proven important by most accounts. China’s unwillingness to participate in multilateral approaches to the South China Sea in light of the escalating disputes, presents opportunities for regional allies and partners to strengthen cooperative efforts and partnerships.

**Strengthening Multilateralism**

Indo-Asia-Pacific nations are increasingly recognizing that partnerships can bolster multilateral
response. For example, a June 2015 Japan-Philippine Joint Declaration asserts the importance of security cooperation between the two nations, as well as with other allies, “at a time when the security environment in the region is faced with many challenges.”

“The development of a Philippine-Japan strategic partnership is part of a trend developing among U.S. allies and security partners in the region in the face of China's growing naval power,” Renato Cruz de Castro, an international studies professor at De La Salle University in Manila, wrote in a July 2015 analysis for CSIS’ Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative.

By partnering with Japan, the Philippines can maintain its economic independence from China. Meanwhile, Japan can support the U.S.-Philippine alliance to counter China's assertive expansionism in the South China Sea. “These partners regard American strategic presence as the best guarantee of peace and security in East Asia; however, they also see the urgency to establish and foster security relationships among themselves to amplify the stabilizing effects of U.S. forward-deployed presence and alliances in the region,” Cruz de Castro wrote.

The Philippines and Vietnam have also strengthened their partnership to safeguard common interests in the South China Sea. They have drafted a strategic partnership agreement to create a bilateral dialogue, synchronize their diplomatic stances and facilitate joint naval and coast guard exercises and scientific research in the South China Sea, philstar.com, the online presence of the STAR Group of Publications, reported in April 2015.

When Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung visited Manila in mid-2014, he asked the Philippines for advice on employing the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea to resolve disputes. “Given Vietnam’s geographical proximity and economic dependence on China, not to mention the country's strong party-to-party ties, it has had to tread more cautiously than the Philippines, which enjoys a treaty alliance with Washington,” Richard Javad Heydarian, assistant professor of political science at De La Salle University in Manila, wrote in a July 2015 analysis for CSIS’ Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. “Nevertheless, what’s clear is that despite their age-old rivalry in the Spratlys, Manila and Hanoi have been bound by a common threat in China.”

Moreover, the Philippines and Vietnam have reached to external powers including the United States and Japan by inviting them to help improve domain awareness and deterrence capability, according to a December 2013 account on the Asia Times website. The Philippines, for example, is evaluating allowing Japanese troops access to Philippine military bases near the South China Sea, the dailybalita.com, a Philippine website, reported. In exchange, Japan is contemplating sharing P-3C anti-submarine reconnaissance aircraft and radar technology with the Philippines, the website reported. Indeed, multilateral and bilateral agreements need not be mutually exclusive.

**Paths Forward**

Nations must work to strike an appropriate balance between multilateral and bilateral intervention in the South China Sea. Success stories from Nepal to the Horn of Africa reveal responsible reactions and resolutions of issues in the region through multilateral approaches to disputes. The success of multilateral mechanisms in the South China Sea for the long term depends on individual nations and especially China’s ability to understand how cooperation can best protect sovereignty, bolster security and manage economic, environmental and resource concerns.

The advantages of multilateral responses for achieving regional security and transnational goals far outweigh any perceived loss of influence by any given individual nation, experts agree. Moreover, multilateral interventions will become increasingly important for combating terrorism, piracy, trafficking and more as the global economy continues to emerge.

Regional leaders remain hopeful China will act responsibly in the South China Sea. Malaysian Armed Forces chief Gen. Zulkifeli was encouraged by China’s apparent willingness to engage with other stakeholders in the South China Sea during the Shangri-La Dialogue, *The Wall Street Journal* reported in May 2015. “I’m reassured by what [Adm. Sun Jianguo] said because he said China would continue to work on the Code of Conduct — that means China has not rejected that,” Gen. Zulkifeli said. “It is up to ASEAN and the claimant states to help them do this.”

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**Adm. Yuji Sato, right, commander of Japan’s Coast Guard, walks with senior Philippine Coast Guard personnel at Manila headquarters in May 2015. The two nations engaged in bilateral talks during the 5th Maritime Law Enforcement exercise to combat piracy and armed robbery at sea.**  
[AFP/GETTY IMAGES]
A Pakistani Soldier protects displaced people near North Waziristan.
It was a warm spring day in March 2015 when a caravan of 26 vehicles unloaded members of 62 families at the Kajhuri check post in Mir Ali, North Waziristan, Pakistan. They were greeted by Maj. Gen. Jamil Akhtar Rao and other officers of the Pakistan Army. As a gentle breeze swayed the surrounding palm trees, the group of travelers assembled in a clearing to await processing. One man began to beat a traditional duff drum while several others broke into a version of the Bhangra folk dance. After a year or more of displacement, the group of men, women and children had returned to their home territory, and they were celebrating.
This homecoming to the war-torn Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan was made possible by coordinated efforts on the part of the Pakistan Army, Disaster Management Authorities (DMAs), various United Nations agencies including the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and a number of nongovernmental organizations. It marked the beginning of a steady and increasing flow of returning internally displaced people (IDPs), recently estimated at 38 percent of those originally displaced.

“With unflinching resolve and courage, our proud tribesmen of FATA and people of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa stood up to atrocities of the terrorists, pushed them back and marginalized them in the society,” said Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff Gen. Raheel Sharif as he addressed the topic of returning displaced people at a February 2016 meeting in Peshawar. “We are in the most difficult phase of the operation, physically rebuilding the war-damaged areas, resettling of IDPs and eventually establishing an administrative system that focuses on the needs and aspirations of the people.”

Military operations against terrorists launched in 2009 and 2014 in the FATA districts of North and South Waziristan and an earlier operation in Pakistan’s province of Balochistan led to the displacement of up to 2 million Pakistani citizens from about 300,000 families. Many of these people were sheltered in camps, while many more stayed with relatives and friends, typically in cities.

An estimated 75 percent of the displaced population are women and children, according to the FATA Disaster Management Authority, and about 21 percent of the households returning so far are headed by women.

RELEIF COORDINATION

The camps for displaced people are largely run by Pakistani civilian agencies and located in FATA and the neighboring province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, where they are managed by the local Provincial Disaster Management Authority. Relief supplies and money have come from a number of sources, including the U.N. World Food Programme, the Pakistan Army, civilian contributions, and donor countries such as Canada, Denmark, Germany, Japan, Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Arab Emirates and the United States.

Most displaced people, however, have opted to stay with host communities, rather than in camps, which has affected the government response to their displacement. The extended displacement has had an impact as well. Families displaced by the 2014 military operation were expected to return home in three to four months — a period extended to nearly two years.

The Pakistan Army has played a central role in helping the displaced people, from dispensing relief supplies at the time of displacement to providing security clearances to NGO relief agencies and helping people return to their areas of origin. When displaced families relocated from North Waziristan at the onset of the Operation Zarb-e-Azb counterterrorism effort in June 2014, the Army was there to meet them and distribute relief provisions in the settlements of Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan and Tank, according to the Inter Services Public Relations office of Pakistan’s Armed Forces.

In addition, the Army collected relief supplies at donation points across the country, treated thousands of displaced people at its Khalifa Gul Nawaz hospital in Bannu, and arranged for veterinary treatment for displaced families’ livestock. More recently, the Army has been working with the regional disaster management authority to facilitate each round of returning displaced people, guiding convoys through checkpoints to reach their home territories.

THE U.N.’S ROLE

In responding to the needs of displaced Pakistanis, the UNHCR has taken the cluster approach that it first applied in Pakistan after a 2005 earthquake. This approach pools the resources of U.N. and non-U.N. organizations to address peoples’ needs in times of disaster.

In areas such as South Waziristan, Bara in Khyber Agency and North Waziristan, UNHCR supported the return of 750,000 displaced people in 2015 and early 2016. It took the lead managing camps and shelters and providing nonfood items to hundreds of thousands of people.

CHALLENGES OF NGOs

Bringing nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) on board the various clusters in times of need has presented its own challenges, as has been widely reported in Pakistan’s media. The need for security and legitimacy clearance is cited as the reason for restricting NGOs from operating in Pakistan until they obtain a permit from local government and the Army.

The U.N.’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) reported in October 2015 that delays in receiving such permits had complicated a number of projects supported by the U.N.’s Pakistan Humanitarian Pooled Fund, citing an average waiting time of 26 days. However, the same report stated that 23 projects were implemented in the areas hosting displaced people, facilitated by cluster NGOs that had received permits.

Among the approved NGOs are the United Arab Emirates-based Hayat Foundation, the Centre of Excellence for Rural Development and the National Rural Support Program. Among other services, NGOs are educating residents about the risk of land mines through discussions, leaflets and brochures.

The government and relief agencies used TV and radio broadcasts, as well as camp visits, to publicize the rounds of returns and to disseminate important information to prospective returnees. UNOCHA reported success in the summer of 2015 with a program of dispensing cash grants to returnees to ease their resettlement. It cited the example of Khan Auro, a mother of 11, who was able to rebuild her home in Khyber Agency and buy provisions with a $250 grant delivered to her as a prepaid ATM card.

“We traveled to Peshawar to withdraw the funds,” said Auro, acknowledging the lack of an ATM near her home, “and to use the card at authorized EasyPaisa shops. I
reached the money in three installments."

Families whose homes were destroyed have been eligible to receive additional grants and temporary shelters.

Nagging issues continue to plague displaced families, such as the lack of convenient and affordable access to health care and questions concerning the sustainable livelihoods of the returnees. However, the commitment for displaced people to return home remains strong.

“There are signs of improvement. Things are getting better,” said Shahid Ehsan, program manager at the Pakistan-based Society for Human Rights and Prisoners’ Aid. “More and more people are returning to their places of origin because the majority of the area is becoming clear.” The recent return-intention survey indicated that the majority of people displaced do want to return immediately, and a very insignificant number would prefer to return in a month’s time because of ongoing commitments in the host areas.”

MILITARY SUPPORT
So far, the Pakistan Army, and in particular Gen. Sharif, have received strong popular support for clearing territories of terrorists and helping displaced people return. How long the cleared areas of FATA and Khyber will remain free from terrorism is itself a topic of debate among experts.

“Whether the nonstate actors who fled into Afghanistan during the FATA military operations come back or not,” said Rebecca Zimmerman, associate policy analyst at the Rand Corp., “part of that depends on how well Pakistan does at keeping Taliban actors at the negotiating table.”

Zimmerman added that conditions on the Afghan side of the border with Waziristan could also play a role — namely the strength and success of Afghanistan’s government and military. She acknowledged that it was a breakdown in negotiations between the Pakistani government and the nonstate actors that led to the military operation in 2014. She indicated that a lasting solution will probably need to take the form of a “cross-border effort,” involving the four participants in the February 2016 Quadrilateral Talks — Afghanistan, China, Pakistan and the United States.

“If the major regional powers aren’t able to work together on the issues,” said Zimmerman, “this will likely impact the refugee phenomenon.”

For the time being, these sections of northern Pakistan are relatively peaceful, and displaced families continue to return to their home territories. The government of Pakistan and its partners vow to rebuild infrastructure to ensure that resettlement is both durable and successful. —
rising tensions

Chinese actions in the South China Sea remain under scrutiny
By most analysis other than their own, Chinese posturing in the South China Sea has boosted tensions in the disputed waters to an all-time high — and there’s no sign of the pressures ebbing any time soon.

In fact, commercial satellite imagery that emerged in late June 2015 depicting a 3,000-meter runway constructed by China in one of the Spratly Islands only added to a growing list of flashpoints generating concern among South China Sea claimants and international security experts.

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying confirmed that China had completed land-creation projects on some features and reefs in the South China Sea, stopping short of saying where these locations existed.

“The construction is mainly to provide services to meet civilian demands so as to better facilitate China’s efforts at maritime search and rescue, disaster prevention and reduction, maritime research, meteorological observation, environmental protection, safety of navigation, fishery services and so on, in keeping with [our] international responsibilities and obligations,” she said, according to Reuters.

In addition to the construction of an expanded airstrip on Fiery Cross Reef, satellite images captured Chinese military personnel walking around the island, and a naval vessel has moored in the newly constructed deep water port, according to a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI). Images of Johnson Reef South show a multilevel military facility erected near the center of the island, with a half dozen security and surveillance towers under construction along with possible weapons towers, AMTI reported. Dramatic changes can also be seen in satellite images for Subi Reef and Mischief Reef, where the southern entrance has been widened, suggesting preparation for a naval base, according to AMTI.

“China is showing that — as a major power — it can control escalation, that it has the initiative, and that it can do what it sees fit for its interests,” Huang Jing, an expert on Chinese foreign policy at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy in Singapore, told The Wall Street Journal newspaper in June 2015.

While China generates the most scrutiny by its actions in the South China Sea, it isn’t the only claimant causing a stir. Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam also have disputes in parts of the sea with China.
TACTICAL ANALYSIS

Dr. Christopher Yung and Patrick McNulty, former researchers at the National Defense University in Washington, D.C., spent a year examining tactics of all rival claimants in the South China Sea. Their research focused on activities by claimants between 1995 and 2013 that could be found through an open-source Internet search.

Here’s what their research concluded:

- China accounted for more than 500 actions during the 18-year period examined.
- The Philippines registered a little more than 300 actions.
- Vietnam and Taiwan each undertook about 150 actions.
- Malaysia took just over 50 actions; and Brunei registered the least with fewer than 20.

Yung and McNulty said China argues that the U.S. rebalance to the Indo-Asia-Pacific encouraged Chinese rivals to act “provocatively” in the region, thereby triggering China to respond.

In an interview with FORUM, Yung, now an independent political-military analyst, acknowledged that the actual number of activities per country likely far exceeded what he and McNulty captured (though China would still outnumber the others), given the specific parameters of their research. When he shared his findings with the Chinese, they too were surprised at the number, expecting it to be higher. When Yung spoke with the Vietnamese about his findings, they told him they were involved in activities “that wouldn’t necessarily be publicized.”

Still, it’s China that dominates headlines and remains the common thread whenever the South China Sea is mentioned.

“From a Chinese perspective, the most transparent and direct explanation of China’s rising assertiveness in the South China Sea is simple: China believes that its past unilateral restraint has done nothing to improve its position regarding South China Sea disputes, and these inactions have in fact resulted in other claimant countries strengthening their presence and claims,” Yun Sun, a senior associate with the East Asia Program at the Stimson Center in Washington, D.C., wrote for the East-West Center in a June 2014 analysis of Chinese calculations in the South China Sea. “Therefore, for China to improve its position in the current climate or for future negotiations, it must first change the status quo through all available means necessary.”

Chinese policy allowing for a more assertive maritime posturing has existed for several years, according to Yun. President Xi Jinping has acted recently on those powers because he needs a strong...
foreign policy posture to boost his domestic power base, she said.

“Xi needs as much foreign policy credits as possible to build his strong-man image and defuse internal criticisms of his various domestic agendas,” which have included deepening economic ties and a strong anti-corruption campaign, Yun wrote.

“This does not necessarily suggest or prove that Xi personally does not endorse an assertive foreign policy, but it does add an additional layer of strong motivation to it.”

China remains selective about its targets, Yung told FORUM. It engages more publicly in disputes with countries like the Philippines and Vietnam, as opposed to smaller countries such as Brunei, because China “doesn’t want to portray itself as an overly aggressive hostile state,” Yung said. “That’s part of China’s strategy.”

“China is behaving assertively in the South China Sea because it believes it can,” Yun wrote. “This assessment is not only based on China’s growing military capacity, which dwarfs the capabilities of perhaps all other Southeast Asian claimant countries combined, but also on a strong conviction in China that the United States will not use its hard power to counter Chinese actions.”

Or will it?

In June 2015, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blinken said the United States takes no position on competing claims but has a strong interest in how they are resolved and in ensuring that freedom of navigation remains, according to Reuters.

“The way forward is for China, and all claimants, to freeze their reclamation activities and resolve their difference in accordance [with] the rule of law,” Blinken said in comments in which he compared China’s actions in the South China Sea to those of Russia in eastern Ukraine. “In both eastern Ukraine and the South China Sea, we’re witnessing efforts to unilaterally and coercively change the status quo — transgressions that the United States and our allies stand united against.”

FROM LEFT: A Filipino Soldier patrols Pag-asa Island in May 2015, of the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

Taiwan Coast Guard patrol ships participate in a drill near the port of Kaohsiung in June 2015. Taiwan’s Coast Guard boosted its defenses amid concerns about China’s growing footprint in the South China Sea. REUTERS

A Chinese coast guard ship cruises near a Vietnam Coast Guard ship in May 2014 in the South China Sea, about 210 kilometers off Vietnam’s shore. REUTERS
PACIFIC PERSPECTIVES

The Royal Australian Chief of Navy shares his insights on maritime issues that span the Pacific and Indian oceans and South China Sea

Article by Forum Staff | Photos from the Royal Australian Navy

Vice Adm. Tim Barrett, Chief of Navy for the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), sat down for an interview with FORUM during the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) in Dhaka, Bangladesh, in January 2016. He spoke on a variety of topics from an expanded perspective following Australia’s chairmanship of IONS, which the RAN hosted in Perth, Australia, in March 2014. Among the themes discussed, Barrett shared his thoughts on regional maritime cooperation, the need for continued discussion on issues affecting the Indian Ocean region among its stakeholders, and the RAN’s contribution to Australia’s fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.

Barrett joined the Royal Australian Navy in 1976 as a seaman officer and later specialized in aviation. He assumed command of the RAN on July 1, 2014. A dual-qualified officer, Barrett served on Her Majesty’s Australian (HMA) ships Melbourne, Perth and Brisbane and HMS Orkney as a seaman officer and then as a flight commander in HMA ships Stalwart, Adelaide and Canberra. He has served as commanding officer for the 817 Squadron, commanding officer for the HMAS Albatross, commander of the Australian Navy Aviation Group, commander of the Border Protection Command and most recently, commander for Australian Fleet.

He holds a bachelor of arts in politics and history and a master of defense studies, both from the University of New South Wales. He recently completed the Advanced Management Program at Harvard Business School. He and his wife, Jenny, have two daughters.
FORUM: What do you know now or better understand about the capabilities of regional navies after your tenure as IONS chairman?

BARRETT: I have a graying understanding of what others can provide, both in a collective sense and what we can share. But also, I’ve noticed there are a number of countries that are still developing their own organizations to prepare themselves to be able to respond to what could be collective security issues. I’ve seen, I think, a broad range of development, but also I’ve seen the constraints that some of our particularly smaller nations are still facing in bringing themselves up to speed.

FORUM: How has the existence of IONS changed the conversation on maritime issues for nations that have an interest in the Indian Ocean?

BARRETT: It has given them a voice, where previously they may have been attempting to manage situations through governments in isolation. IONS, and the great strength of IONS, is that there are like-minded people — mariners — who understand the issues that navies can attend to and the way that navies can assist. We’re able to have those conversations in a forum that I don’t think they’ve necessarily been able to take in other forums. If we look only at the Indian Ocean Rim Association, for instance, it has developed over a period of time, but it is still searching to meet some of its intended outcomes. IONS, because of the closeness of navies — and we know intimately what each does in terms of on the sea — we’ve been able to progress a little further in terms of the working groups, and I think that has allowed some of the smaller nations to feel they can have a voice.

FORUM: Please expand on the comments you made during IONS on creating a maritime information and exchange directory.

BARRETT: I used the example of the search for MH 370, the loss of the Malaysian Airlines aircraft. That caused a number of desperate nations in the region, because there were passengers of many nationalities onboard. Everyone had a need and desire to be part of the search. It needed to be immediate, because at first we thought we were looking for survivors. Then quickly, we realized it was becoming a search for debris. What we found was to bring everyone together quickly, because at first we thought we were looking for survivors. Then quickly, we realized it was becoming a search for debris. What we found was to bring everyone together quickly, we were, I wouldn’t say scrambling, but we were spending a lot of valuable time up front learning each nation’s capability. If we had some intimate sense and knowledge of that earlier in the piece, our response might have been a little different early on to be able to mix and match the required capability to meet what we thought was needed at the time.

We found we were reactive, rather than being proactive in establishing the search.
I would argue even a short time after the tragedy that was the Malaysian aircraft, north of Indonesia, even within that time, there was a noticeable change with people having a sense of what other nations could provide. I think IONS — by developing a directory of information, including capabilities and the sort of preparedness that each nation has, knowing within each nation how the civil military situation works in terms of search and rescue and responsibilities between military organizations and civil organizations, command and control structures — the more information we can openly share about those things, the more quickly we can make the right decisions early on when a tragedy of that nature starts.

FORUM: Talk about force modernization, which seems to be a theme across the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. What’s happening in Australia with your Navy and a move forward?

BARRETT: There’s a complete recapitalization of our Navy at the moment. It is tied to our white paper on defense [released February 25, 2016], which is the government’s position. It indicates that Australia accepts that it has a regional responsibility in terms of security for its own defense, but also to provide a level of security in the region for others. There’s a global responsibility for us to show ourselves to be a good citizen and to act where we need to around the world. It also acknowledges that we still gain most of our trade by sea and that our major trading partners are in the Asian region, be it China and Japan.

With all those things into account, it’s very much seen that this is a maritime strategy that needs to be evoked. As a result, Navy will recapitalize. We’ve already started, and it will demonstrate a drive for a greater level of engagement that we will have at sea, both by ourselves in our sovereign capability, but also when we operate with allies.

Those two things dictate where the force will go, the shape of the force, but also the nature of the force when we seek to operate with others. In that mind, we are developing a force that is task-group oriented and will allow us to operate from anything from a policing function or an HADR [humanitarian assistance and disaster response] function, right the way through high-end warfighting, knowing that we may be doing that with others.
FORUM: On the topic of security in the region, Australia has been very proactive in the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. Talk about what the Navy does to secure not only the waters around Australia but in neighboring waters as well.

BARRETT: Our most evident is our activities in the Middle East. We’ve been providing a frigate almost constantly now since 1991, and we’re in our 62nd rotation. Principally there, it’s in an anti-piracy role. We feel that’s important. The acts of those ships are stopping the flow and trade of narcotics, which fund terrorist activity, not just in the Middle East, but around the world. We will continue to do that. We also provide personnel in the Middle East to run CTF [Combined Task Force] 150, and currently Australia has command of that task force. Each of those provides us the opportunity to contribute away from Australia on what is still a global issue in terms of terrorism. We’ve had great success. The ships we have sent there over the last 18 to 24 months have interdicted upward of 5 tons of illegal drugs — street value is enormous. That is our contribution to show that this can’t be a free trade of drugs that fund terrorist activity.

In our own region, we continue to be part of a number of regional fora, all of which have a strength in either voicing our concern over international terrorism or demonstrating that we have a capability to join others to act against terrorism as it happens. Often, that’s highlighted through things like anti-piracy activities. In the Asian region, we are a member of ReCAAP [Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia], so we contribute to that fora, and we stand ready to contribute in a naval presence if required.

FORUM: Terminology has begun changing to be more encompassing and inclusive by referring to this as the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. Australia recently completed an exercise with China. How would you describe your relationship with them, given your geographic locations, and ability to work together?

BARRETT: We take a firm view that China remains our significant trading partner. It is important in an economic sense, and from a government-to-government extent, that we demonstrate that we can operate. At the same time — and it’s open press to show — it hasn’t stopped Australia as a sovereign nation from making its position well understood to all those within the South China Sea. We do not condone anyone who makes claims within the South China Sea or who doesn’t seek to manage those claims through international courts or international fora. We don’t see a dilemma in being able to trade with China, and through that, exercise government-to-government relations through Navy conducting exercises with China. That does not stop us from still making our voice heard. We take a very clear view of our relationship in the South China Sea — with China in particular.

FORUM: What does the Royal Australian Navy look like in the next five to 10 years?

BARRETT: It’s a question I’m asking all my members of the Navy to look at, because we actually have some certainty now with a number of government decisions. Government, in the last half of last year [2015], have indicated that we will procure new frigates to replace our current frigate force. We will procure new offshore patrol vessels to replace our current patrol boat force. We’re in the throes of a project to replace our tanker force. And we’re also looking at replacing our submarine with a future submarine in the mid- to long term. All of those things will completely change how our Navy looks, whilst we’re also bringing in new air warfare destroyers and the new LHDs [landing helicopter docks]. In five to 10 years’ time, the Navy will look completely different. What we have, though — between now and then — is certainty in what we need to do. We have to introduce current capability, the LHD, the air warfare destroyer, new Seahawk Romeo helicopters, but we also know that we have to continue the project to bring these new capabilities in. All that work will need to be done in the next three to five years, with the prospect then in 10 years that the ships will be operational.

It’s not often a small- to medium-size Navy gets to see so much clarity around where it will be in 10 to 15 years’ time. I’m using that to our advantage to allow all those who are in the Navy or who are contemplating joining the Navy to say, I can tell you where you will be and what you will be doing over the next five to 10 years.

This recapitalization is a great opportunity for us in the Navy. The beauty of all of this being done as not just individual projects with ships, but it is to be seen as a system that allows us to think completely different about how we might train and how we might sustain each of these forces. We’re in a prime position at the moment, and we’ve got a great opportunity to really bring this Navy up to a very contemporary and future standard in everything we do — not just how we operate the ships, but how we sustain them, how we train for them, how we develop the workforce to be able to manage them. And I can show people that there’s a distinct outcome or product that they will see for their efforts and their endeavors. It’s a great time for Navy at the moment.
Creating Seamless Maritime Security Coalitions in the Indo-Asia-Pacific

Vice Adm. (Ret.) Hideaki Kaneda
JAPAN MARITIME SELF-DEFENSE FORCE

The rapid expansion of China’s political, economic and military power in the Indo-Asia-Pacific presents opportunities and challenges for the region. China’s rapid military buildup and assertive behavior could heighten tensions, especially over regional maritime disputes, and produce seriously adverse effects.

A policy of outright containment or isolation of China would be inappropriate and counterproductive. Regional states should instead seek to improve cooperation among themselves in order to pressure Beijing to conform to, and fulfill its responsibilities under, established international law and norms. They must also establish a defense posture that will allow them to hedge against a deterioration in the regional security environment.

At the same time, regional countries should take every opportunity to involve China in bilateral and multilateral talks to avoid the danger of unintended maritime clashes, prevent inordinate military buildups or an irrational arms race and foster a habit of cooperation among regional militaries. Greater transparency and confidence-building measures will be the keys to achieving these objectives.

In this context, it is imperative that China and other regional states establish bilateral maritime and air communication mechanisms, including holding regular dialogues, setting up hotlines to manage crises, and introducing common military communication systems. China and Japan will hopefully sign such agreements in the near future.

The Indo-Asia-Pacific region faces a range of traditional and nontraditional security issues. Maritime security issues are of particular importance and must be tackled by regional players. States should reaffirm the need to respect and comply with international maritime law and practice, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). They should also emphasize the importance of freedom of navigation and sea lane security. These are critical elements in further expanding trade safely throughout the sea lanes in the region.

The majority of regional countries strongly believes that China, as a country aspiring to be a strong maritime power, should be more proactive in obeying international maritime laws and norms. Instead China’s assertive behavior in the South and East China seas has caused strong dissatisfaction in the region and heightened its neighbors’ vigilance.

Similarly, regional states want to see the United States ratify UNCLOS as soon as possible. Having all Indo-Asia-Pacific maritime countries become parties to the convention and sincerely respect and comply with it would serve as an important foundation for resolving or at least managing most of the region’s maritime disputes.

Composing Maritime Security Coalitions

In the meantime, regional countries should seek to establish flexible mechanisms for collective maritime security cooperation. Confidence-building through official dialogue and information sharing, and cooperative maritime security exercises to tackle mutual threats would contribute to regional stability by preventing misunderstandings, reducing mistrust, and expanding the scope of common interests.

Regional countries have already displayed such collective maritime security cooperation in combating nontraditional maritime threats. They have made cooperative efforts to tackle common concerns such as counterpiracy, combating illicit trade, and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The region is also exploring greater cooperation on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, given the Indo-Asia-Pacific’s vulnerability to earthquakes, typhoons and other disasters. Most states in the Indo-Asia-Pacific would like to see the reliable regional maritime powers, such as Japan, Australia, India and the United States, play more important roles in these areas.

These reliable regional maritime powers are key players in maritime security and defense in the Indo-Asia-
Pacific, sharing a wide range of common interests and seeing preservation of regional security and prosperity as regional public goods. They are the countries with the will and ability to contribute to regional security and stability, despite differences in maritime policy and capabilities, and other regional states have generally welcomed their initiatives. Establishing maritime security coalitions among these responsible powers that are as seamless as possible should therefore be a major focus of security and defense cooperation in the region.

The responsible regional maritime powers should pursue cooperation with each other and smaller neighbors in both traditional and nontraditional areas of maritime security, not through a formal alliance but via a chain of mini-lateral cooperative maritime security coalitions that would form a seamless whole. These coalitions would be loose, voluntary associations providing universal maritime security as regional public goods.

To do so effectively, smaller regional countries that share common interests should join in mini-lateral maritime security coalitions — for instance, by subregion, thereby taking advantage of their unique geographic and strategic needs. These coalitions would need to be backed by the United States, including its naval forces, and by the other responsible regional maritime powers — Australia, India and Japan.

These maritime security coalitions should be allowed to build upon each other, bringing in as many sensible maritime nations as possible to blanket the Indo-Asia-Pacific in a layered, seamless chain of coalition. However, each coalition should remain mini-lateral — containing just a few countries in order to ensure the ability to build consensus within the grouping. This loosely organized by seamlessly connected chain of coalitions could help ensure stability in the region.

Retired Vice Adm. Hideaki Kaneda served in the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force from 1968 to 1999. He is a director for the Okazaki Institute and adjunct fellow of the Japan Institute of International Affairs. This article has been edited to fit our format. It is reprinted with permission from the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative.
China's godfather of rock Cui Jian says his basic message of personal freedom hasn't changed in his new album, even if the world has.

The rocker, who fell out of favor with the government after he sided with demonstrating students during the 1989 Tiananmen protests, said the messages in his songs today may not be different, "but the way that you understand could be different" because of the changes China has gone through.

Growing personal wealth among Chinese has created the chance to travel and take control of their private lives, Cui said, a far cry from the tightly controlled society of the 1980s. "They got a chance to make money, so this is a big change," he said.

At the same time, other things haven't changed, said Cui, wearing a stylish business suit and his trademark white baseball cap adorned with a red star. There are still limits on how freely you can talk, and "you shouldn't say black and white; you could say something gray and then make it safe," he said.

Cui's first album in 11 years is called Frozen Light, and he said he hopes his music will inspire Chinese to think about how some things remain static, then "think about whether you take it or you just try to warm it and change it or break it."

The 54-year-old began his musical career with a six-year stint playing trumpet in the Beijing Philharmonic, writing songs and forming a band on the side. He became the symbol of China's embryonic rock scene when he sang his signature tune Nothing to my Name at a televised stadium concert in 1986.

That song, in which he sings of desire and dashed hopes, later became the unofficial anthem for student pro-democracy demonstrators. He played on Tiananmen Square just days before the government sent in tanks and troops to crush the protests.

Later, Communist authorities refused permission for his concerts in the capital and censored his lyrics. In 2005, he was able to headline at a Beijing stadium. In 2006, he performed with the Rolling Stones in Shanghai, singing Wild Horses alongside Mick Jagger.

Today, Cui said people view him more as "an old man" than a rebel, a familiar face on television but no longer influential. "They don't care about someone who is saying some truth, they just care about your age," he said. "They care about whether you say something they like to hear, because they don't have time to think about serious things."

"I don't even want people to say I'm the godfather of Chinese rock music. I would like to say I'm the grandson of Chinese rock music," he said. "I want to keep doing something; I don't want to sit there and tell people what you should do. I don't like that."

Despite that, Cui said there's greater freedom of expression today and was surprised he had faced no demands to change the lyrics on Frozen Light when he submitted them to authorities, as all artists in China must do. Or perhaps he'd already censored them himself: "The self-censorship is always there."

Frozen Light is Cui's first album since 2005, although most of the songs were completed at least five years ago. Cui said he felt the album wasn't ready and, acting as his "own boss," was in no rush.

The record was released on Christmas Day 2015 in 119 countries, including the U.S. and Japan, according to Cui's manager, Yoyo. He'll follow up the release with performances in Beijing and other Chinese cities in the second half of 2016.

Some Chinese reviewers have been unimpressed, pointing to simple melodies and lyrics employing hard-to-understand classical riddles. "I would say it's more powerful music and more original, even if there is a lot of melody, even if it is rock 'n' roll," said Cui. "In at least two or three songs, I think I create the groove, which is reggae but it's not like 'on the beach' kind of reggae, not like dance floor music. It's really a heartbeat, with hurt feeling and suffering feeling."

The track Outside Girl captures those sentiments, he said, with its lyrics about the humiliations that migrants from the countryside to the cities must endure, no matter how hard they strive.

Appraising China's modern rock scene, Cui said that, unlike well-supported but superficial pop acts, China's most talented rockers exist underground without record contracts or management teams. "That's why people think they're not successful. But in my eyes they're very, very brave. They're saying something. ... They talk about the environment, they talk about pollution, they talk about corruption, everything."

In the near future, he wants to see artists — in music, movies and TV programs — speak out about what they feel. "Don't make it just for money; believe it, and then you can see the change," Cui said.
Kenya passed a law in April 2016 that criminalizes doping by athletes and threatens drug cheats with prison sentences.

To help the country avoid sanctions from the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) ahead of the 2016 Olympics in Rio de Janeiro, President Uhuru Kenyatta signed the long-awaited anti-doping bill after lawmakers passed it. The law also gives Kenya’s new national anti-doping agency the legal power to operate.

The new law allows for a three-year prison term and a U.S. $30,000 fine for people found guilty of doping-related offenses. An athlete could also be sent to jail for one year for failing or refusing to submit to a doping test.

Kenya’s punishments are tougher than what WADA was seeking. WADA is against authorities taking criminal action against athletes for doping, believing they should face sporting sanctions such as bans.

Amid a doping crisis that has undermined its reputation as the leading distance-running nation in the world, Kenya has gone further. Since the 2012 London Olympics, 40 Kenyan athletes have been banned for doping. Also, four senior track federation officials were suspended on allegations of corruption and doping cover-ups.

The law was met with relief by some of Kenya’s top athletes, who feared being thrown out of the Rio Olympics. The Associated Press

A German university is launching a program aimed at enabling teachers who fled Syria and other countries to return to the classroom, potentially helping them serve as bridge-builders between German schools and the many new refugee arrivals.

The project at the University of Potsdam, outside Berlin, starts as Germany increasingly focuses on integrating what will likely be hundreds of thousands of people into its society and workforce.

In April 2016, the first all-Syrian group of refugees grappled with the intricacies of German time-telling and days of the week at the modern university campus on the city’s outskirts. The Associated Press

The World Bank in April 2016 pledged U.S. $2.5 billion to educate and empower adolescent girls in low-income countries as a way to improve their well-being and fight poverty.

Speaking at the spring meetings of the World Bank Group and the International Monetary Fund, World Bank President Jim Yong Kim said that enabling girls to attend school helps them delay marriage; have fewer, healthier and better educated children; and get better jobs.

The funds will be allocated by 2020, and 75 percent of the money will go mostly to countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. “Unleashing the full economic potential of half the population can drive the growth and prosperity of nations,” Kim said. “Investing in girls and women is not only the right thing to do for them as individuals. It’s also the smart thing to do for economies.”

Let Girls Learn seeks to encourage the leaders of other countries to provide opportunities for education to the estimated 62 million girls around the world who do not attend school. The Associated Press

The 11-month course to familiarize them with the language and Germany’s education system starts with months of intensive German courses. Then they’ll take part in regular teacher training and learn about teaching in Germany, ending with practice at a school.

“I was very happy that there is a course specifically for refugees who are teachers — that’s what I want,” said Alaa Kassab, a 23-year-old from Aleppo, who taught English and other subjects to young children in Syria.

Mirjam Vock, a professor of education at the university who helped initiate the program, said she and others launched it after realizing there was “no program in Germany for this group of highly qualified people.”

The university received more than 700 applications but had only 23 places in its first course. The Associated Press
When Vincent van Gogh peered out the window of the Saint-Paul asylum at the nighttime sky in Saint-Rémy in 1889, he saw the brilliant light of countless stars over southern France that inspired his evocative painting *The Starry Night*.

Nowadays, nights aren’t as starry for billions of people. About 83 percent of the world’s population, including more than 99 percent in Europe and the United States, live in areas beset by nocturnal “light pollution” from the incessant glow of electric lights, researchers said in June 2016.

It is so pervasive that more than a third of people globally, including nearly 80 percent of North Americans and 60 percent of Europeans, cannot see the luminous band of the Milky Way, a familiar nighttime sight for the eons of human existence.

“It is surprising how in a few decades of lighting growth we have enveloped most of humanity in a curtain of light that hides the view of the greatest wonder of nature: the universe itself,” said Fabio Falchi of the Light Pollution Science and Technology Institute in Italy, who led the research published in the journal Science Advances.

“Our civilization’s roots are connected to the night sky in every field, from literature to art to philosophy to religion and, of course, to science.”

Physicist Christopher Kyba of the GFZ German Research Centre for Geosciences added, “Appreciating beauty is just part of what makes us human.”

The researchers used satellite and sky brightness data to create a global atlas of light pollution, the artificial illumination of the night sky sufficient to substantially wash out starlight. It is one of humankind’s most omnipresent forms of environmental alteration, exemplified by the nocturnal glow over cities.

“Countries even as large as Italy or Spain or France or Germany do not have any single spot in their territory with a pristine night sky,” Falchi added.

Despite the American West’s vast open spaces, almost half of U.S. territory has light-polluted nights. The East Coast is particularly hit hard, with only part of Maine and the islands at the end of the Florida Keys having pristine sky quality, U.S. National Park Service researcher Dan Duriscoe said.

The most light-polluted country is Singapore. The hardest-hit G20 countries are Italy and South Korea. Only small areas in Western Europe remain relatively unaffected, mostly in Scotland, Sweden and Norway. Australia and Africa are least-affected among the populated continents.
PEPPER STATUS

Cambodia’s Kampot pepper, a go-to spice for chefs around the world, has joined an elite group of gourmet food items whose names are protected by the European Union (EU), joining products such as Gruyere cheese from France and Parma ham from Italy.

The coveted designation, known as Protected Geographical Indication (PGI) works like a trademark protection that certifies the origin of regional foods. It means that any product sold in EU countries calling itself “Kampot pepper” must come from a designated region in southern Cambodia that includes Kampot and neighboring Kep province.

The recognition was awarded to Kampot peppers in February 2016, making it the first Cambodian product to receive the PGI label, the EU office in Cambodia said in a statement.

The peppercorns, which come in white, red and black, are described by gourmet chefs as having a complex flavor with floral overtones. Cambodian farmers from the seaside region on the Gulf of Thailand say the area’s microclimate and mineral-rich soil give the pepper its unique taste.

HEDGEHOG LOVE

As if cat, rabbit, owl, hawk and even snake-themed cafes aren’t enough in a country that loves all things cute, Tokyo residents wanting to spend time with animals have a new choice: a hedgehog-themed cafe.

Customers at “Harry,” a play on the animal’s name in Japanese, have been lining up to spend time in a bright room in the Roppongi entertainment district where 20 to 30 hedgehogs of different breeds scrabble and snooze in glass tanks.

A fee of 1,000 yen (U.S. $9) on weekdays and 1,300 yen on holidays brings an hour of playing with and cuddling, carefully, the prickly mammals, which have long been sold in Japan as pets despite not being native to the island nation.

“All of these hedgehogs are friendly even though some of them might spike you,” said Anna Cheung, an 11-year-old visitor from Britain.

Staffer Mizuki Murata, who also works in a rabbit cafe in the same building, said the shop had been popular since its February 2016 opening, with customers often having to queue.

“We wanted to show people the charm of hedgehogs, which give the impression of being hard to handle. We wanted to get rid of that image by letting people touch them,” Murata said.

“The cutest thing about hedgehogs is getting them to finally open up and show you their face.”

The Associated Press

The Associated Press
Republic of Korea (ROK) Army Soldiers work on a pontoon bridge during a joint U.S.-South Korea river-crossing exercise in April 2016 in Yeoncheon, South Korea, near the Demilitarized Zone that separates North and South Korea. The drill simulated how ROK Soldiers and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers would rebuild bridges destroyed by enemy shells. The U.S. and South Korea signed a memorandum of understanding in March 2016 to improve operations, enabling the two militaries to conduct new types of training, including bridge building.

Photo By: KIM HONG-JI | Reuters

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