Deep-water Dialogue

India could extend maritime reach by developing Indonesian port

Strategically situated off the northern tip of Sumatra at an entry to the Malacca Strait, Indonesia’s Sabang port soon could receive a makeover that might alter the balance of power in the Indian Ocean region (IOR).

Indonesia and India announced in May 2018 that they would set up a task force to “undertake projects for port-related infrastructure in and around” Sabang port. Sabang is a town on Weh Island in northern Sumatra. India pledged to finance infrastructure improvements, and in return, India would gain commercial and potentially military access to the port. Luhut Pandjaitan, Indonesia’s coordinating minister for maritime affairs, said the port could dock ships and submarines, according to Eurasia Review, an independent journal and think tank.

Although the stated purpose of the partnership is to enhance tourism and address issues of the “blue economy,” such as the fishing industry, the partnership has an obvious military benefit, experts contend. Access to the port would give India another way to check the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC’s) growing reach in the IOR, which has increased through multiple partnerships as part of its so-called String of Pearls strategy. 

“Unarguably, India and Indonesia share concerns about the uncertain nature of China’s rise,” retired Indian Navy Commodore Abhay Kumar Singh, told FORUM. Singh, a research fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, said both countries believe the partnership enhances regional security. 

“Both [India and Indonesia] wish to see the development of a multipolar regional order in which they are recognized internationally as regional powers,” he said.

Singh added that a joint statement issued after Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Jakarta in May 2018 emphasized that enhanced maritime cooperation can “be a force of immense stability in the region.” 

“Both countries consider a bilateral strategic partnership useful in balancing the growth of China’s influence in the region,” Singh said.

Strategic Significance

Some experts argue that the port is better suited for military use than commercial development. 

“The port, owing to its small size and distance from the core Indonesian hinterland and ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] economic powerhouses, is not conducive for long-haul maritime trade,” Angshuman Choudhury, a researcher and coordinator for the Southeast Asia Research Programme, wrote for Eurasia Review.

“On the other hand, Sabang’s distinct location, merely 90 nautical miles below the southernmost tip of India’s Andaman and Nicobar islands, gives it a critical strategic advantage of facilitating broader maritime reconnaissance in and around the Andaman Sea during peace time; preemptive blockading of the Malacca Strait during war time; and as a proximate base for additional strategic maneuvering in the eastern IOR flank.” The island already has an operational airport, which could be upgraded to accommodate military aircraft, Choudhury wrote.

Military cooperation is already occurring at Sabang. In June 2018, the INS Sumitra, an Indian Navy patrol vessel, visited the port. The vessel was welcomed by a ceremony involving traditional Indonesian dancers, as well as an appearance by R.K. Rawat, India’s ambassador to Indonesia, according to the Business Standard newspaper, an English-language daily in India.

Countering the PRC’s naval presence in the Indian Ocean isn’t the only benefit of the port partnership, however. Singh pointed out that protecting some of the world’s busiest shipping lanes is paramount. The adoption of a shared vision on maritime cooperation in the Indo-Pacific “reflects the progressive strengthening of maritime cooperation,” he said.

Sabang “has significant strategic importance due to her location astride Six Degree Channel, also known as Great Channel. Three major sea routes of the Indian Ocean originating from or destined to the Cape of Good Hope, the Gulf of Aden and Strait of Hormuz converge in the Great Channel,” he said. “As a major feeder and outlet of Malacca Strait, the Great Channel or Six Degree Channel is crucial for usage of the Malacca Strait by maritime shipping.” 

He recounted the history of piracy in the seas around the Aceh province where Sabang is located and said that remains a serious concern. 

Growing Chinese Presence

The PRC’s maritime presence in the IOR has grown rapidly during the past five years with dual-use port agreements with Burma, Djibouti, Maldives, Pakistan and Tanzania, Choudhury wrote. The String of Pearls strategy in which the PRC established a series of nodes of military and economic power throughout the region could be contested if India receives cooperation from other South and Southeast Asian states, including Burma, Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Thailand, he said. 

“In this context, New Delhi has made some headway by promoting a nascent framework of strategic convergence in the IOR through interforce coordination, joint maritime patrols, naval exercises and real-time intelligence sharing with littoral states,” he wrote. “Yet, New Delhi must not presume that smaller littoral countries would unconditionally back India in an event of confrontation with Beijing in the IOR.”

In some cases, the PRC used economic pressure to gain access to ports in the region. In Sri Lanka, for example, the government was economically coerced by the PRC to grant the Chinese government a 99-year lease for control of the Hambantota port when Sri Lanka was unable to pay down Chinese loans for its construction.

In Gwadar, Pakistan, the Chinese government provided U.S. $46 billion in investments and loans to build energy and infrastructure projects as part of its China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. The PRC, in return, assumed ownership of Gwadar Port just northeast of the Strait of Hormuz.

Although Pakistan’s military said the PRC has not asked for naval access to the deep-water port, officials from India and the United States have singled out Gwadar as a possible location for a future Chinese military base, according to media reports. China and Pakistan said they plan to turn Gwadar into a transshipment hub and megaport, Reuters reported. Energy pipelines, rail links and roads will connect Gwadar to the western regions of China.

With its intense interest in the region, the Chinese government paid special notice to the fledgling agreement between Indonesia and India at Sabang. The prospect of military cooperation at the port evoked contentious rhetoric from China’s Global Times newspaper. 

“China has always kept a positive attitude toward India’s overseas port investment in Southeast Asian countries, a move that could promote regional economic integration, but that doesn’t mean China will turn a blind eye to possible military cooperation between India and Indonesia at Sabang,” the newspaper wrote in May 2018. “China’s heavy use of the Malacca Strait means its economic and energy security is to some extent tied to trade routes across the strait. If India really seeks military access to the strategic island of Sabang, it might wrongfully entrap itself into a strategic competition with China and eventually burn its own fingers.”

Longtime Partners

That rhetoric is unlikely to shape the decadeslong partnership between India and Indonesia. As littoral neighbors who share maritime boundaries in the East Indian Ocean, the countries have common interests and security challenges, Singh said. “This provides an ideal environment to enhance the avenues of maritime cooperation between India and Indonesia.”

The Indian Navy and Indonesian Navy have a “vibrant cooperation,” Singh said, that dates back to the 1950s. Singh, who specialized in missile and gunnery warfare in his 27-year naval career, said the navies signed their first security agreement in 1958 and conducted their first joint naval exercise in July 1960. Partly due to Cold War dynamics and a divergence in “regional perceptions,” the military
ties loosened in the 1960s and 1970s, Singh said.

Following the end of the Cold War, however, “there was significant convergence of strategic perceptions of the two countries and resultant enhancement in maritime cooperation, which now includes regular bilateral exercises, coordinated patrols, cooperation on maritime domain awareness and training exchanges between the two navies,” he said.

As for the Sabang project, the port would give the Indian Navy a logistics and resupply base to sustain operations in the eastern Indian Ocean and the Malacca Strait. It also could “boost the Indian Navy’s ability to respond to humanitarian emergencies, provide disaster relief, and conduct anti-piracy patrols,” asserted an article in The Diplomat, an online news magazine.

So, whether the mission is humanitarian assistance, anti-piracy patrols or protecting shipping lanes, forging lasting partnerships with neighbors to enhance maritime security makes strategic sense, Singh said. “Indonesia is an important partner for India due to her strategic geography,” he said. “A close partnership between the two navies aims to ensure strategic stability in one of the most important areas of the Indo-Pacific.”