Critical Conduits

FORUM Staff

Even as the world plunged into war, Direction Island seemed a strange destination for a German landing party in November 1914. Part of the largely uninhabited Cocos atoll midway between Australia and Sri Lanka in the eastern Indian Ocean, the speck of land was 11,000 kilometers from the Imperial German Navy’s main port at Wilhelmshaven on the North Sea. But it held a target of immense strategic value for the 50 or so troops who came ashore on the wooden jetty from the light cruiser SMS Emden.

The island was a relay point for a nascent undersea grid connecting Britain’s far-flung administrative hubs. Sliding beneath turquoise waters, communication cables extended as far as Mauritius on the other side of the Indian Ocean and Perth in western Australia. “My orders were to destroy the wireless telegraph and cable station on Direction Island,” the Emden’s first officer wrote in his memoirs, recalling how his men “set to work upon the stout cables with crowbars, axes, driving chisels, and other like implements.”

Today, nearly 600 cable systems snake like mythical serpents across ocean floors. The fiber-optic network extends 1.4 million kilometers — enough to gird the planet 35 times — and includes the 20,000-kilometer Asia-America Gateway cable stretching from California to the Gulf of Thailand. By 2026, the first subsea cable connecting the Indo-Pacific and South America is set to begin operating, linking Australia and Chile via French Polynesia. These critical conduits, barely the width of a garden hose, carry more than 95% of the world’s data traffic. Without these digital arteries, global communication and commerce would founder — financial transactions, state secrets, social media posts, internet searches, military orders and emails to distant loved ones.

Since undersea telegraph cables first carried messages 175 years ago, securing these seabed lines of communication has been imperative. The 1884 Convention for the Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables, signed by two dozen nations, made it a “punishable offence to break or injure a submarine cable, willfully or by culpable negligence, in such manner as might interrupt or obstruct telegraphic communication.”

Time has not diluted such concerns.

“Submarine cables are the unsung heroes of the digital age, enabling the connectivity that drives economic growth and societal development. In the Indo-Pacific, their importance cannot be overstated,” Jihoon Yu, a research fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, wrote for The Diplomat magazine in July 2024. “However, the security of these critical infrastructures is increasingly threatened by natural disasters, geopolitical tensions, and malicious activities. Addressing these challenges requires a comprehensive and cooperative approach, integrating national strategies, regional cooperation, technological innovation, and strengthened legal frameworks.”

SEISMIC DISRUPTION

Like ships steaming in response to an SOS, Allies and Partners across the Indo-Pacific and beyond are heeding such distress signals with initiatives to expand undersea cable connectivity, fortify infrastructure and guard against malfeasance. Projects include uncrewed submersibles to inspect and monitor cables; regional centers for research and policy development; and hybrid networks to reroute communications via satellite if cables are attacked or damaged. Next-generation cables, meanwhile, are equipped with climate- and hazard-monitoring sensors to provide early warnings of earthquakes and tsunamis, a crucial capability in the Indo-Pacific, which sits along a 40,000-kilometer-long belt of seismic instability known as the Ring of Fire.

Many of the endeavors are buoyed by public-private partnerships and multinational collaboration. They were launched after a succession of events exposed the fragility of undersea cables and the susceptibility of global communications to disruption.

In January 2022, an underwater volcanic eruption in the South Pacific Ocean — among the largest recorded — severed an 840-kilometer submarine cable connecting Tonga with the outside world. The island nation’s 106,000 citizens were without internet service for weeks after the disaster as civilian and military crews worked to restore connectivity.

Then, in February 2022, Russian forces invaded Ukraine, an unprovoked assault that sparked Europe’s biggest conflict since World War II and sent tremors through the global economy. A month before, the United Kingdom’s top military officer had warned of a “phenomenal increase in Russian submarine and underwater activity.” As a result, Moscow could “put at risk and potentially exploit the world’s real information system, which is undersea cables,” Adm. Tony Radakin told The Times newspaper. “Russia has grown the capability to put at threat those undersea cables and potentially exploit those undersea cables.”

Any attempt to destroy the cables could be considered an act of war, Radakin said.

In 2023, with the fighting grinding on in Ukraine, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) intensified its coercion campaign against Taiwan, which Beijing claims as its territory and threatens to annex by force. So, when Chinese fishing and cargo vessels cut the two undersea communication cables linking the Matsu Islands with the rest of the self-governed archipelago, it had the hallmark of “targeted harassment by Beijing — or an exercise in preparation for cutting off the whole of Taiwan,” Elisabeth Braw, a senior fellow at the United States-based Atlantic Council think tank, wrote in Foreign Policy magazine in February 2023. “Cable sabotage could become our era’s blockade — and unlike past generations’ blockades, it can be conducted on the sly.”

DELIVERING A MESSAGE

In May 2023, just a few weeks after a cable-repair ship restored communications to Matsu’s 13,000 residents, the leaders of Australia, India, Japan and the U.S. unveiled their Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience. The public-private collaboration includes capacity building and technical assistance and will “develop trusted and secure cable systems and establish better internet connectivity and resiliency in the Indo-Pacific,” they stated. The project is part of a wave of regional undertakings:

In June 2023, NATO announced it was establishing the U.K.-based Maritime Centre for the Security of Critical Undersea Infrastructure. The move followed apparent attacks on gas pipelines in the Baltic Sea and the unexplained severing of subsea cables in the Arctic Ocean, which also prompted the 32-member security alliance to boost naval patrols. “The threat is developing,” Lt. Gen. Hans-Werner Wiermann, a senior NATO official, told reporters. “Russian ships have actively mapped our critical undersea infrastructure. There are heightened concerns that Russia may target undersea cables and other critical infrastructure in an effort to disrupt Western life.”

Also in mid-2023, the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the U.S. agreed to expand and bolster undersea cable systems and other digital networks.

Tech giant Google said it would expand an undersea cable project for Pacific island nations. The South Pacific Connect initiative, which will link Fiji and French Polynesia to Australia and the U.S., includes funding from Canberra and Washington. “Our shared vision is to pave the way for a more interconnected and fortified digital future not only for Fiji but also for the entire Pacific region and beyond,” Fijian Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka said in an October 2023 statement.

At the inaugural meeting of NATO’s Critical Undersea Infrastructure Network in May 2024, experts discussed enhancing information-sharing and situational awareness to deter and defend against threats, including through artificial intelligence, drones and sensors. “The increasing dependency of our societies on undersea infrastructure means we need to do more to enhance their security,” then-NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg told attendees. “NATO is well placed to take on a greater role given our Allies’ unique military capabilities, vast intelligence network, and operational expertise.”

Two months later, Australia launched the Cable Connectivity and Resilience Centre, with plans to invest about $12 million over four years for training, technical assistance, research and government-industry engagement. “This work is integral to the prosperity and security of our region,” Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong stated. “The Centre is an important Australian contribution to the Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience, which is an important demonstration of the Quad’s delivery in the region, responding to the Indo-Pacific’s most pressing challenges.”

As of September 2024, the Quad had committed more than $140 million for undersea cable installation in the Indo-Pacific, the nations’ leaders announced at their summit that month in Delaware. Also, the U.S. has conducted capacity-building training for more than 1,300 telecommunication officials from 25 countries, while India is studying a possible expansion of cable maintenance and repair capabilities across the region. These investments “support all Pacific island countries in achieving primary telecommunication cable connectivity by the end of 2025,” the leaders stated.

SECURE COMMUNICATION

An estimated 300,000 kilometers of undersea communication cables, valued at $10 billion, were scheduled to become operational between 2023 and 2025, according to TeleGeography, a U.S.-based company that provides data for monitoring, forecasting and mapping telecommunications. That growth, the highest in 20 years, is largely driven by demand for online searches, video and social media. Since 2018, for example, Facebook parent company Meta and Google parent Alphabet invested in 15 and 26 submarine cable systems, respectively, TeleGeography reported. Google also is partnering with Chile in the landmark Humboldt cable system, which will connect South America with the Indo-Pacific. The U.S. State Department says the transformational project will accelerate “digital connectivity and integration with the global economy” in both regions.

“Despite ever improving satellite data transfer capacities, the low latency, speed and relative low cost of submarine cables will ensure these seabed connections remain the backbone of the internet and digital communications into the future,” Samuel Bashfield, a research fellow with the University of Melbourne’s Australia India Institute Defence Program, wrote in his article “Defending seabed lines of communication,” published in July 2024 in the Australian Journal of Maritime & Ocean Affairs.

The U.S., along with nations such as France and Japan, is a global leader in submarine cable supply and installation, according to a February 2024 analysis published by the Pacific Forum, a Hawaii-based foreign policy research institute. China has designs on the lucrative market through an offshoot of its One Belt, One Road (OBOR) infrastructure scheme. However, while the U.S. and its Allies and Partners promote expanded access and the free flow of information for the common good, analysts contend Beijing’s motives are far from altruistic. As with the detritus of OBOR — shoddy and unfinished projects, debt-laden recipient nations, and undermined sovereignty — the CCP’s attempt to inveigle itself into undersea cable and other digital projects threatens to create disarray and damage.

“Globally, China has pursued opaque partnership agreements on telecommunications infrastructure such as [fiber-optic] and satellite systems, 5G, cloud computing, digital economy, smart cities, and other emerging technologies,” noted the report “The Digital Silk Road: China and the Rise of Digital Repression in the Indo-Pacific,” published in March 2024 by the international research and analysis organization Article 19. “Such infrastructure can be exploited to gain access to user data or to filter or block online content. China’s domestic digital ecosystem and information and communications technology (ICT) legal frameworks thus provide a template for would-be digital dictatorships.”

Given such realities, the report noted, “China’s goal of gaining greater control of this [undersea cable] infrastructure … raises questions about information flow and security.”

Indo-Pacific nations increasingly view Beijing’s overtures as a Trojan horse. A CCP-controlled firm’s proposed undersea cable system connecting several Pacific island nations was scrapped in 2021 after Australia, Nauru and the U.S. warned of security risks. The CCP requires companies in China to cooperate with Beijing’s intelligence and security services, the Reuters news agency reported. Canberra, Tokyo and Washington subsequently announced that they would fund the East Micronesia Cable linking Kiribati, Micronesia and Nauru. The project will “provide faster, higher quality and more reliable and secure communications, connecting more than 100,000 people,” the U.S. Agency for International Development stated.

U.S. officials also have shared intelligence with Vietnam over the potential for sabotage should Hanoi choose state-run companies to install 10 undersea cables by 2030, Reuters reported in September 2024. The U.S. has sanctioned at least one of the companies, HMN Technologies, over national security concerns.

“China’s maritime expansion and militarization of disputed territories in the South China Sea add layers of complexity to the already fragile security environment,” Jihoon, of the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, wrote in The Diplomat. “The potential for conflicts over cable routes and landing points is high, as these are strategically significant assets. Control over submarine cables could provide a strategic advantage in terms of intelligence and communication superiority, making them prime targets in any geopolitical conflict.”

HISTORY LESSON

The Battle of Cocos lasted less than a day but secured a place in Australian military history. Alerted to the German raid by a wireless operator’s distress signal, the Royal Australian Navy light cruiser HMAS Sydney — part of a flotilla carrying nearly 30,000 troops to the months-old conflict in Europe — changed course toward Direction Island. Within hours, the surviving enemy troops aboard the Emden were prisoners, while their ship “was riddled with gaping holes, and it was with difficulty one could walk about the decks, and she was gutted with fire,” the Sydney’s surgeon reported to his commanding officer. No more would the Emden menace military and merchant ships in the Indian Ocean. The Royal Australian Navy, still in its infancy, had prevailed in its first battle.

The attack on the cable station proved futile. Concerned by reports of the Emden’s presence near the atoll, wireless operators had buried spare equipment as a backup, according to the Western Australian Maritime Museum. Meanwhile, the raiders could only sever one of the three submarine cables, which was quickly repaired. By the next day, the station again was relaying communications around the globe.

More than a century later, the events at Direction Island are a reminder of the strategic value of undersea cables and the importance of vigilance, preparedness and response mechanisms in ensuring the free and open flow of data. It’s a history lesson gaining new impetus as Allies and Partners confront suspicious cable-cutting incidents involving CCP- and Russian-linked vessels from the Taiwan Strait to the Baltic Sea. In January 2025, NATO unveiled its “Baltic Sentry” initiative after the suspected sabotage of energy and communications infrastructure in the Baltic by Russian ships. The alliance’s enhanced regional presence includes deployment of maritime patrol aircraft, frigates and naval drones, as well stringent enforcement. “Ship captains must understand that potential threats to our infrastructure will have consequences, including possible boarding, impounding and arrest,” NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte said. 

In an era of global turbulence, like-minded partners must also collaborate to build a “robust and efficient Indo-Pacific framework” to protect this vital infrastructure, the Pacific Forum analysis noted: “The longevity and critical role of submarine cables in global connectivity underscore the newfound imperative to address their protection in the face of escalating geopolitical tensions, exemplified by the Quad’s proactive stance in establishing a cooperative framework.”