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A Multidomain Approach to Defense

Australia’s New Defense Strategy Enables an Integrated Force and Enhances Interoperability

Lt. Gen. Simon Stuart/Australian Army Chief of Staff

Lt. Gen. Simon Stuart delivered this speech at the Land Forces Pacific conference, hosted by the Association of the United States Army in Honolulu, Hawaii, in mid-May 2024. It has been edited to fit FORUM’s format.

To the military professional, history is not merely about commemoration. History — especially military history — also provides valuable insights into statecraft and warfare. The past is, indeed, prologue for military professionals.

So today, I am acutely aware of the weight of history as we gather near Pearl Harbor. The attack of December 7, 1941, on that fleet base brought the United States into the Second World War, connecting three theaters into a truly global conflict. In the perilous days after that tragic event, the Australian continent was directly attacked for the first and only time in our history.

Our alliance with the United States was forged during the Pacific War. And, paradoxically, it inextricably linked our history and our future to that of Japan, a nation that is now a highly trusted security partner and vital trading partner to Australia.

Australian Soldiers march during the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps Day service in Queensland in June 2024. REUTERS

It was a great honor to sit alongside my colleague Gen. Yasunori Morishita, Chief of Staff, Japan Ground Self-Defense Force, as we discussed our shared challenges. Many of those states that emerged from colonialism in the aftermath of the Second World War, who are represented here today, were impacted deeply by the fighting across Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific. 

Geography made us neighbors. History made us allies. A shared commitment to regional security and stability has now made us friends and partners.

In our National Defence Strategy, published in April 2024, the Australian government assessed our strategic environment as “the most complex and challenging since the end of the Second World War.” While concluding that war in the Indo-Pacific is not inevitable, it asserts that strategic competition between the United States and China is “entrenched” and will increase, thereby constituting the “primary feature of Australia’s security environment.”

This document represents the most profound shift in Australia’s defense strategy since the 1980s. This, in my view, is a wholly necessary shift if Australia is to meet the challenges of the future. It will fundamentally shape our military posture and approach to the region in the decades to come.

The strategy directs that the Australian Defence Force [ADF] must adapt to meet contemporary threats: to shift from a “balanced force” to a “focused force,” to be more capable, more lethal and more integrated. Integration is vital. It means that the ADF must be able to apply military force across all five environments — the traditional physical domains of land, sea and air, and the newer domains of cyber and space. By integrating forces across these domains, and then by working with all branches of government, the ADF will make the whole far more than the sum of its parts. 

The Australian government has therefore concluded that it is no longer sufficient to have a joint force that converges in effect. We instead require an integrated force, developed and applied by design from first principles. This integrated force will be capable of imposing such a cost as to deter an aggressor by changing their calculus. The aim is that an aggressor concludes that the risks of aggression are too great. The integrated force will build relevant, ready and credible asymmetric military forces to deter conflict and to deny any adversary’s attempts to project power against Australia. 

This is Australia’s National Defence Strategy: a strategy of denial. It envisages an ADF that can achieve five tasks:

  • Defend Australia and its immediate region.
  • Deter through denial any potential adversary’s attempt to project power against Australia through our northern approaches.
  • Protect Australia’s economic connection to our region and the world.
  • Contribute with our partners to the collective security of the Indo-Pacific.
  • Contribute with our partners to the maintenance of the global rules-based order.

EVOLVING MISSION

The Australian Army’s mission and role in this inherently defensive — if proactive — strategy is clear. We are to “prepare land power to enable the integrated force in competition and conflict.” We are the integrated force’s experts in land combat, a role that history tells us is vitally and inextricably linked to deterring aggression, and to compelling the cessation of conflict should it come.

Australian Soldiers participate in an amphibious training activity with the Armed Forces of the Philippines, supported by U.S. Marine Rotational Force – Darwin. AUSTRALIAN DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE VIA THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

The Australian Army is adapting to achieve this mission and role against today’s challenges. Adaptation is no longer a phase for the Australian Army; it is a constant.

Australia’s primary area of military interest is a region of islands and archipelagos that form a “land bridge” connecting Australia to the Pacific and Southeast Asia. So, we are becoming a force optimized to fight in the littoral — the areas of the sea that influence the land and the areas of the land that influence the sea.

Littoral is a broad term that goes well beyond the physical environment. It includes the land, rivers, jungles, coastal waters, people, cultures, urban areas and airspace. And more so than ever, today it includes both the electromagnetic spectrum that characterizes the littoral zone and the space effects that can be delivered into it from above.

In the littoral — and across the battlespace — we are seeing technological change of a pace and scope perhaps unseen in the history of warfare. We are witnessing the exponential proliferation of sensors. This is making some domains almost transparent whereas others, such as those on the land, under the sea and in cyberspace, are filled with “clutter,” something that offers opportunities and threats.

Technology is evolving what armies can achieve, most obviously seen in the effect of missiles launched from the land against ships, the strategic value of which both the Houthi rebels and the Ukrainians have clearly demonstrated in early 2024. Sea denial and sea control from the land is now within reach of even modest armies.

The Australian Army is adapting to deploy deep into the littoral battlefield, by air, sea, and land, and to fight across all the domains from this decisive terrain. We are building capabilities that are both relevant and credible in this evolving battlespace.

Weapon ranges are a dominant example of this evolution. We live in an era where all weapon ranges — from the humble battle-shot to the ballistic missile — are expanding exponentially. As our National Defence Strategy points out, this is eroding one of Australia’s greatest strengths: our geography. No longer can our remoteness and inaccessibility protect us against attack.

An Australian Army M1A1 Abrams tank lands on a beach during Exercise Alon 2023, the first joint and combined amphibious training with components of the Australian Defence Force and the Armed Forces of the Philippines. AUSTRALIAN DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE VIA THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

DECISIVE DOMAIN

The Australian Army is adapting as a result to both take advantage of these expanded weapon ranges and to build the defenses to defeat long-range attacks. These evolutions require new ideas as much as they require new equipment. We must rethink our concepts of the “close” and the “deep” battle … building an Army that conceives, executes and enables operations over hundreds and even thousands of kilometers, across all domains … rather than the old ways of tens of kilometers just on the land.

We must be ready for the inevitable action/reaction/counteraction cycle that the injection of high technology into warfare inevitably drives. We must remember that history tells us that technology alone is rarely decisive. It is instead how technology is absorbed into our doctrines, and leveraged by our cultures, that is most often battle-winning. I would suggest that the U.S. Army Pacific Multi-Domain Task Force is a strong example of such absorption and adaptation.

Above all, the Australian Army is integrating with the rest of the ADF, and with our Allies and Partners in the region. We must support the integrated force from the littoral and must be able to be supported from the other domains in turn. 

However, let’s not mystify multidomain operations more than necessary. Rather than treating multidomain operations as something specific, it is fair to ask, “Is there now any other kind of military operation?” As the U.S. Secretary of the Army Christine Wormuth said: “The wars of the future are not going to be fought in one or two domains and are not going to be fought by one or two services. They are going to be fought across multiple domains. They will require a joint force to prevail on the battlefield, and it will require a combined joint force.”

However, the decisive domain is still likely to remain on land. It is from the land that governments apply statecraft, linking politics and conflict. And it is on — and indeed over the control of — land that wars most often start and end. Across the spectrum of conflict — from competition through humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping to large-scale combat operations — land forces provide persistent presence, reassurance and security to populations.

Motivated ground forces, on the defensive, can impose delay and great costs on more sophisticated forces, including those at sea. That lesson is as old as lessons learned from the Greek battle of Thermopylae. Ignoring such evidence, many commentators discern the imminent extinction of combined arms-capable land forces … the end of land combat itself.

Australian, Philippine and U.S. Soldiers and Marines participate in a large-scale amphibious assault exercise in San Antonio, Philippines, in August 2023. AUSTRALIAN DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE VIA THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

Some contend that technology will soon replace soldiers. That the golden age of artificial intelligence will deliver conflict free of bloodshed, and devoid of risk. I refer to such thinking, the predictable illusion of every interwar period, as “new bomber theories.”

As military professionals we can recognize the wars in Ukraine and Gaza as a microcosm of modern multidomain operations: the balance of war’s enduring nature against its changing character.

Land forces are being enhanced and enabled by technology, but equally they are being forced to adapt in a never-ending effort to gain an advantage. Yes, fusion of intelligence, targeting data and information warfare is being enabled by space assets in real time to a scale that is new in warfare. However, the point of decision remains on the ground amongst the people.

The close combat in complex urban terrain in Ukraine and Gaza — an exemplar of the “clutter” of the land domain — demonstrates the limitations of technology. No one has yet solved the problem of the last 100 meters, the last bound to the trench line.

The enduringly human nature of war means that leadership, individual and collective will, and the moral component of fighting power remain crucial to any hope or prospect of victory. This is the case in multidomain operations today and will be in the future. As the respected U.S. analyst of warfare Stephen Biddle has observed, the fighting in Ukraine resembles as much the Great War as it does “Star Wars.”

We need to keep all these factors in mind — technology, lethality, multidomain operations, integration — when we think about the Army’s contribution to the defense of Australia.

Old thinking perceives the maritime approaches to Australia simply as a sea-air gap, capable of being exclusively defended by sea and air platforms.

Australia’s National Defence Strategy conceives of it instead as complex sea, air, land — and in particular littoral — terrain: densely populated, in which integrated forces, in conjunction with Allies and Partners, must work together to develop and exploit windows of opportunity that converge military effects across multiple domains. Even more so, we must do this as part of a whole of nation and potentially even a whole of region effort that supports our collective security.

Australian and Indonesian Army tanks participate in Super Garuda Shield in East Java, Indonesia, in September 2023. THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

Land forces are an enduring, indispensable element of the combined joint and interagency team. And the demographic trend toward urbanization and congestion in proximity to the littoral zones of our region is intensifying. The reconfiguration of the Australian Army to operate and thrive in the littoral regions is a response to this trend. Our forces will be equipped and trained to support friends, Allies and Partners where common interests prevail, and where shared effort strengthens deterrence. By being present and persistent in key terrain, we can place the burden of aggression on our adversaries. In particular, the enhancement of anti-access/area denial capabilities, especially land-based maritime strike, provides conventional land forces and special forces with lethal asymmetric capabilities. A small team of Soldiers carefully positioned and well concealed in strategic terrain can now inflict serious damage on an expensive and sophisticated ship. 

We are significantly enhancing the Army by building capabilities in force projection, long-range strike and close combat, an effort that is squarely focused on ensuring that our land force is relevant and credible in all domains. An enhanced contribution of land power to the integrated force is the ultimate outcome.

This adaptation is not a one-off event or project. It is to be achieved by continual adaptation better responding to the dynamic nature of the operating environment. It is both a rewarding and challenging time to be an Australian Soldier.

STRONGER TOGETHER 

In 2023, our Army marked the 80th anniversary of the Lae-Wewak campaigns, the most complex joint forcible entry amphibious operations ever conducted by Australian forces. And November 2023 marked the 80th anniversary of the Battle of Tarawa, where the U.S. Marine Corps overcame staunch resistance in an amphibious operation of exceptional courage and skill. 

The U.S. Marine Corps refined doctrine and tactics that were vital to the success of the littoral operations of the Pacific War. Those brutal battles across the Timor Sea, New Guinea and the Southwest Pacific were fought because deterrence had failed. Our main aim now is to ensure that the specter of failed deterrence does not darken the region again. This is the explicit aim of Australia’s new defense strategy: to deter any conflict before it begins.

We seek to do this alongside our longest-standing Allies and Partners in the region. We are committed to a Pacific-first approach to security through the strong and deep relationships we have built over decades in the region. We desire regional security and stability, and a favorable regional strategic balance. We want to successfully manage the escalating strategic competition in our region. We seek to ensure that no country attempts to achieve its regional objectives through military action.

An Australian Reservist readies a howitzer at the Shrine of Remembrance in Melbourne for a salute to commemorate the King’s Birthday in June 2024. REUTERS

But it would be professionally irresponsible for us not to be ready should deterrence once again fail in the region. The past reminds us that far too often conflicts have begun due to misunderstanding, miscalculation or misadventure. We cannot rule this out. History has rhymed too often.

So, the Australian Army stands ready to respond with credible military force should we be required to do so. We will deny any potential adversary from taking actions that would be inimical to Australia’s interests. We will prevent any adversary from succeeding in coercing Australia through force.

The most powerful tool we have in succeeding in this era of strategic competition is not the weapons we have, nor is it technology. It is the people here today, who represent the network of land forces that exists throughout our region. As our host Gen. Charles Flynn, commander of the U.S. Army Pacific, recently reminded us … ours is a region of armies. Land forces represent the bulk of Indo-Pacific regional ally and partner military capabilities.

This network is not new; it reflects our shared history and geography. Today, it is more relevant than ever. 

I have seen exponential growth in multilateral communication, coordination and cooperation — the indispensable human elements of shared training, of personnel exchanges and persistent presence in each other’s countries. Exchanges of personnel to build confidence and trust among partners and even competitors. And where national interests align, we help each other in disaster and humanitarian crisis, a vital contribution in our shared grappling with the challenges of climate change. All of which contributes to a practical demonstration of collective capacity and the demonstration of collective will.

So, from my perspective, the most important contribution we have to multidomain operations in defense is each other. We are stronger together.

These are challenging, indeed perilous times. And time is not on our side. The assessment of my government is that the risks of conflict are greater than they have been since the end of the Pacific War that began with the attack on Pearl Harbor. Our coming together at events such as this, and the thickening of our practical cooperation, demonstrates our resolve. They build on vital human connections, they assist in dialogue. And it is only through such dialogue — and the professional collaboration that follows — that we can ensure that our region remains peaceful for generations to come.  

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