Arctic Aggression

FORUM Staff

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is not an Arctic nation. Its northern border is nearly 1,500 kilometers from the Arctic Circle and even farther from the Arctic Ocean. Yet the PRC is encroaching upon the frozen region to control its vast resources and exploit the strategic location for economic and potentially military purposes.

The PRC arbitrarily declared itself a “near-Arctic” state in 2018. The label immediately drew widespread criticism. “There are only Arctic states and non-Arctic states,” then-United States Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said. “No third category exists, and claiming otherwise entitles China to exactly nothing.”

Eight nations surround the Arctic — Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the U.S. — and all claim territory and territorial waters within the Arctic Circle.

Despite its distance, Beijing under Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping has conducted extensive Arctic research, coveted the region’s plentiful resources — including oil, gas, minerals and fish — and touted the potential of the Northern Sea Route (NSR), a multilegged passage across the top of Asia and Europe. The NSR, when ice-free, offers an alternate, shorter east-west maritime corridor for commercial and likely military vessels.

Beijing proclaims the NSR as an extension of the PRC’s One Belt, One Road (OBOR) infrastructure investment scheme, Dr. Kristina Spohr, an international history professor at the London School of Economics and Political Science, told The Diplomat magazine in December 2023.

Various factors have enabled the PRC to gain a foothold in the region:

Melting sea ice due to a warming climate. Arctic temperatures are rising as much as four times faster than the global average, a phenomenon called polar amplification, the Voice of America news organization reported in November 2023.

Improved technology such as icebreakers, all-weather airstrips, floating nuclear power plants, remote sensing equipment and drones.

Arctic behemoth Russia’s military and financial struggles from its unprovoked war on Ukraine. With 53% of the Arctic coastline, Russia has acquiesced to Chinese investment in maintaining and developing regional infrastructure as Moscow prosecutes its war, the Global and National Security Institute (GNSI) at the University of South Florida in Tampa reported in December 2023.

The PRC’s 14th Five-Year Plan, adopted in March 2021, outlined the nation’s objectives for the Arctic region, Trym Eiterjord, an Arctic Institute research associate based in Vancouver, Canada, told FORUM. The plan provided the first clear indication of Beijing’s plot to infiltrate the region. The PRC culled its improved intelligence of the Arctic using ground-, sea- and space-based technologies.

The PRC has used its growing knowledge in attempts to influence Arctic nations. Initially, some were receptive when the distant nation expressed significant interest. But questions over Beijing’s intentions for the region have continued to grow. “People began wondering what it means for China to have a greater presence in the Arctic,” Eiterjord said. “There’s more skepticism now.”

Some of its actions may be revealing. For instance, Chinese and Russian naval forces staged a military exercise in international waters off Alaska in August 2023. Earlier, security concerns spurred calls for tighter regulations after reports that Chinese researchers — who had been working with researchers in Denmark and Sweden — had undisclosed ties to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, The Diplomat reported in June 2022.

“China’s intentions for the region remain opaque,” Royal Netherlands Navy Adm. Rob Bauer, NATO’s Military Committee chair, said at the annual Arctic Circle Assembly in Reykjavik, Iceland, in October 2023. Later that month, he told Bloomberg News: “They haven’t said they won’t go there militarily.”

Melting Ice

Thawing sea ice is opening the Arctic to trade and exploitation of resources. It is increasing the region’s geostrategic significance, a stark difference from its all-but-ignored status a decade or so ago.

Historically, vessels have required icebreaker escorts to navigate the NSR. The melting ice cap is changing that, opening a potential shortcut for trade that avoids congested sea lanes and chokepoints such as the Bab el-Mandeb and Malacca straits, and the Suez Canal.

The Danish merchant ship Nordic Barents in 2010 was the first non-Russian bulk carrier to traverse the NSR. More commercial vessels followed. Chinese demand for Russian oil — sold to Beijing at a discount as Moscow sought to circumvent international oil sanctions imposed after its February 2022 invasion of Ukraine — resulted in a record 75 transits on the NSR in 2023, Norway’s High North News newspaper reported. A total 2.1 million tons of cargo moved on the NSR in 2023, surpassing the previous high in 2021, according to the newspaper.

The Arctic is undergoing a “fundamental shift,” Walt Meier, a scientist at the U.S. National Snow and Ice Data Center, told The Associated Press. Some models predict that Arctic Ocean summers will be ice-free by mid-century, or sooner.

Environmentalists and officials worry that the rush to take advantage of the melting ice could lead to a catastrophe. Indeed, Russia, pressured by Ukraine-related sanctions, authorized two unreinforced oil tankers to transit the NSR to China in September 2023, the Financial Times news service reported.

The environmental group Greenpeace has called for a global ocean treaty to restrict activities in the Arctic Ocean — the planet’s least-protected ocean — as part of a network of sanctuaries.

Arctic Governance

The Arctic Council comprises the eight nations with territory inside the Arctic Circle. All but Russia are NATO members. There are 13 non-Arctic observer states, including the PRC, along with 13 intergovernmental and 12 nongovernmental organizations. Observers participate in meetings and working groups when invited but have no decision-making authority.

Established by the Ottawa Declaration in 1996, the council promotes cooperation, coordination and interaction among Arctic states and Indigenous communities with an emphasis on sustainable development and environmental protection. The council has no jurisdictional authority. Regulatory responsibility rests with individual Arctic nations and international bodies such as the United Nations.

The potential for regular NSR transit — with its promise of significant savings in time and shipping costs — and access to expansive resources is drawing international interest to the region, GNSI reported. The Arctic holds 13% of the world’s oil reserves, 30% of its natural gas, and mineral deposits including aluminum, copper, gold, graphite, gypsum, iron, nickel, platinum, silver, tin and uranium, the research institute said. There also are rare-earth elements needed to manufacture smartphones, laptops and electric vehicles, as well as clean energy and military technology.

Xi emphasizes dual-use technologies and civilian-military fusion, so Chinese advancements in the Arctic likely could also have military purposes, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) think tank reported in April 2023. While the CCP denies military interest in the Arctic, NATO leaders consider it a potential threat. The CCP has militarized sites elsewhere — artificial islands in the South China Sea, for instance — after promising not to do so. The 32-member security alliance and individual Arctic nations are enhancing their force postures in the region. U.S. Marines, for example, practiced cold-weather tactics during exercise Arctic Edge in March 2024.

The PRC’s attempts to establish research centers in the Arctic have received pushback from Denmark, Finland, Greenland and Sweden for national security reasons, CSIS reported, and the U.S. has cautioned other Arctic nations to be wary.

“The threat should not be inflated,” Stephanie Pezard, a political scientist and Arctic security expert at the Rand Corp., said in an article published by the U.S.-based research group in December 2022. “But at the same time, they [the PRC] have a clear intent to not be excluded from Arctic developments as the region becomes more accessible.”

The PRC’s “no-limits” friendship with Russia, proclaimed days before Russia attacked Ukraine, caused a divide within the Arctic Council. Some of the council’s seven NATO members questioned the motives of the PRC and its Arctic proxy Russia. “Left with few options, China is stepping up its investments in Russia as it looks to Moscow as its strategic partner of choice in the Arctic,” CSIS reported.

‘Based on Convenience’

On its surface, the Arctic partnership between Beijing and Moscow appears mutually beneficial. Preoccupied with its protracted and costly war against Ukraine, Russia relies on the PRC to buy its oil, conduct scientific research, build infrastructure and promote the NSR as a viable shipping lane. The PRC, meanwhile, enhances its Arctic expertise while hoping to be considered a regional stakeholder.

Russia’s war in Ukraine is a “golden opportunity” for the PRC, Strider Technologies, a U.S.-based strategic intelligence firm, reported in February 2024. “Our findings reveal a strategic pivot by Russia, marked by decreased government spending and a remarkable policy shift to include the People’s Republic of China … and private sector investment to maintain its Arctic dominance,” said Eric Levesque, the company’s co-founder.

More than 230 Chinese companies registered to operate in Russia’s Arctic territory from January 2022 to June 2023, an 87% increase over 2020 and 2021 combined, Strider reported.

Still, there are rifts in the relationship. Moscow is leery about the PRC gaining too much Arctic influence at its expense. The PRC, meanwhile, is sensitive to how Arctic nations perceive its relationship with Russia and seeks a “close but not too close relationship,” Marc Lanteigne, a professor and Arctic researcher at The Arctic University of Norway, Tromso, told FORUM. While Beijing recognizes Russia’s substantial Arctic presence, he said, it also views Moscow as a declining power not to be entirely trusted. “China has been trying to walk the line. I think it’s finding out it can’t do that,” Lanteigne said.

The PRC has not condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine or joined global sanctions against Russian oil imports. Yet it doesn’t want to aggravate the seven Arctic Council nations that support Ukraine and honor the sanctions.

“The China-Russia relationship is very much based on convenience,” Lanteigne said. “It’s extremely fragile.”

Imperfect Union

The PRC and Russia are among the world’s largest autocracies. They share a 4,184-kilometer border, have a deepening economic relationship, conduct joint military exercises and are among five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council with veto power. Their greatest commonality might be a disdain for the West. 

Their outwardly agreeable stance belies a sometimes-difficult history. Even now, Beijing and Moscow are not natural partners or formal allies, and experts question the strength of their relationship, the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), a New York-based think tank, reported in March 2024. There is mistrust motivated by historical rifts and racism among many Chinese and Russian officials, business leaders and citizens, according to CFR.

During what’s known as the Sino-Soviet split from 1969-89, border disputes between the CCP and the then-Soviet Union included a seven-month military conflict with a major skirmish near Zhenbao Island on the Ussuri River, which divides the countries, in March 1969. There also were disagreements about communist ideology, Russia’s support of India and whether to work with Western nations, CFR reported.

Relations between the two powers slowly stabilized, culminating with the CCP and Russia signing the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation in 2001, about a decade after the Soviet Union’s demise. The relationship strengthened when the CCP declined to condemn the Russian takeover of Crimea in 2014, and again when the party stood down following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

The countries’ trade relationship is asymmetrical, with the PRC having by far the most robust economy though Russia has the most oil-industry experience. Sino-Russian economic cooperation in the Arctic has been limited, and largely based on the fossil fuel trade, Lanteigne said. Though their armed forces train together, there is skepticism about their level of interoperability and the two sides have not fought together, CFR reported. They generally agree on U.N. Security Council matters, at times thwarting efforts to advance international peace and security.

Under President Vladimir Putin, the Kremlin has traditionally strived to keep other nations out of the Arctic. That’s what makes Moscow’s recent acceptance of Beijing’s overtures remarkable, Spohr told The Diplomat.

With Russia sidetracked by its war, the PRC has not moved forward in the Arctic as a single national entity, said Eiterjord, of the Arctic Institute, Tromso. Following the Five-Year Plan in 2021, Chinese provincial governments, companies, ministries and other actors initiated their own Arctic projects in line with Beijing’s broader vision, he said.

While Russia and the CCP share many interests and outlooks, they differ in key respects. Russia remains more insular, while the CCP, with initiatives such as its OBOR scheme and Global Security Initiative, openly seeks to achieve a global hegemony. Yet if the CCP reveals its aggressive approach to the Arctic, it may lose the goodwill of Arctic nations on which its regional future hinges.

“Russia is much more provocative, while China is taking a more careful, long-term approach when it comes to global competition with the West,” Maria Repnikova, an associate professor at Georgia State University who studies comparative authoritarianism in the PRC and Russia, told CFR.

“The PRC wants to be perceived as a responsible power,” Lanteigne said, speaking of its role in the Arctic. “Being linked to Russia doesn’t help that perception.”