Myanmar military on verge of falling from power, analysts say

Dr. Miemie Winn Byrd

The Myanmar military junta faces imminent collapse, even though many analysts believed it was “too big to fail” at the start of the country’s armed resistance to restore democracy. The junta seized power in a February 2021 coup, but the resistance coalition’s ongoing Operation 1027, named for its launch date of October 27, 2023, has weakened the military to an unprecedented degree, analysts say.

The military’s recent loss of the northeastern command headquarters in Lashio, a town of about 150,000 people in the mountainous Shan state, highlights the junta’s weakened condition. The resistance coalition has liberated 75 towns and cities, is fighting to free 75 more and has surrounded 105 others. That leaves fewer than 100 of the nation’s 352 towns (28% of the country) under the military junta’s control as of mid-August 2024, according to the Defense Ministry of the pro-democracy National Unity Government (NUG).

This unforeseen shift in the conflict has shocked those who initially underestimated the resistance, including in neighboring countries such as Bangladesh, India, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Thailand. Those nations misjudged the impact of Myanmar’s decade-long democratic transition and clung to overrated views of the military’s strength.

The conflict has shattered the illusion of the military’s might. Despite having more resources, the once-feared junta is being overpowered by the People’s Defense Forces and ethnic armed organizations (EAO).

The resistance’s resilience and effectiveness are attributed to five factors:

Historic Collaboration: EAOs and the NUG have formed an unprecedented alliance, combining combat experience with strategic insight.

Defections: Significant numbers of defectors from the military and civil service have provided the resistance with crucial insider information and weakened the junta’s operational capabilities.

Popular Support: Widespread support across segments of society has been vital in sustaining and expanding the resistance.

Diaspora Mobilization: The international diaspora has mobilized support and resources, further bolstering the resistance.

Women’s Participation: Women have been instrumental in the movement, constituting an estimated 60% of the resistance.

The PRC, like other neighbors, initially expected the Myanmar military’s superior firepower to ensure its dominance. Beijing engaged with the junta, pressuring northern EAOs to remain neutral. However, the emergence of junta-backed scam hubs and related criminal activities in Myanmar near the Chinese border shifted the PRC’s stance. Tens of thousands of mainly Chinese people have been held hostage in the hubs and forced to defraud victims with internet schemes.

With its interests at stake due to the criminal activities, the PRC stopped pressuring the Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BHA) against launching Operation 1027 to target the junta’s outposts near the nations’ border. The operation, which liberated thousands of trafficked victims, inspired other resistance groups, shifting momentum in favor of the pro-democracy coalition forces and altering Beijing’s perception of the junta’s viability.

The PRC, however, then resumed pressuring the 3BHA to agree to a cease-fire in January 2024. The junta immediately violated the agreement, and the PRC has been unable to enforce the military’s compliance.

Historically, cease-fires with the junta have served as tactical pauses rather than genuine peace efforts. Such pressure tactics foster distrust of the PRC among the Myanmar people.

The PRC now appears to doubt the junta’s chances of victory but remains reluctant to fully support the pro-democracy movement. Beijing is pressuring the junta’s chief, Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, to step down and continues to advocate for a military-administered election under Myanmar’s 2008 Constitution as an exit strategy.

At the outset of the coup, the people of Myanmar rejected the 2008 Constitution, which grants all power to the military and reserves 25% of parliamentary seats for it. Over 90% of the populace is committed to removing the military from politics and exerting civilian control over the armed forces, polls indicate.

After the loss of the command headquarters in Lashio, the junta blamed the PRC for providing lethal support to the 3BHA. Also, the military has sought to further inflame anti-China sentiment by portraying the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, which is primarily ethnically Kokang Chinese and a member of the 3BHA, as Beijing’s proxy invasion force. The junta has organized anti-PRC protests in Yangon and Mandalay.

Simultaneously, the Myanmar pro-democracy diaspora worldwide is protesting Beijing’s support for the pro-junta constitution enacted in 2008 and for continuing the authoritarian regime.

Beijing appears to be out of touch with the sentiments of the Myanmar people if it believes that a military-administered election will bring back stability. The PRC’s attempt to play all sides will likely leave it in a highly unfavorable position with all sides, exacerbating anti-China sentiment among the Myanmar populace.

It would be in the PRC’s long-term interest in Myanmar to align with the people’s desires, adopt a less resistant stance toward democracy and take a more pragmatic approach to resolving the protracted conflict.

Retired U.S. Army Lt. Col. Miemie Winn Byrd is a professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Hawaii.