PRC’s global security initiative contradicts actions
Analyzing the biggest challenges behind the disparity
Dr. Jinghao Zhou
The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) foreign ministry released a paper in February 2023 addressing international security challenges and solutions. The Global Security Initiative (GSI) reflected a speech by Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping 10 months earlier in which he unveiled his GSI proposal. It is imperative that those who question recent CCP actions understand the GSI and respond appropriately.
From National to Global Security
Security entails being free from threats and unauthorized access. It can have economic, financial, political, educational, informational and cyber implications at national, regional and global levels.
A country’s security is a consequence of its power and worldview. When the PRC was established in 1949, it focused on safeguarding national security and preserving its territorial integrity while facing significant economic challenges and remaining isolated from the international community. Being a single-party state, the CCP’s security concept was articulated in its leaders’ speeches and in official documents. The paramount objective in chairman Mao Zedong’s regime was to ensure stability of the Chinese political system. To achieve domestic stability, the CCP put forth the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, which encompassed mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression, noninterference in other nation’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.
The CCP did not push worldwide security initiatives in the early post-Mao era. Instead, the priority was to develop the Chinese economy and enhance domestic living standards to avoid political instability and maintain the government’s legitimacy. Under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership (1978-97), the PRC kept a low-profile foreign policy to improve its relations with the international system led by the United States. In 1990, Deng reiterated to Chinese officials the importance of avoiding confrontation with the West, encouraging them to: “Observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership.” This strategy gave the CCP time to modernize without significant foreign interference. The PRC remained highly pragmatic under the Hu Jintao administration (2002-12), with a strong focus on its domestic economic growth and cultivation of amicable international relations through an approach that encouraged benevolence, partnership and neighborliness.
Two years after the PRC became the world’s second-largest economy in 2010, Xi took office and proclaimed his desire to establish a new type of relationship with the U.S. This strategic alteration was driven by his assessment of the global landscape. Xi believed the world was undergoing a major change in which the East was rising while the West was declining. In May 2014, he proposed a regional security framework that addressed major challenges. It asserted the PRC’s ambitions beyond its borders and signified the Chinese pursuit of a balanced distribution of global power with the U.S. in the East and West.
The PRC’s 2019 white paper, “China’s National Defense in the New Era,” elaborated on Xi’s vision of Asian security. According to the paper, the U.S. had redirected its foreign policy focus toward the Indo-Pacific, adopting a unilateralist approach, intensifying competition among major powers, increasing military expenditures, expediting advancements in defense capabilities and compromising global strategic stability. Given these circumstances, the paper asserted, the CCP was compelled to realign national security priorities to safeguard Asia. Chinese leaders vowed to build the world’s best military force by 2035.
Meanwhile, Xi took steps to establish a new great power relationship. Disappointed with the U.S. response to his vision for national defense, he ultimately aligned with Russia and succumbed to pressure from nationalists at home. Xi in February 2022 declared the PRC’s “no limits” friendship with Russia, shortly before Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine. Perceiving the Russia-Ukraine conflict as an opportunity to counterbalance U.S. dominance, the CCP sought to transform the international security order with an alternative global framework that serves its interests. Xi proposed the GSI a few weeks after the war began. The initiative attempts to position Xi as a global peacemaker, despite criticism that the PRC is providing diplomatic cover for Russia’s invasion.
Similarities and Differences
Both the Chinese foreign ministry’s paper and Xi’s statements contextualize the GSI within an era rife with challenges and hopes. Speaking at the Boao Forum for Asia in April 2022, Xi asserted “changes of the world, of our times and of history are unfolding in ways like never before,” the PRC’s foreign ministry reported. He said the global community must maintain peace and stability, calling the GSI the best means to do so.
The foreign ministry’s paper outlines the GSI’s core principles and six supporting commitments, which include upholding indivisible security, building a balanced and sustainable security architecture, opposing the enhancement of national security by exploiting other countries’ insecurities, promoting common development and security through cooperation, advancing dialogue and consultation to resolve disputes, and improving coordination and cooperation on global security governance.
The GSI aligns with the CCP’s existing security concepts and consolidates Xi’s worldview. The central focus of each is to strengthen Xi’s position in the party. He contends only CCP leaders can ensure domestic development of the socialist system with Chinese characteristics while expanding the PRC’s global influence through economic growth, assertive foreign policy and rejection of Western values.
The evolution of PRC security concepts — from national to regional to global — signifies the nation’s confidence and expresses its intention to pursue great power status. The CCP’s stated goal to promote its brand of global security also forecasts fierce competition with the West.
The CCP plans to extend the GSI as part of its drive toward global dominance. To become a global power, the PRC must reach beyond mainland Asia by breaking through the chain of island nations off its east and south coasts to extend its influence and project power to the Western Pacific and elsewhere.
To further its interests and values, theoretically, the CCP must expand its regional security concept to global security architecture by safeguarding sovereignty, promoting noninterference, advocating for multipolarity, and countering the U.S.-led international order and multilateral treaties. The GSI attempts to legitimize the CCP’s global activism while the nation continues to exert pressure on Taiwan as part of its campaign to isolate the self-governed island diplomatically and militarily, and increase the chances of its annexation by Beijing.
Say One Thing, Do Another
The GSI paper contains ambiguous and abstract terminology along with seemingly fair and justified pledges. Given the historical context of Chinese foreign policy and its implementation, there are valid concerns about the CCP’s credibility. The party often says one thing and does another. Some analysts observe that under Xi, the CCP’s aggressive international behavior counters that espoused in the GSI.
The GSI claims to uphold “the principle of indivisible security,” but the CCP has pursued its interests at the expense of others, such as by building and militarizing artificial reefs and other maritime features in the disputed waters of the South China Sea, and by rejecting an international tribunal’s 2016 ruling in favor of the Philippines’ maritime rights in the sea. The GSI advocates “dialogue and consultation” to solve disputes and conflicts, but the CCP uses coercion and sanctions to punish countries that disagree with its policies, such as imposing trade restrictions on Australia after it called for an investigation into contentions that COVID-19 began in China and detaining Canadian citizens in retaliation for Ottawa’s arrest of a Chinese tech company executive.
The GSI “reject[s] the Cold War mentality,” though the CCP has considered the U.S. an adversary since the Mao era. The GSI advocates “win-win cooperation” and the “principles of mutual respect, equality, [and] mutual benefit” in addressing nontraditional security challenges, but the CCP rejected the World Health Organization’s request to investigate COVID-19’s origin. While the GSI “uphold[s] non-interference in internal affairs” and supports “the independent choices of development paths and social systems made by people in different countries,” the CCP has established more than 100 secret police stations to implement its long-arm jurisdiction in more than 50 countries, especially Western ones. And the CCP supports autocratic and totalitarian regimes’ infringement of individual freedoms while defending its own widespread human rights violations.
The CCP portrays itself as a peacemaker, but it has increased military pressure on neighboring nations, resulting in clashes with India along their disputed border and with the Philippines in contested waters. The CCP’s stance on the Taiwan Strait is far from peaceful. Its massive propaganda campaign and provocative military exercises around Taiwan exemplify its aggressive approach rather than the peaceful resolution it outwardly advocates.
The GSI refuses to acknowledge that Russia invaded Ukraine, evidence that the CCP does not neutrally assess Russian atrocities. Its suggested resolution of that crisis encourages Ukraine to give up its territory in exchange for peace and warns NATO not to defend any countries Russia chooses to invade. The CCP’s peace proposal favors Russia and further victimizes Ukraine. That explains why Russian President Vladimir Putin welcomes the so-called peaceful settlement while Ukraine rejects it.
The GSI depicts the PRC as a problem solver, while casting the U.S. as a troublemaker. But the paper’s pretense, articulated in seemingly neutral and agreeable prose, neither reflects reality nor specifies how the GSI would resolve conflicts among countries with different interests. It lacks substance and feasibility.
Paper Tiger, but Biting
The GSI emphasizes Asia because, in Xi’s view, the region will be “an anchor for world peace, a powerhouse for global growth, and a new pacesetter for international cooperation.” Xi and the GSI call on Indo-Pacific countries to cooperate and leverage the role of regional organizations and gatherings such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the economic grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, the PRC and South Africa (BRICS), the China-Central Asia Summit, and mechanisms of East Asian cooperation. Xi wants to realize his vision of Asian nations handling Asia’s security affairs without outside interference. In this sense, the CCP employs a traditional Chinese military doctrine known as “defense through offense.” By taking an offensive stance, the GSI seeks to achieve defensive objectives and solidify the PRC’s dominant position in Asia while reducing Western influence. Failure to understand the CCP’s approach could mean the U.S. dilutes its global resource allocation and potentially loses deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, the frontline of great power competition.
On the surface, the GSI does not pose an immediate threat to the U.S. and its Allies and Partners. But its underlying intention is seriously challenging. It’s worth noting that the purpose of the CCP’s Asian security concept differs from those of other Asian countries and organizations. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations, for example, advocates peace, stability and cooperation among its 10 member states. Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept supports a rules-based order, respect for international law, freedom of navigation, and open and transparent economic systems. India’s Security and Growth for All in the Region initiative focuses on maritime security, connectivity, sustainable development and enhanced cooperation among Indian Ocean states.
Meanwhile, the GSI proposes a security vision for other parts of the world. It calls for supporting nations in Africa, the Caribbean and Latin America, and promoting peace and stability in the Middle East. Obviously, the CCP is eager to claim a significant role well beyond China’s borders. The GSI provides a strategic platform for it to develop security relationships with more countries to gain influence.
The GSI seeks to help the CCP expand its worldwide ambition through platforms and mechanisms such as the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) infrastructure plan, the SCO, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation and BRICS. The CCP has used BRICS, OBOR and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to promote Chinese currency over the U.S. dollar. It has distributed 582 billion yuan ($81.7 billion) in more than 40 countries and regions. More than 25 countries plan to join BRICS and 30 nations have said they would accept a proposed BRICS currency. Although the U.S. will not lose its global reserve status overnight, the CCP seeks to undermine U.S. supremacy.
The GSI challenges post-World War II security alliances and partnerships by seeking to create division among nations as to how to deal with the PRC. While the leaders of the Group of Seven major industrial nations met in Hiroshima, Japan, in May 2023 to discuss the Russia-Ukraine war and Taiwan tensions, Xi hosted the China-Central Asia Summit and pledged 26 billion yuan ($3.7 billion) in loans and grants to the five other participating nations.
Countering the GSI
Close examination of the GSI’s intent and historical context — as well as the disparity between the CCP’s words and actions — reveals challenges and possible negative consequences. The GSI proposes an international security framework that reflects positively on the PRC, but its diplomatic language obscures the goal of portraying the CCP as the world’s go-to purveyor of security measures. While the GSI is a paper tiger, it seeks to move Xi’s China dream to the world stage at the U.S.’s expense. Nations that question the CCP’s motivations should respond. However, responding effectively entails more than criticizing Xi’s vision. A full understanding of the GSI is needed, along with hard- and soft-power measures to counter its domestic and international security agenda.
The CCP is the greatest challenge to the U.S. and its Allies and Partners and potentially the biggest hindrance to global peace. It would be naive to believe that the CCP will fall in line with nations that uphold a rules-based global order. It’s time to abandon any such illusions about the CCP and take unified action. A competing global security initiative based on firm and coherent policy is needed to counter CCP influence in the Indo-Pacific and other regions prominently mentioned in the GSI: Africa, Latin America and the Middle East. That central task — developing strategies to deal with the CCP in the context of a new international security dynamic — must be the priority.