Fit for Purpose

FORUM Staff  |  Photos by AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE DEPARTMENT

The mission was critical; the timeline telling: Conduct a comprehensive review of Australia’s defense strategy and force posture — perhaps the nation’s most consequential such analysis in more than three decades — and issue recommendations within six months, rather than the 18 months typical for such an undertaking. “Now that’s a tall order,” said retired Air Chief Marshal Sir Angus Houston, co-lead of the Defence Strategic Review, who served as head of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) during his 41-year military career. “But such is the urgency of our strategic circumstances, we needed to do this very, very quickly.”

Those conditions “have been going downhill for a long time, and I would characterize them as the worst strategic circumstances certainly in my lifetime,” Houston told an audience at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in May 2023, weeks after the release of a 110-page unclassified version of the review. Among the factors fundamentally reshaping Australia’s defense: a regional giant’s opaque military buildup; growing use of coercion as a state tactic; rapid transformation of emerging technologies into military capabilities; proliferating nuclear weapons; and the heightened risk of a catastrophic miscalculation.

That combustible combination threatens to upend “40 years of peace, stability and prosperity” in the Indo-Pacific, Houston said at the Washington, D.C.-based think tank. Meanwhile, in an age of long-range missiles and hypersonic weapons — let alone cyber and space-based threats and attacks — Australia’s natural defensive barriers of distance and ocean no longer seem so insurmountable, and “warning time for conventional conflict for the first time in my experience had been assessed as going below 10 years,” Houston said of ADF projections of how long an adversary would need to launch a major attack against the country from the time intent is established. 

For a half-century, Australia’s defense policy has been “aimed at deterring and responding to potential low-level threats from a small or middle power in our immediate region,” Houston and former Defence Minister Stephen Smith wrote in their review. “This approach is no longer fit for purpose.” The ADF “must be able to hold an adversary at risk further from our shores.”

“The strategic risks we face require the implementation of a new approach to defence planning, force posture, force structure, capability development and acquisition,” noted the review, which was presented in classified form to the government in February 2023, six months after Houston and Smith began their assessment. “We aim to change the calculus so no potential aggressor can ever conclude that the benefits of conflict outweigh the risks. This is how Australia contributes to the strategic balance of power that keeps the peace in our region, making it harder for countries to be coerced against their interests.”

‘STRATEGY OF DENIAL’ 

The review presents whole-of-government recommendations encompassing all domains of defense — air, land, maritime, cyber and space — including transitioning from a joint force designed to respond to a range of contingencies to an integrated force focused on the most significant risks and more reflective of the emergence of cyber and space as arenas for potential conflict.

“The development of a strategy of denial for the ADF is key in our ability to deny an adversary freedom of action to militarily coerce Australia and to operate against Australia without being held at risk,” the review stated, calling for the acquisition and development of long-range strike capabilities such as the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) and the Precision Strike Missile, which would extend the range of the Australian Army’s weapons beyond 500 kilometers. Additionally, the review supports integration of the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile on F-35A Joint Strike Fighter and F/A-18F Super Hornet aircraft, as well as accelerated development of the MQ-28A Ghost Bat drone, which can integrate with crewed and uncrewed aircraft and space-based capabilities.

“A strategy of denial for the ADF must focus on the development of anti-access/area denial capabilities (A2AD),” the review noted. “Anti-access capabilities are usually long-range and designed to detect an adversary and prevent an advancing adversary from entering an operational area. Area-denial capabilities are shorter range and designed to limit an adversary’s freedom of action within a defined operational area. A2AD is often synonymous with long-range strike capability, undersea warfare and surface-to-air missiles.” 

As part of the nation’s maritime defense upgrades, development of a fleet of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines is “an absolute imperative,” Houston said at CSIS. The vessels can travel farther and faster and are stealthier than diesel-powered submarines. In partnership with the United Kingdom and the United States, the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) is expected to receive its first domestically built nuclear-powered submarine in the early 2040s. Before then, Australian civilian and military personnel will embed with the U.K. and U.S. navies for training. “We’ve got to do it as quickly as we can,” Houston said.

Houston and Smith also recommended an independent analysis of the RAN’s surface combatant fleet to ensure its capabilities complement those of the planned nuclear-powered submarines. With the nation almost entirely reliant on seaborne trade, including for petroleum and other liquid fuels, maritime operations are central to defense planning, according to Mark Watson, director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s (ASPI) Washington, D.C, office. “We need to stop any nation choking off our maritime approaches and our sea lanes. Australia is a maritime country. If someone shuts that down, we’re in a world of hurt,” Watson told National Defense magazine in May 2023. “We need to keep those approaches open, and that means having the ability to challenge anybody who may wish to shut that down.”

The Australian government has committed about $13 billion through 2027 to implement the half-dozen immediate priorities identified in the review, including nuclear-powered submarines and long-range strike capabilities, as well as enhanced base infrastructure in the nation’s north. Overall, defense spending is projected to reach 2.3% of gross domestic product within a decade, up from about 2%. “Central to the security of Australia is the collective security of our region,” the Defence Department stated. “Importantly, there is additional funding for key defence partnerships in the Indo-Pacific.”

‘IMPACTFUL PROJECTION’

The proposed transformation of the 85,000-member ADF mirrors a regional trend as Indo-Pacific forces adapt to acute security challenges, many of them shared:

Japan’s new National Security Strategy, adopted in late 2022, calls for doubling defense spending through 2027, including to develop counterstrike capabilities. Tokyo cited North Korea’s unprecedented barrage of missile tests in violation of United Nations sanctions, including at least one rocket launched over northern Japan, as well as the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) assertive actions around the Japanese-controlled Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. “It is a clear change to how Japan thinks of defense and an indication of the evolved Indo-Pacific threat landscape,” Yuka Koshino, a research fellow for security and technology policy at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, told FORUM.

Beijing’s aggression in the disputed South China Sea prompted the Philippine military to shift its focus from internal security to territorial defense as it modernizes its arsenal with multilaunch rocket and land-based missile systems. “If any invaders come near the land of the Philippines or inland, your [Army] is ready to defend the nation,” Gen. Romeo Brawner, chief of the nation’s Armed Forces, said in early 2023.

Among the catalysts for the strategic shifts underway in Australia and elsewhere, one looms large, clouding the region’s future. The PRC’s military buildup is now “the largest and most ambitious of any country” since World War II, the Defence Strategic Review noted. In 2022, Beijing increased its nuclear arsenal by nearly 20%, adding 60 warheads — more than any other nation, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

“This buildup is occurring without transparency or reassurance to the Indo-Pacific region of China’s strategic intent,” Houston and Smith wrote. “China’s assertion of sovereignty over the South China Sea threatens the global rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific in a way that adversely impacts Australia’s national interests. China is also engaged in strategic competition in Australia’s near neighborhood.”

The contest for regional influence came into sharp focus in early 2022 when the PRC signed a security pact with the Solomon Islands, a nation of 700,000 people with no military that has long leaned on Australia for security and policing. The secretive deal raised the specter of a permanent Chinese military presence in the South Pacific, a prospect that rattled the region despite denials from Beijing and Honiara. While more than 4,000 kilometers separate northern Australia from mainland China, the Solomon Islands sit 1,600 kilometers northeast of Townsville, Queensland, home to an RAAF base and an ADF training area.

“People’s Liberation Army (PLA) force-projection capabilities have grown dramatically in the past two decades and include long-range conventional ballistic missiles, bombers and advanced surface combatants that have already transited through Australian waters,” according to “Impactful projection — Long-range strike options for Australia,” a December 2022 report by ASPI. 

“The ‘worst case’ scenario for Australia’s military strategy has always been the prospect of an adversary establishing a presence in our near region from which it can target Australia or isolate us from our partners and allies. PLA strike capabilities in the archipelago to our north or the Southwest Pacific, whether on ships and submarines or land-based missiles and aircraft, would be that worst case.”

ENHANCING STATECRAFT 

As they restructure their defense forces for such eventualities, like-minded nations also are fortifying longtime alliances and fostering new partnerships to amplify capabilities for collective benefit — a vision that employs diplomatic engagement as a force multiplier. “The statecraft needs to really lift to a new level so that we can engage all the small countries in the South Pacific, all of the nations in our region and Southeast Asia, and, of course, our very important partners the United States, the Quad partners [India, Japan and the U.S.], and a whole raft of bilateral, trilateral and many-lateral relationships that we have,” Houston said at CSIS. “We’ve really got to get out there and use the opportunities.”

In late 2022, Australia and the island nation of Vanuatu signed a partnership covering border security, policing, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), cybersecurity, and maritime and aviation safety and security. “It reflects Australia and Vanuatu’s ongoing commitment to working together as members of the Pacific family to address shared security challenges,” Australian Defence Minister Richard Marles said in a statement.

Canberra also signed a security deal with neighboring Papua New Guinea (PNG), which recently reached a defense cooperation agreement with Washington that allows U.S. forces to deploy from bases in the island nation, including for security assistance and HADR missions. “We’ve had a long, long relationship with Papua New Guinea. We’ve always provided them with assistance to develop their Defence Force,” Houston said at CSIS. “But going forward there are capabilities that they want to develop, and we need to invest in those capabilities. For example, an air capability. And we think there’s great scope to develop an air wing that will be very useful to them. We already provide them with patrol boats, but we probably need to develop even further the sort of support that we provide.

“And the other thing is we need to exercise with all of these countries,” he said. “And Papua New Guinea is a very challenging environment, as we saw in the Second World War. And I think exercises [there] will be very valuable to developing the sort of capability we need and also providing everybody involved with familiarity with a very demanding and challenging environment.”

LINKED BY VALUES

Two months after Houston spoke, PNG Defence Force personnel deployed across the 150-kilometer-wide Torres Strait — once a land bridge connecting their island nation to the northern tip of the Australian continent — to join Talisman Sabre, a multilateral exercise led by Australia and the U.S. The largest-ever iteration of the exercise, which has been held biennially since 2005, drew 34,500 personnel from 13 nations to training areas and other sites across Australia, including in the Northern Territory and Queensland. Drills included amphibious landings, air combat and maritime operations, and ground force maneuvers to enhance interoperability and readiness.

Talisman Sabre embodies an Australia-U.S. alliance steeled to face any crisis, officials say. The nations’ forces have fought together in conflicts since World War I, and Canberra and Washington signed a mutual defense agreement in 1951. “Our Alliance with the United States is becoming even more important to Australia,” the Defence Strategic Review noted.

In that regard, the review represents “almost a defense revolution,” said Charles Edel, a senior advisor and Australia chair at CSIS who hosted the think tank’s conversation with Houston. “The big deal here is that one of our closest and most trusted allies is significantly changing its orientation and, in many ways, the purpose of its defense strategy and its defense forces in ways that will complement and augment American power in the region,” Edel told National Defense.

At CSIS, Houston underscored the need for Australia to enhance its alliance with the U.S. “That also includes basically the rotational presence of the United States in Australia. We should further develop that,” he said. “We obviously need to be as self-reliant as we can. But given our circumstances, we need that alliance. And the alliance, by the way, has served us very well through many, many years.”

Those strategic circumstances, Houston and Smith emphasized in their review, demand that Australia deploy all elements of national power, including alliances and partnerships, “to shape a region that is open, stable and prosperous: a predictable region, operating by agreed rules, standards and laws, where sovereignty is respected.”